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SUMMARY
This essay concerns the possibility of a
critical discourse/practice that will not be immed-
iately and unproblematically appropriated by that which
it attempts to critique. Chapters one and two estab-
lish the problems of the possibility of such a dis-
course/practice as those of economy, traversed by re-
lations of power and desire. They also explicate the
matter of economy as a relationship between identity,
difference and opposition. Saussure's work on ling-
uistic economy is presented as a metaphysical phallo-
centrism and Derrida's work on Saussure's economics
is presented as a critical feminism that is not appro-
priated by that which it attempts to critique.
In addition to being the constituent parts
of economy, identity, difference and opposition are
'also' the ingredients of dialectics. Chapter three,
therefore, begins the task of elucidating the 'origins'
of this critical feminism in the works of Hegel and
Nietzsche. The task of showing how such a critical
position is possible by looking at its philosophical
development is continued in chapter four by examining
the work of Heidegger and Adorno. Adorno's inclusion
in this chapter permits the comparison of contemporary
French criticism with another strand of critical
thought that has been influenced by Hegelian dialectics,
German ~arxist theory.
Chapter five recapitulates the themes of
chapters one and two by looking again at the work of
Oerrida on economy. Chapter six deals with how power
operates and is operated upon by looking at the work
of Foucault. And chapter seven explains the workings
of desire within and between phallocentric and feminist
economy by looking at the work of Oeleuze and Guattari.
The various (Nietzschean) operations performed by these
thinkers upon the manifestations of identity in economy,
power and desire are shown to be feminist in that they
are concerned to show how that which is irreducibly
different ultimately escapes being reduced to self-pre-
sent identity.
Having accounted, 'philosophically' per-
haps, for the workings of economy that are labelled
'feminist' and 'phallocentric', the essay then looks
at how the various issues raised are to be found in the
more 'concrete' work 'of psychoanalysis on female sex-
uality. In order to do this, the 'tension' between
centric and ec- centric economy, between phallocentrism
and feminism, as it is found in the work of Freud and
Gallop is examined in chapter eight.
The concern with more recognisably femin-
ist matters is continued in chapter nine. In the light
of the nature of economy, power and desire, the various
strategies that are available to feminism in the attempt
to critique phallocentrism are elucidated and their
chances of avoiding being appropriated by that phallo-
centrism are assessed. Of the three forms of feminist
strategy, only deconstructive feminism is seen to avoid
being rendered harmless by phallocentric economy.
Chapter ten summarises the arguments used,
provides an account of the second sense of 'possibility'
and articulates the essay's own position with regard
to a critical feminism.
iPREFACE
The Examiners of this thesis, Doctor
Christine Battersby and Doctor Christopher Norris,
have suggested that both a 'Preface' and an 'After-
word' be appended to it. The 'Preface' is to
clarify the relation between 'vulgar' and 'non-
vulgar' feminism and to comment on the choice of
such a vocabulary. It is also to refer forward to
the points they suggest are made in the 'Afterword'.
They suggest that the 'Afterword' deal first with
the existence of other readings of Nietzsche and
second with some more aspects of the relation bet-
ween 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism.
The distinction between 'vulgar' and
'non-vulgar' feminism is introduced on page one.
The choice of such a vocabulary derives from Der-
rida's use of it in the essays "Ousia and Gramme",
(where he refers to a 'vulgar' or metaphysical con-
~
cept of time), and "Linguistics and Gramm",tology",
(where he refers to a 'vulgar' or metaphysical con-
cept of writing). It cannot be, and clearly has not
been, emphasised enough that, whatever the popular
and unfortunate connotations of these words, 'vul-
gar' is not conceived in this essay as having any
simple derogatory meaning and 'non-vulgar' is not
conceived as having any simple superior status.
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In "Linguistics and Grammatology", for
example, Derrida is dealing with the treatment tra-
ditionally afforded speech and writing in Western
thought. With a few significant exceptions, speech
is privileged above writing: speech is considered
to be 'better' in some way than writing. 'Vulgar'
and 'non-vulgar' are not related as speech and
writing.
One of the things Derrida is trying to do
in this essay is to show that within speech, indeed
essential to it, are the very characteristics of
writing that are supposed to justify the latter's
subordinate status in Western metaphysics. In
order to do this, Derrida makes use of the 'concept'
arche-ecriture. He does not say that the original
(and 'vulgar') metaphysical concept of writing
should be privileged above speech by means of a rever-
sal. Nor does he say that all mention of both speech
and writing should be refused because it is meta-
physical.
Arche-ecriture is neither speech nor wri-
ting in the senses intended by metaphysics. It 'is',
rather, the non-full, non-simple 'origin' of both.
As such, it is 'non-vulgar'. However, to the ex-
tent arche-ecriture must have recourse to the logic,
syntax and conceptual frameworks of Western meta-
physics, it must also be 'vulgar'. At this point,
'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' can themselves be seen to
be undecidable. That the distinction can be of
iii
strategic use only becomes clear. 'Vulgar' and
'non-vulgar' feminism are related in this way and
should be read sous rature as suggested on page
one.
The vocabulary 'vulgar'/'non-vulgar' is
of purely strategic use since the workings of ec-
centric economy preclude any 'proper' use. Some
such vocabulary must be used since there can be no
completely non-metaphysical language and any other
vocabulary that was used to do the work that 'vul-
gar'/'non-vulgar' is attempting to do would be
subject to these considerations. If, as argued in
this essay, an essential part of the 'non-vulgar'
is the 'vulgar' then there can be no completely
'non-vulgar' language or, indeed, practice.
Thus 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' are not
intended to represent a simple 'good'/'bad' oppo-
sition or dichotomy. The ultimate undecidability
of the difference between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar'
feminisms is studied in more detail in Chapter Nine
and also in the 'Afterword', where these matters
reappear in the guise of questions about alterna-
tive readings of Nietzsche, strategy and the telos
of feminist practices.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINISM I
This essay concerns the possibility of
a critical or transgressive discourse that will not
be immediately and unproblematically appropriated by
that which it attempts to critique or transgress.
For want of a better word and for reasons that ~ill
be outlined in due course, this discourse will be
termed 'feminism'. However, following Spivakl, 'fem-
inism' in this sense should perhaps be written and
should certainly be read sous rature in order to dis-
tinguish it from the manifold and more or less 'vul-
gar,2 versions of feminism to be dealt with in chap-
ter nine as illustrating the sundry forms of critic-
al strategy.
Feminism may be loosely and provision-
ally defined as the attempt to account for, critique
and thereby transform the value or status of women
in society. However, beginning with readings of Sau-
ssure and of Oerrida's reading of Saussure, this essay
intends to show first that the problems with which
feminism is concerned are problems of economy, that
the workings of economy are traversed by relations of
power and desire and that feminism's problems are to
be found in places that would not, at first sight,
seem to be appropriate to feminism as defined above.
That is, this essay will establish the
matter of economy as a relationship between identity,
2difference and some form of opposition. Identity,
difference and opposition being the basic and clas-
sical ingredients of thought and language, the essay
~ill demonstrate that feminism's problems are ulti-
mately those concerning ~hat have, less classically,
been called the 'limits' of thought and language,
the 'limits' of philosophy and metaphysics.
It may appear 'arbitrary~ and to that
extent 'improper', to call such a discourse feminist
insofar as what is to be critiqued and transformed
is not only a 'masculine' organisation of the prod-
uction of value, identity, difference and opposition,
but also solidary with white and bourgeois interests,
for example. That is, identity, value and the priv-
ilege that is founded upon that identity and value
are to be found elsewhere (everywhere). They are to
be found in race relations, politics, the treatment
of the unemployed, the old and the mentally and phy-
sically handicapped and disabled, for example.
However, it will be shown that it is
only a certain form of economy, what will be referred
to as centred economy, and which has been tradition-
ally or vulgarly associated with white, bourgeois and
male interests, that accords a strategic privilege to
the values of identity, self-presence and what is pro-
per to that identity. A position adopted with regard
to economy, to identity, difference and opposition,
that is not different and opposed to centred economy
in the ways that difference and opposition are organ-
ised in centred economy will not, thus, be an identity
3that is proper to or appropriate to any particular
sphere.
Such a position, it will be shown, is
that of a non-vulgar feminism, a discourse/practice
that will not be immediately and unproblematically
appropriated by that which it attempts to critique
and transform. And, while it may be arbitrary and
to that extent improper to call a discourse that is
different and opposed to centric economy, the vulgar
masculine concern, a feminism, it is no more and no
less so than calling it anything else. That is, it
would be 'innapropriate' (and not, thereby, all the
more appropriate) to speak of such a position or dis-
course being proper to any area (sex, race, class or
whatever) since it would not willingly participate
in an economy in which the values of identity, self-
presence and property were privileged.
In addition to these, there are a num-
ber of other reasons as to why such a discourse/prac-
tice will be referred to as a non-vulgar feminism.
First, as popularly conceived and practised, femin-
ism seems to have been possessed of more critical
energy and to have achieved rather more than any of
the other '-isms' that are concerned to deal with the
lot of marginal groups. Second, and perhaps related
to the first, feminists often conceive their tasks
as being vitally connected to other, not always ob-
viously or especially feminist, concerns or issues.
These feminists argue that all manner of issues, from
4the nuclear debates to, precisely, the position of
other disadvantaged groups within society, are fem-
inist concerns.
That there can be no final authority
determining the proper limits of feminism ultimately
obliges even the most vulgar feminism to recognise
its involvement in these 'other' areas. Such a con-
dition may be dealt with in a number of ways. Culler
notes that '"women's studies" is the name now applied
to many fundamental questions of personal freedom and
social justice,3. And Eagleton argues that the lib-
eration of other repressed groups is a condition for
the emancipation of women4• This essay will show
that the 'liberation' of 'other' repressed groups is
'the same' issue as that of the emancipation of women
in that the discourse/practice that will transgress
the state in which such repression occurs itself ques-
tions talk of 'the proper' concerns of feminism.
And thirdly, it will be shown that a non-
vulgar feminism consists in a particular relation to
difference; it affords a peculiar treatment to the
'opposition' or 'gap' between terms which is constit-
utive of economy. Economy, the relationship between
identity, difference and opposition, is one of the
central concerns of this essay and as such the treat-
ment of difference will be of crucial and strategic
importance at a number of places. Thus the issues
surrounding a non-vulgar feminism, like those surroun-
ding differance or any of the other 'non-synonymic
substitutions'S that replace it, arise at various
5points at which the different ways of dealing with
difference are found.
In order to introduce these problems
and in order to establish feminism's problems as
those of economy, power and desire, this chapter will
consider an issue that is of concern to contemporary
feminism - the question as to whether theoretical
discourse has any legitimate role to play in the
women's movements.
In her essay "Enslaved Enclave", Clement
tells of the women who interrupted the speeches at
the 1975 Week of Marxist Thought with shouts and
'piercing cries of "Hey, Heyn,6. She explains that
the women who thus interrupted considered articulated
speech and theoretical discourse to be practices which
were intrinsic or proper to the position of 'the man':
theory and articulated speech are somehow male prop-
erty, deriving any value they have from a male domin-
ated system of values and used to ensure both the con-
tinued existence of that system and the subjection of
women and female values within it. If a male domin-
ated system of values has privileged theoretical dis-
course and if men have used that discourse to domin-
ate women, to ensure their secondary status within
society, then these women hold that a properly femin-
ist gesture is to oppose that system through the inter-
rupting of theoretical discourse with a form of speech
that has been undervalued and held to be a properly
feminine form of speech, non-sensical, emotional and
6shouted speech.
Cl~ment comments, '"Be a feminist and
shout"; an unchanged variant of "Be beautiful and
keep your tongue"'. She suggests, that is, that to
shout in this way is not necessarily a properly or
specifically feminist gesture, it is simply the re-
verse of the traditional male dictate that women be
seen to be beautiful and not heard. As simply the
reversal of this demand, Clement claims that the val-
ue or meaning of shouting in this way derives from
its place ~ithin a male dominated or phallocentric
system of values. She thus implies that to attempt
to oppose a phallocentric economy by means of the
interrupting of theoretical discourse with impassion-
ed and angry shouting is not a properly feminist ac-
tivity. What is experienced as the domination of
women by men through the exercise of theoretical dis-
course will not be ended, she suggests, by the exer-
cise of shouted speech when it is a male dominated
system of values that defines the value of shouted
speech 'in the first place'.
Now the question arises as to what would
be the or an appropriately feminist gesture. Are
theory and articulated speech only valued in an eco-
nomy in which the value of women is said to be infer-
ior to that of men? If they are, in virtue of what?
What are the issues over ~hich such a question could
be decided? The question also arises, precisely, as
to whether there !! or could be a properly feminist
7response. Apart from the problem as to whether the
very idea of there being properties or the appropriate
does not only derive any value it may have from within
a male dominated economy, the question as to the nat-
ure of articulated speech still requires an answer.
For if, on the one hand, theory and ar-
ticulated speech do only derive any value they have
from their place within phallocentric economy, then
it is not immediately obvious whether to refuse and
interrupt such discourse by shouting is not to leave
basically secure the initial and objectionable state
of affairs. Simply to reverse the status of two cat-
egories of speech, as CI~ment suggests, does little
to damage a male dominated economy when it is the or
a male oriented principle that ultimately defines or
regulates the value of the categories to begin with.
And if, on the other hand, theory and articulated
speech are not inevitably and properly masculine ac-
tivities, then women may use them in the identifica-
tion and discussion of their problems without being
specifically or properly anything other than language
users.
The question of the possibility of fem-
inism and of the problems that feminism faces are
problems of economy. The question of the possibility
of feminism may be described as the question 'How can
the value of feminist gestures be produced in anything
but phallocentric economy and still remain in any way
both critical and feminist?'. And the problems that
8feminism faces may be described as asking how to ac-
count for the value and status of women as they have
been produced in economy. It was also claimed above
that there is a further aspect to economy and its
relation to feminism that must be explained in deal-
ing with these questions. Although they are not to
be considered as separate operations, the value of
women has not only been produced, it has also been
legitimated. The value of women, as it has been pro-
duced in economies, has appeared and been experienced
as being legitimate, as justified or appropriate.
Thus in the production of value and identity, power
and desire are being exercised and satisfied in the
regulation of a certain form of economy.
That is, if, as in the example above,
it is claimed that theoretical discourse is employed
by men to consigni women to a position of inferiority
and to justify men's positions of dominance, then it
would appear that power is being employed on the one
hand to effect the satisfaction of the desire to dom-
inate women and on the other to justify the subordin-
ate position of women. Three of the many women who
are concerned with the sexual balance of power and
whose work might be cited here include Dworkin, Mil-
let and de Beauvoir. In her work on pornography,
Dworkin asserts that 'male power [isJ expressed in
pornography' and that pornography is one of the means
by which men exercise their power to subjugate women?
Similarly, Millet, in her Sexual Politics, sets out
9to examine the power relations between men and women
as they are found in literary works and which illus-
8trate the control of ~omen by men. And deBeauvoir
asks in the introduction to The Second Sex, '~hence
comes ••• submission in the case of women?' and won-
ders why women do not dispute what she calls male
'sovereignty,9.
If what feminism identifies as the domin-
ation of women by men cannot by its nature be unmot-
ivated, then male desire is satisfied in or through
that domination and male power is exercised in order
to achieve and legitimate that domination. In that
deBeauvoir also wonders why women do not dispute this
sovereignty, the question as to why women do not des-
ire to remove themselves from the situations in which
they find themselves may be raised. With regard to
desire, Firestone refers to the way that the 'self-
containment of the other creates desire' and goes on
to affect fundamentall~ and to the detriment of women,
relations between the sexeslO•
Thus it is claimed that, even on this
crude and naive level, power and desire may be seen
as constitutive elements of economy, of the way in
which identity, value and status are produced and leg-
itimated. It is claimed that without power and desire
economy would not operate. Since it appears to be
the case that desires are being satisfied in legiti-
mating a certain view of the proper status of women
and that a certain power is being exercised to legi-
timate that value or status, feminism and an account
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of the possibility of that feminism must deal with
power and desire as they are found in economy •
•••
Thus this essay intends to deal with
the workings of economy and with the roles of power
and desire in those workings in order to elucidate
the problems noted above concerning the possibility
of feminism. Having shown that feminism's problems
are those of economy, power and desire, chapter two
will establish the idea of economy as a matter of a
relationship between identity, difference and oppo-
sition and introduce the workings of power and des-
ire into that relationship.
In explaining the workings of economy
as a relationship between identity, difference and
some form of opposition, traversed by relations of
power and desire, this chapter will provide some idea
of the nature and limits of the difference between
phallocentric or metaphysical and de- or ec- centric
feminist economy. For essentially pedagogical pur-
poses, it will be claimed that centric economy (and
the versions of power and desire to be found there)
is vulgarly masculine and that de- or ec- centric
economy (and the versions of power and desire to be
found there) is non-vulgarly feminine or feminist.
So, looking first at Saussure's account
of the production of value, chapter two will
11
establish the idea of economy as a relation between
identity, difference and some form of opposition
and introduce the various versions of power and
desire as part of that relation. It will thus be
possible, in chapters three and four, to discuss the
problems of feminism as they are exemplified as the
'limits' of thought and language, the 'limits' of
philosophy and metaphysics. The work of Hegel,
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno will be used to pro-
vide an account of how the basic and classical ingred-
ients of thought and language are matters for femin-
ism.
That is, it will be noted that dialec-
tics is, amongst other things, the thought of a rel-
ation between identity, difference and opposition.
Thus chapter three will begin by outlining Hegel's
account of economics, as that account is found in
The Science of Logic and The Phenomenology of Mind
before going on to consider Nietzsche's work as a
sort of critique of that account. Similarly, chap-
ter four will look at Heidegger's response to the work
of Hegel and Nietzsche as well as providing a chance
for the comparison of this work with one of the more
sophisticated versions of another strand of critical
thought influenced by Hegel; the Marxist tradition
as it appears in Adorno's negative dialectics. The
role of Nietzsche in Adorno's thought will be seen
to provide the crucial difference between negative
dialectics and the relation of contemporary French
philosophy to dialectics.
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Having outlined Hegel's account of the
relations between identity, difference and opposition
and having elucidated the versions of power and des-
ire that this account represents, the responses of
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno will be examined.
The antics of these philosopers 'at the limits' of
thought and language, of philosophy and metaphysics,
will thus be discussed in terms of a relation to the
or a possible feminism. Such a discussion will also
provide a sort of genealogy of the thinkers to be
elucidated in chapters five, six and seven in that
again it is Nietzsche, Heidegger and Hegel who are
decisive for the positions that Derrida, Foucault and
Deleuze and Guattari adopt.
On the basis of this discussion of Hei-
degger and Adorno, then, chapters five, six and seven
will elucidate the various Nietzschean operations per-
formed by Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari
upon the manifestations of identity in economy. power
and desire. Recapitulating, repeating and developing,
what was said in chapter two, these operations will
be seen to be feminist in that they are concerned to
show how feminist economy is 'domesticated' or redu-
ced to form restricted or centred economy and to show
how the work of the irreducibly different and thus
threatening values that are excluded from the self-
present identity of the privileged term in centred
economy at once constitutes and subverts that iden-
tity.
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Chapter eight will deal with more con-
ventional or recognisably feminist concerns in order
to show how the issues discussed in the preceding
chapters manifest themselves in what might be called
more concrete economies. The theoretical labours of
Freud on female sexuality will be shown to be a ver-
sion of phallocentric economy, involving the repres-
entation and constitution of a particular (phallocen-
tric) disposition of power/desire. Gallop's reading
and discussion of Lacan will be used to provide a
link bet~een the concerns of the previous chapters
with identity, difference and opposition, those of
this chapter and those of the following chapter with
strategy.
Given all this, chapter nine will des-
cribe the various strategies that are available to
the critique of the production of value. The possi-
bility of a transgressive or critical discourse that
is not rendered harmless and unproblematically assi-
milated by that which it attempts to critique will
be discussed in this chapter in terms of the forms
of strategy that follow a priori from the nature of
economy. These various strategies' chances of suc-
cess in transgressing and transforming the production
of value, which has itself been seen to be a matter
for feminism, will be evaluated in this chapter, also
in terms of the nature of economy, in terms, that is,
of the sorts of problems that a feminism worth the
name would have to deal with.
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The conclusion, chapter ten, will
summarise the arguments of the essay and provide
an account of the second sense of the 'possibility'
of the subtitle. This second sense will be seen to
relate to the possibile uses of feminist strategy,
as the essay has elucidated it, in other areas in
which marginal groups are accorded supplementary
status. The conclusion will also provide an account
of the essay's own relation to a possible non-vulgar
feminism by means of a discussion of the various
differences or dichotomies in terms of which this
work itself makes sense.
The next chapter will introduce the
matter of economy as a relation between identity,
difference and some form of opposition.
CHAPTER TWO
ECONOMY: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND OPPOSITION
Looking at Saussure's account of eco-
nomy, and at Derrida's account of Saussure, this
chapter ~ill introduce and establish the idea of
economy as a metter of a relationship bet~een iden-
tity, difference and opposition. The constitutive
role(s) of po~er and desire in the production and
legitimation of value will be introduced in terms
of the apparent 'innocence' of Saussure's notion of
the diacritlcity of the linguistic sign. And the
distinction, ~hich ~ill immediately have to be qual-
ified, between centric or phallocentric and de- or
ec- centric (feminist) economy, will be introduced
by ~ay of a discussion of the will to identity as
a codification of power/disposition of desire.
That is, where the value of the sign
is apparently generated in the de- or ec- centric
economy of exchange or (pure) difference, it will
be shown that there is ultimately a privileged term
or value that is supposed to be outside that diacrit-
icity and which, in sovereign fashion, governs the
production of linguistic value. The position of the
privileged term is, it will be shown, one of sover-
eign power and the result of a certain disposition
of desire: Saussure's diacriticity is not at all
innocent. This chapter will thus provide the basis
16
for the readings of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and
Adorno in chapters three and four and for the recap-
itulation of the themes to be discussed in this chap-
ter in chapters five, six and seven •
•••
However, before looking in more philo-
sophical detail at the workings of economy and at
the role{s) of power and desire in those workings,
a brief excursion into various dictionaries will be
made in order to show the etymological and semantic
relations bet~een economy, power and desire.
Of the many senses of 'value', the Ox-
ford English Dictionary gives 'worth', 'desirability',
'purchasing power', 'equivalent' and, from biology,
'rank in classification'. It also refers, via the
feminine past participle of the French valoir (to be
worth) to the Latin valere. From the Oxford Latin
Dictionary, it appears the the Romans had a better
word for it, valere including among its senses 'to
be strong or able', 'to have power', 'to prevail',
'to be worth', 'to mean' and 'to be valid'. Resis-
ting for the moment the temptation to make much of
the idea of some originary feminine past in which
women were worthy, powerful and valid citizens which
has been superceded by a present in which they are
second class and non-participant citizens of little
worth and power, it should be evident that what is
17
perhaps a surprising variety of ideas is involved in
our word for value.
Apart from the more obvious tautologies
entailed by saying that to be valued or valuable is
to be worth something, it appears that to say to be
powerful or authoritative and to be desired or desir-
able are also to say things that, if not quite the
same, are at least very similar and closely related.
The notion of value refers, then, to the constitut-
ion and satisfaction of desire and to the possession
and exercise of power.
If, on the other hand, it is suggested
that a concise definition of economy today ~ould be
that it is the organisation or structure of relations
between individuals, institutions and practices by
means of which value, in the form of goods (commodi-
ties) and services, is produced and distributed ac-
cording to various fluctuating conditions of supply
and demand, then it should come as less of a surprise
to note that the Greek oikos nomos, from which 'eco-
nomy' is derived, indicates the management of the
household.
Dikos nomos thus refers to the complex
of familial relations, involving the heads or elders
of families, their wives, husbands and offspring,
paid or unpaid domestic staff and so on. It also
refers to the ways in which those members and their
resources or abilities interrelate in the running of
the household, in the deployment and expenditure of
the family's accumulated wealth and according to
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their various needs and desires.
In the word 'economy', then, there is
reference to the possession and exercise of power -
to the experience of dominance and subordinance,
that of the head of the household over the other
members and their staff, for example. Within the
oikos nomos, the relative rank of the members of the
housebold is constituted and legitimated or made pro-
per, then, in addition to the regulation of the order
and preference of the household's needs and desires
and the expenditure of its resources and property.
So, positions of relative power are determined in
the oikos nomos, as are equivalences, properties and
whose word is meaningful or valid since they are pos-
itions of power that determine who owns what, who can
do what and whose word is authorit~tive.
Similarly, insofar as the household's
needs and desires are catered for by means of the
oikos nomos, (they are determined, in a sense consti-
tuted, by the family income and they are satisfied
by decisions taken by those in authority as to what
to buy and what not to buy), then desire is also
part of the oikos nomos. It might also be said that
desire is a constitutive part of economy insofar as
certain sexual relations are constituted, prohibited
or approved, by means of the organisation of the fam-
ily. For example, incestuous desire is usually rig-
orously prohibited, for whatever reason, and the ap-
proval of those in authority, the heads of the fam-
ily, may be necessary in order that a marriage take
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place. The situation here is especially complic-
ated if that marriage is of strategic importance to
the social, political or economic status, (the power
or value), of the family.
Without claiming to have discovered an
original and thus authentic sense of economy, this
discussion has introduced many of the ideas that the
following chapters will take up. Moreover, it has
introduced them as being fundamentally interrelated,
as forming their own version of oikos nomos. Those
interrelations will be summarised before looking
again at the themes that have been thus introduced.
It can be seen that, even on semantic
and etymological levels, economy, power and desire
are intimately related. The sense of oikos nomos
8S the proper management or governance of the house-
hold's wealth and property refers to positions and
relations of power and desire. And the sense of val-
ue as 'to prevail' or 'to be strong' is produced
within a context of what is usually thought of as
economy, a matter of value and wealth. So, value,
as that which is worth something and to be desired,
like economy, as that within which value is produced,
refers to positions and relations of power and to the
prohibition and satisfaction of desire. Indeed, it
becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate and
keep apart the senses of value and economy as invol-
ving worth and the senses of power and desire as in-
volving authority and need.
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So, in introducing po~er and desire
into the production and legitimation of value and
in explicating economy as the management of the
household's property, this discussion has situated
some of the matters with which the following chap-
ters will deal. More generally, it reflects what
Aristotle, Nietzsche and Deleuze have said, in
their various ways, about 'man' and locates those
statements in the context of power and desire.
And, more specifically, it introduces the concerns
of the thinkers to be dealt with later as relevant
to the matter of economy.
That is, Aristotle calls man 'the eco-
nomic animal'. Presumably he intends to say some-
thing about the family and its importance in human
life. And the discussion above concerning the no-
tions involved in the oikos nomos locates those no-
tions as matters of great significance for human
values and being. Nietzsche, similarly, asserts
that man is the evaluating animal 'as such,l: he is
claiming, that is, that the activities of valuing,
evaluating, calculating and measuring are constitu-
tive of the creatures that we are. The discussion
of the oikos nomos locates those activities ~ithin
the realm of the household.
Deleuze, finally, completes the trio by
saying that 'evaluations, in essence, are not values
but ways of being, modes of existence of those who
judge and calculate,2. Not only is human being
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fundamentally involved with valuation and calcula-
tion, then, but the entire sphere in which these
involvements occur is traversed by the workings of
power and desire. Supposedly mundane matters like
the management of the household, the affairs of
daily life, affect and are affected by what have
been considered to be the most remote of philoso-
phical concerns.
The next section will introduce and
begin to elucidate the idea of economy as the ~ork-
ings of identity, difference and opposition by look-
ing at Saussure's account of linguistic value or
identity.
Economy and Saussure
In chapter three of part one of the
Course in General Linguistics, Saussure is concerned
~ith the distinction between static or synchronic
and evolutionary or diachronic linguistics. 'Most
other sciences', he says, 'are unaffected by this
radical duality,3: sciences such as law, politics,
and astronomy can get along without making this dis-
tinction. However, the 'economic sciences', the
most obvious of which is economics itself, have this
duality 'forced upon them'. Political economy and
political history, for example, 'constitute two clear-
ly separated disciplines within a single science,4.
Moreover, economists have not simply decided to div-
ide their science thus; in pursuing these two discip-
lines separately, economists are lobeying an inner
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necessity'S. This necessity, Saussure says, also
'obliges ••• linguists ••• to divide linguistics
into two parts,6 because linguistics, like economics,
is 'confronted with the notion of value: both sci-
ences are concerned with a system for equating
things of different orders - labour and wages in
one and a signified and signifier in the other'?
Saussure thus conceives of language as
an economy and of linguistics as one of the econom-
ic sciences. In order to explain the idea of an
economy as a relationship between identity, differ-
ence and some form of opposition, Saussure's account
of la langue will be examined.
Within the account to be given of la......
langue, the nature of the linguistic sign plays an
essential role. Within this accountS, 'sign' des-
ignates a whole. That whole consists in the unity
of concept and sound-image. The concept is the sig-
nified and the sound-image the signifier. It is the
bond between the signified and the signifier that is
said to be arbitrary. That is, there is no natural
law or reason to determine that any particular sig-
nifier or sound-image should stand for or signify
any particular signified.
Because of the arbitrary nature of the
sign, because there is no natural law or reason to
determine which signifier signify which signified,
and because, therefore, each sign is what it is only
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in relation to, in its place in, the whole system
of signs that are different from it, Saussure ar-
gues that a distinction be made and maintained bet-
ween ~hat are called synchronic and diachronic lin-
guistics. The distinction between the two may be
conceived as that between the 'axis of simultaneit-
ies', ~hich 'stands for the relations of co-existing
things and from which the intervention of time is ex-
cluded', and the 'axis of successions', 'on which
are located all the things on the first axis along
with their changes,9.
This distinction must be maintained be-
cause 'language is a system of pure values which are
determined by nothing except the momentary arrange-
ment of its terms,lO. That is, since there is no
natural connection between signifier and signified,
the value or identity of the sign is a function or
product of the differences between it and all other
signs. The relevant or proper signs by means of
which anyone sign is defined at anyone time are
those which are effective or operative to the language
users at that time. As Saussure says, 'the speaker
is confronted with a state,ll. What is significant
to a speaker is the system of relations and differ-
ences constitutive of the value of the signs that go
to make up the language state at anyone time. h!
langue, then, is 'a system whose parts can and must
be considered in their synchronic solidarity,12.
The synchronic analysis of the
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momentary arrangement of the terms of a language
consists, for Saussure, in accounting for the two
sorts of relations in which a sign may exist with
regard to all other signs. If 'there are only dif-
ferences, without positive terms' in a language
state13, and consequently 'everything is based on
relations,14, then there are two sorts of relations,
two sorts of difference of which the value or iden-
tity of the sign is a function. As Saussure says,
'relations and differences between linguistic terms
fall into two distinct groups, each of which gener-
ates a certain class of values,15. The two sorts
of differences or relations of which linguistic val-
ue or identity is a function are 'syntagmatic' and
what will henceforth and as is conventional be ref-
erred to as 'paradigmatic' relations.
Basically, syntagmatic relations concern
the ways in which linguistic elements, whether phon-
emes, morphemes or sentences16 may combine with other
elements and paradigmatic relations are those which
concern the ways in which elements 'oppose' one an-
other, where the presence of one drecludes the pre-
sence of another. For example, 'the phoneme Ipl in
English is defined both by its opposition to other
phonemes which could replace it in contexts such as
I-et/, (Cf. bet, let, met, net, set), and by its com-
binatory relations with other phonemes', 'it can pre-
cede or follow any vowel; within a syllable, the liq-
uids III and Irl are the only consonants that can
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follow it and lsi the only one that can precede it,l?
Another example would be that of a menu, where roast
chicken would be eaten after the soup but before the
sweet. Combinatorial relations (syntagmatic relations)
would account for the value of the chicken as coming
before and not after the sweet and paradigmatic re-
lations would account for the chicken being eaten as
an alternative to, rather than with, roast beef.
These various ways in which linguistic
elements at all levels differ, oppose and relate to
one another and so come to have the value that they
in fact have may be given the generic title of a
diacriticity or play of differences. On the one hand,
the meaning or identity of the term 'bed' is the fun-
ction of its differential relations or opposition to
other terms such ~ 'bad', 'bet' and so on. And on
the other by its place in syntagmatic relations with
'flower', 'double' and so on. These shifting oppo-
sitions and relations to other linguistic terms by
means of which a term acquires the value that it has,
then, will be referred to as a diacriticity. Insofar
as Saussure claims 'that the entire linguistic sys-
tem can be reduced to and explained in terms of a
theory of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations,18
then the whole linguistic system may be referred to
as a diacriticity or play of differences.
Thus, basically, does Saussure account
for the production of value in the economy of lang-
uage. And thus is the idea of economy established
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as a matter of a relationship between identity, dif-
ference and opposition. Having described linguis-
tics as one of the 'economic sCiences,19, Saussure
says that 'in semiological systems like language •••
the notion of identity blends with that of value and
vice versa,20. The value or identity of the ling-
uistic sign being defined by the appositive, dia-
critical relations in which it stands to all other
signs, Saussure is saying that, in the economy of
language, value, identity and meaning are a function
of difference and some form of opposition. Those
differences and oppositions are the syntagmatic and
paradigmatic relations in which • term stands to all
other terms.
The next section will deal with Derrida's
reading of Saussure in order to establish the nature
and validity of the distinction between centric and
de- or ec- centric economy. This distinction will
be established as that between phallocentric and,
for the reasons noted in the introduction, 'feminist'
economy. Having elucidated this distinction, it will
be possible to begin the introduction of power and
desire into the workings of economy and thus complete
the introduction to the thought of identity, differ-
ence and opposition as the thought of the production
and legitimation of value, meaning and identity.
Economy and Derrida
In Positions, Derrida says that 'differ-
ance is in! economical concept and since there is no
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economy ~ithout difference, it is the most general
structure of economy,2l. He also says that what he
calls metaphysics amounts to 'a subordination of the
movement of differance in favour of a value or mean-
ing supposedly antecedent to differance, more orig-
inal than it ••• governing it in the last analysis,22.
Where metaphysics posits the presence of a value or
meaning as the source or origin of other values, Oer-
rida attempts to indicate the work of the economy of
differance, 'the non-full, non-simple "origin" •••
the structured and differing "origin",23, as the
'absolute production and destruction of value,24.
Differance is the absolute production
of value in that it is the endless and de- or ec-
centric interplay of oppositions in which elements
relate and refer to one another and by means of whiCh
their value or meaning is generated. Insofar as dif-
ferance may be conceived, for Derrida .ays that it
is not a concept25, it may be 'conceived' as a rad-
icalised and generalised version of the diacriticity
by means of which Saussure holds that the value of
the linguistic sign is produced. As the 'non-full,
non-simple "origin" ••• of differences', it is pro-
ductive of the differences by means of which elements
relate to one another and so come to have the value
that they have26•
On the other hand, it is the absolute
destruction of value in that it would defer and post-
27pone the presence of any value or meaning that
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metaphysics might appeal to as the source or origin
of value. It would show that the value which Der-
od 11 th t d t 1 ° °fo d28 t 29r1 a ca s e ranscen en a s1gn1 1e or cen re ,
as supposed source of value, was always already in-
habited by absence and was already itself part of an
infinite play of deferring and differentiating rela-
tions to other, absent, terms from which its value
derived. Where metaphysics posits a centre that is
supposedly antecedent to the play of oppositive rela-
tions from which value is generated, Derrida's task
is that of showing that that apparently self-present
identity was already the result of those relations
and, as such, would be destroyed or deferred infin-
itely.
'Coming before' the conceptual oppo-
sitions of which language is built, differance is the
'structured and differing' origin of differences and
thus of those conceptual oppositions. As structured,
differance is the absolute production of value or
identity since it is the play of oppositions which,
as seen in Saussure, produces the value or identity
of a particular term. As differing, it is the abso-
lute destruction of value since it defers and post-
pones any full and simply present element in relation
in relation to which another element could be said
to have value. Insofar as the economy of differance
is not 'governed by,30 but would rather destroy the
self-present identity of the centre posited by meta-
physics as the source of value, it may be called de-
or ec- centric economy.
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Thus an identity or value only acquires
its value or identity in the economy of differance.
At the same time, however3l, that value or identity
is subverted or postponed. It is the relation to
the other, to what is different and never present,
that both constitutes and subverts value and iden-
tity in the ecbnomy of differance. Derrida's name
for the relation to the absent is 'trace'; the trace
~.arks the relationship with the other,32.
In this sense, the economy of differance
is an 'economy of traces,33. The trace, however, is
neither a thing nor the trace of anything: like dif-
ferance, it must be thought before the thing. The
trace, then, is the relationship with what is absent,
with that which is not and can never be present and
which must be related to in its absence in order for
anything to be, to have the value that it has. If
it is the relation to the other, to what is different,
that generates the value and identity of an element,
then that relation also postpones and subverts that
identity and value. The trace also marks the disap-
pearance of value and identity in that there can nev-
er be a simple presence for an element to be opposed
to in the 'systematic play of differences, of traces
of differences ••• by means of which elements are re-
lated to one another,34.
In the economy of differance, then,
what is referred to as identity and value is at once
produced and destroyed. Identity and value are
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produced and destroyed in such a way, moreover, that
the value and identity of terms like 'produce' and
'destroy', 'structured' and 'differing', used to des-
cribe it, are themselves put into question. They
become 'undecidable', as Derrida has it. The play
of oppositions between different terms in the economy
of differance thus produces undecidable 'identities'
and 'values'.
This economy, which produces values that
are strictly undecidable, their value both produced
.nd destroyed, and which will later be explicated as
non-vulgarly feminist economy, may be called de- ££
ec- centric. It is both de- centring and ec- centric
with regard to centric economy. It would de- centre
or, as Derrida has it, deconstruct centric economy
by illustrating how the supposedly self-present and
self-identical value of the transcendental signified
was deferred and postponed by its relations to all
other terms. And it is ec- centric with regard to
centric economy; as illustrative of the production
and destruction of value and identity, it would not
behave 'properly', as would centric economy. So long
as this is understood and to avoid what is perhaps
an awkward construction, de- or ec- centric economy
will henceforth be referred to simply as ec- centric
economy.
Reference has been made, as perhaps it
must, given that identity and value are the product
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of some form of opposition, to the opposite or other
of ec- centric economy. What is referred to as meta-
physics or centric economy and the nature of the op-
position in which it stands to difference must now
be elucidated.
On the most general level, Derrida holds
metaphysics to be the 'exigent, powerful, systematic
and irrepressible desire for a transcendental signif-
ied,35. It is the desire for the 'subordination of
the movement of differance in favour of the presence
of a meaning or value supposedly antecedent to it,36.
It could be said that metaphysics is indicative of a
certain 'anxiety,37 in the face of differance and the
lack of full and simple origins that it entails. It
is indicative of the desire to posit or possess some
such source in order that the ec- centric free_play38
of the economy of differance be curtailed and seen
to issue from some stable and present source.
Supposedly antecedent to the economy of
differance, the centre is held to provide a stable
and fully present identity, the value of which is nE!
produced through its relations to other not simply
present values. The centre or transcendental signi-
fied is thus 8 privileged term that has been set ap-
art from or outside the play of oppositive relations
that would ultimately both produce and destroy its
value. This centre which is thus held to be outside
the ec- centric economy of differance has at least
two functions.
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First, it is supposed to 'master',
'neutralise' or 'reduce,39 the economy of differ-
ance. The economy of differance is 'neutralised
or reduced ••• by ••• giving it a fixed centre or
fOOt tOt f fO d .. ,40re err~ng ~ 0 a po~n 0 presence, a ~xe or~g~n •
Thus the centre puts an end to the endless referral
and deferral of differance. And second, the centre
is to 'orient, balance and organise' the economy
that is established by the curtailing of differance4l•
As such an entity, the centre provides some organis-
ing or governing principle in relation to which the
other elements in the economy are said to have the
value they have. In this sense, the centre is set
up and privileged as being outside the differential
relations that would at once produce and destroy
identity and value. Thus it is held to be a stable
and self-present identity that is the origin of val-
ue.
So metaphysical economy is a centred
economy, an economy governed by a privileged term or
value that is held to be beyond or immune to the
shifting network of relations that are at once pro-
ductive and destructive of value and identity. A
centred economy is one in which the production of
value is held to follow from a relation to the cen-
tre, a term the value of which is held to be defined
solely in terms of itself. As such, the centre is
a sort of sovereign or absolute value, the same as
itself, and the economy it is said to govern may be
said, therefore, to be based upon the logic of ~:'---
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identity.
Given this description of differance
and of what metaphysics consists in and did it not
itself constitute a distinction that would signal
the subordination of ec- centric to centric economy,
it could be said that one aspect of centred economy
was that it involved the occlusion of the 'real wor-
kings' of the production of value. That is, insofar
as differance is the absolute production and destruc-
tion of value, and insofar as the centre involves
the subordination of that economic process to the
self-present identity of a term held to be outside
that process, then it could be said that the centre
is set up in the place of differance, to occlude its
workings and appear as the absolute origin and meas-
ure of value.
The economy of differance, 'the system-
atic play of differences, of the traces of differ-
ences,42, like the trace itself, 'is necessarily
occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation,43.
In thus not being present, in its effacement or ab-
sence44, the play of differences provides the con-
dition for centred economy, for the production of
value. So, the non-full, non-simple 'origins' of
the value or identity of the centre, as it has been
produced in the economy of differance, are occluded
and forgotten in the subordination of ec- centric
economy to centric economy.
In this way, the two functions of the
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centre, mastering and neutralising differance on the
one hand, and orienting the economy that results on
the other, correspond to the way in which the origins
of the centre in differance and that term's differen-
tial relations to all other terms are occluded. Thus
the metaphysical economy appears and is experienced
as one in which the production of value is accomplish-
ed by virtue of a relation to the identity or value
of the centre.
However, as Derrida says, metaphysics
does not 'merely set up vaulue oppositions around an
ideal ••• limit,45, it also subordinates those values
to each other. In a given economy, there will be
found such oppositions/subordinations as 'normal/ab-
normal, standard/parasite, fulfilled/void, serious/
non-serious, literal/non-literal' and these reduce
to a basic opposition/subordination - 'positive/neg-
ative and ideal/non-ideal,46. That is, while all the
values produced and distributed within centred eco-
nomy are held to be what they are by virtue of their
relation to the centre, there are various terms that
are held to be supplementary, to be secondary and
thus subordinate to the others.
It is 'of the nature' of the sort of op-
position to be found in centric economy, then, that
that opposition 'also' establishes relations of dom-
inance and subordinance among the elements of that
economy. The oppositional or differential relation
is such that the second term in the various dichoto-
mies (some of which were noted above) is conceived
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as a threat to what is held to be the value and self-
identity of the first. Thus, if the value of 'the
serious' is produced by relation to the centre, which
could be logos, if it is held to enjoy a privileged
relation to that centre, then those values which are
not 'of the order' of the centre, which consist in a
threat to its self-identity, will be opposed to the
centre and to the privileged term in such a way that
they will be treated as secondary and supplementary.
So where, for example, the phallus is
the centre of an economy, where the phallus is suppo-
sedly beyond the diacritical play of sexual differen-
ces and oppositions and thus a 'pure' and self-iden-
tical value, those values which are solidary with
the value of the phallus, phallomorphic values, will
be privileged in sexual economy. Those which are not
of the order of the phallus will be considered a
threat to that centre and held to be secondary or
supplementary values.
Thus the dichotomy or opposition male/
female is one of dominance/subordinance: no-one has
a phallus, even the best of men only has a penis,
but the penis is phallomorphic and is thus privileg-
ed over the female with regard to the phallus. It
is dominant with regard to the absence of the penis,
with regard to the female and gynomorphic values.
In this way, the feminine is conceived as a threat
to the self-presence and self-identity of the penis,
the feminine is secondary, supplementary, not as good
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and in need of something ~ith regard to the phallus
and phallomorphic values.
Derrida sums up the situation be saying
that 'all metaphysicians, from Plato to ••• Husserl,
have proceeded in this way, conceiving good before
evil, the positive before the negative, the pure be-
fore the impure ••• etc,47. In the reduction or mas-
tering of ec- centric economy by centric economy,
difference and opposition are so ordered that the
terms of centred economy are placed in positions of
dominance and subordinance. The oPPosition, of dom-
inant and subordinant values, is set up in terms of
the relation to the centre: dominant values are pri-
vileged because of their proximity to the centre
and subordinate values are said to be supplementary
because they consist in a lack of, or distance from,
that privileged term and as such constitute a threat
to it.
Finally, with regard to this notion of
supplementary value within centric economy, it should
be noted that, as supplementary, Derrida considers
those values which are not of the order of the cen-
tre to be 'limited'. The opposition of dichotomous
terms within centric economy is an opposition of dom-
inant and subordinate forces and it seems that the
subordinate force is limited, overcome or overpower-
ed, by the dominant one. Moreover, Derrida says
that the supplementary term is limited 'for motiv-
ations and relations of force [WhiCh are] yet to be
37
analysed,48. So, and as is to be expected, not only
does centric economy consist in an organisation of
power and desire but the movement from and occlusion
of ec- centric economy is itself also the result of
the ~orkings of po~er and desire.
These, then, are some of the major as-
pects of economy to be found in the work of Derrida,
of the ec- centric economy of differance and of the
subordination of that economy to centric economy or
metaphysics. Derrida describes the operation where-
by differance is reduced as being performed by 'man
as that being who, throughout the history of metaphy-
sics, ••• has dreamed of the full presence, the re-
assuring foundation, the origin,49. This descrip-
tion of the desire to master the anxiety engendered
by the lack of a full, simple origin of value, how-
ever, raises explicitly a point that is significant
for this essay and which should be emphasised.
It is that, following Nietzsche, Derrida
calls the play of differance, as both the production
and destruction of value, the feminine operationSo•
Similarly, he calls the setting up and workings of
centred economy the masculine operationSl• That is,
at the 'moment' a transcendental signified is set up
to order the various differences and regulate the
production of value, any number of other centres
are set up to organise differences in other areas.
The operation is the 'same' in all these areas. As
Derrida says, 'it is one and the same system: the
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erection of a paternal 10gos,52. For these reasons,
the desire for mastery may be said to be born of
'the apotropaic anxiety,53 at or over the lack of
simple origins.
If, as Derrida says, differance is both
the general structure and some sort of condition for
economy54, and if the reduction of ec- centric eco-
nomy involves 'motivations and relations of force,55,
then not only is that reduction a 'sexual operation,
but before it there ~as no sexuality,56. To reduce
ec- centric economy to centred economy, of which sex-
uality is an example, is to decide what is properly
sexual, as opposed to what is not sexual, and to de-
cide the values or identities that have been consti-
tuted within that economy. An example of such a re-
duction and of the exposure of that reduction would
be Freud's 'demonstration' that children, who ~ere
supposed to be eminently non-sexual beings, were
actually part of sexual economy. There was no sex-
uality, in the sense in which it is 'familiar' from
within centred economy, before the operation that re-
duces ec- centric economy to centric economy because
the ec- centric economy of differance would both
produce and destroy the identity of whatever it ~as
that was held to be properly sexual.
'Before' the reduction of ec- centric
economy to centric economy, everything and nothing
was properly sexual: identities and differences,
motivations and forces, among which what are, in
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centred sexual economy, called sexual identities,
differences and so on, are to be found in ec- cen-
tric economy but precisely not as organised in cen-
tred economy, in relation to a privileged value.
As such, the identities, differences, motivations
and forces of ec- centric economy are organised,
their value as either sexual or non-sexual, for ex-
ample, is decided, via the reduction to centred eco-
nomy, in terms of the relation to the centre.
In this sense, then, the movement from
ec- centric economy to centric economy is a sexual
operation that institutes sexuality. The identities,
differences, motivations and forces that are refer-
red to in centred economy as sexual 'exist' 'before'
the reduction to centric economy but not as they are
organised or referred to in centric economy. Thus
the operation is sexual in a non-vulgar sense, a
sense that is not that which is familiar from the
organisation of sexuality in centred economy.
This operation corresponds to a dispos-
ition or organisation of desire that is satisfied
by means of various relations of force in terms of
~hich identities and differences are produced and
either privileged or subordinated in centric economy.
These dispositions of motivation and force are them-
selves organised in relation to the centre of the
centred economy that results to appear and be exper-
ienced as desire and power. Ec- centric economy,
which is 'constituted' by relations between identity,
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difference and opposition and which involves motiv-
ations and relations of force, is mastered by a par-
ticular disposition of force that is motivated by a
particular disposition of desire to form centred
economy. In that centred economy, those identities,
differences, motivations and forces are organised or
'oriented' in terms of the centre.
As a sexual operation, the reduction of
the economy of differance to centred economy is cal-
led masculine in what should, (for the sake of strat-
egy, in no sense properly), be referred to as a vul-
gar sense. This is because differance, as the abso-
lute production and destruction of value and identi-
ty, would defer and postpone all attempts to provide
or ascribe a proper sense or identity. It would pre-
clude the possibility of identifying an operation or
term as properly masculine or feminine. The vulgar
sense of masculine is that which is usual, the value
of which has itself been produced in centric economy
which involves the privileging of an identity, the
centre, in terms of which all other terms are held
to have the value that they have.
Similarly, as a sexual operation, the
effects of differance are termed the feminine oper-
ation in what must be taken as a non-vulgar sense.
The feminine as it indicates the subversive and iden-
tity-disrupting work of differance is to be under-
stood in a non-vulgar sense in the same way and for
the same reasons as ecriture in Of Grammatology is
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intended in a non-vulgar senseS? Where ~criture is
not writing in the sense in which the logocentric
tradition identifies and values it, but is rather
the 'writing' that is 'interior' to 'speech', so the
'feminine' operation is not the identity and value
that the phallocentric tradition has generated. It
is rather an operation that would show the disrup-
tive undecidable within what is supposed to be a
self-identity and from which it was supposed to have
been excluded.
Among the dichotomous or oppositional
values that are governed by what is experienced as
the absolute value of the phallus in phallocentric
economy, are reason/emotion and logic/intuition.
Vulgar masculinity is privileged, through the posses-
sion of the penis, with regard to the phallus and
phallomorphic values. Vulgar masculinity thus en-
joys a position of dominance over vulgar femininity
which, lacking the penis, (and thus representing a
threat, the possibility of its absence), is consid-
ered secondary or supplementary. Thus within phal-
locentric economy, vulgar masculinity is said to be
reasonable, logical and so on, and vulgar femininity
either has to be similarly reasonable, (it has to be
like masculinity), or it is condemned as concerned
with the unreasonable, the emotional - secondary or
supplementary values.
Insofar as vulgar masculinity has been
associated with reason and logic, for example, and
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insofar as reason and logic are classically based
upon the principle of identity, from which the laws
of thought are held to follow, then the reduction
of ec- centric economy to centric economy, (of an
economy which would subvert identity to one which
privileges a particular identity as source of val-
ue), is termed the vulgar masculine operation.
And insofar as the value and identity of non-vulgar
femininity would not be produced in terms of one or
other of the dichotomous poles of phallocentric ec-
onomy that are governed by the relation to the phal-
lus, (and hence either masculine or supplementary),
but would, rather, be undecidable in terms of them,
then the effects of the economy of differance may be
termed the non-vulgarly feminine operation.
The disruptive and subversive effects
of ec- centric economy are thus termed the non-vul-
garly feminine 'concern', as are the versions of po-
wer and desire to be found there. That is, if dif-
ferance is a difference and opposition of forces,
then the sort of difference and forces to be found
there, and the sort of opposition between those for-
ces, are termed feminine or feminist in a non-vulgar
sense since they are not governed by the relation to
the centre as they are in centred economy. On the
other hand, the relations between identity, differ-
ence and opposition and the parts played in those
relations by power and desire, as they are found in
centred economy, are called phallocentric or mascu-
line since, as has been seen, vulgar masculinity is
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associated ~ith the devices of reason and logic and
these devices themselves privilege the value of id-
entity. Insofar as the economy of differance does
not 'answer to,58 phallocentrism but rather both pro-
duces and destroys values and identities, it is cal-
led feminine or feminist in a non-vulgar sense.
These arguments may be conceived as a
generalised version of those Derrida employs in
,
Spurs/Eperons. Where he is concerned with the fair-
ly specific effects of castration in the texts of
Nietzsche, Heidegger and, to a slightly lesser ex-
tent, of Freud, this chapter is concerned with what
might be called a generalised version of a relation
to castration. That is, Derrida is concerned with
the phallus as centre or transcendental signified
and the relation of various women or texts to that
centre. This chapter is concerned with a more gen-
eralised version of the centre and the relation of
marginal groups in general to that centre.
It was noted in chapter one that the
privilege accorded self-identity and self-presence
was not only the vulgar masculine operation, but also
a white and bourgeois affair, for example. Thus
this chapter is concerned with a castration that in-
valves a relation to the transcendental signified
where that transcendental signified is conceived as
being solidary with all those interests. It may
therefore be read as offering an account of a gener-
alised relation to the centre where that centre
44
cannot simply be termed the phallus since it also
involves reference to other, (all), positions of
privilege/supplementarity or centrality/marginality.
In this sense, 'castration' refers to
the relation of any element or term to the values
solidary with the transcendental signified and the
chapter provides an illustration of what Derrida
intends but does not spell out when he says that
the move to centred economy organises the whole of
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However, as Culler, for example, has
argued, it is no longer clear what is meant when
the terms 'feminine' or 'female' are used - such
terms do not appear to refer to what he calls 'actual
human beings'SO. And, without glibly asserting that
such a 'confusion of identity' is so much the bette~,
some attempt ought to be made to articulate the re-
lation between the sorts of concern and operation
that have been termed 'feminine' so far and the con-
crete, political affairs of 'actual human beings'.
This chapter must begin the task of elucidating what
Derrida has called the 'gap' bet~een 'work on or ag-
ainst the institution' and 'the most advanced version
of philosophical deconstruction,SI.
It might be thought, then, that, as they
are employed here, the terms 'feminine' and 'woman'
do not o.."~ cannot refer to 'actual human beings' but
are rather perhaps textual effects produced within
a version of philosophical deconstruction. Work on,
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or against the institution, involving individual
human subjects who have some idea what they are
trying to do by that work, seems to belong simply
to centred economy, privileging identity and having
recourse to a transcendental signified. And philo-
sophical deconstruction might be thought to simply
postpone all manifestations of identity, leaving
only the confusion as to what was meant by such
terms as 'feminine' noted above.
Such, however, would be to forget the
work of ec- centric economy. Ec- centric economy,
differance, was said to both produce and destroy the
value of a term. The moment of production is no
less a part of this 'feminine' economy than the
deferral of that value. If it is to account for the
workings of ec- centric economy, a philosophical de-
construction would have to have recourse to identity
or an identical subject at some point. Thus Derrida
says, for example, that he does not try to destroy
the subject, he merely tries to situate it, to ac~
count for where it has come from. He says, then,
that the transcendental signified is indispensable
and that 'the subject is absolutely indispensable,62.
That is, work against the institution,
which involves a telos, a subject and so on, is a
necessary moment of a philosophical deconstruction
that would account for the value and identity of a
term. So the work of 'actual human beings', of wo-
men, for example, as both produced and destroyed, is
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a necessary moment in what has been presented as
the non-vulgarly feminist concern, ec- centric eco-
nomy. And so, far from not referring to the con-
crete struggles of actual women, what has been pre-
sented as non-vulgarly feminine includes those con-
crete struggles. It is, precisely, the treatment of
this gap or difference, (whether it is treated as
opposition or contradiction or, as here, as differ-
ance), that will in turn be seen to both preclude and
permit the distinction between vulgar and non-vulgar
feminism in chapter nine. The question of a telos
such as liberation will also be dealt with in this
chapter.
Having introduced the distinction bet-
ween metaphysical and ec- centric economy, that dis-
tinction must now be qualified: it begins to appear
as if the difference and opposition between the two
is itself metaphysical or phallocentric. There are,
that is, a number of reasons as to why the difference
cannot be presented as being easily accomplished and
upheld in any simple form, as the chapter has sugges-
ted so far.
Firstly, it is not a matter of opposing
centric economy to ec- centric economy because, as
Derrida says, there is no sense in doing away with
the logic, syntax and categories which are constitu-
tive of metaphysics63• Metaphysics is not something
like a pathological condition or a historico-philo-
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sophical error ~hich it ~ould be possible to cure or
correct once and for all. Far from being a 'histor-
ical contingency,S4, the privileging of self-identity
and self-presence is said to have a 'founding value,65,
and the movement from ec- centric to centric economy
is a 'necessary ••~. movement and structure,S6. This
movement is necessary to the movement to philosophy
and, if the centreless structure represents the 'un-
thinkable itself,6?, then it is necessary to thought
itself.
Secondly, and for this reason, metaphy-
sical presuppositions and critical motifs are said to
coexist within the same text and even ~ithin the same
·t· 68 't' 1 't' t bpropOS1 10n ,even cr1 1ca propos1 10ns mus orrow
the logic, categories, syntax and so on of the eco-
nomy they are trying to critique and transgress. 50,
for example, for all the promise of not being simply
enveloped in an unproblematically metaphysical eco-
nomy that the work of Husserl affords, in his insights
into the constitutive roles of the non-presences of
future and past in the present, metaphysical elements
can still be seen to inhabit his text in the guise of
the full, simple present he requires for the account
of primordial dator intuitions to do the work he
~ants it to do.
~Thus, as Oerrida says in spurs!Eperons,
if the form of opposition to metaphysics is itself
metaphysical, then 'the relation of metaphysics to
its other can no longer be one of oPPosition,S9.
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The nature of opposition and the significance of these
remarks will become more apparent in the following
chapters and their implications for critical or trans-
gressive practice, feminism, will be made more expli-
cit in chapters five through to eight. However, these
remarks should be emphasised and born in mind despite
the essay's continuing to talk, for the sake of strat-
egy, as if centric and ec- centric economy could be
clearly and simply differentiated and opposed.
One consequence of all this may be seen
as a development of something Spivak has noted. She
suggests70 that philosophy must now be conceived as
a form of housework. That is, there is no way of av-
oiding contact with~and therefore contamination by,
the logic, concepts and syntax that are to be dealt
with as metaphysical. And, in that critical and meta-
physical motifs coexist even in the same statement,
there could be no final point at which it could be
said that metaphysics had been ended or escaped from.
Philosophy, indeed any discourse that attempted to
be critical or transgressive, as housework, entails
getting one's hands dirty and is never finished.
The difference between this conception
and others like it of the nature of critical activ-
ity, those of Locke or Kant, for example, is that
this is no longer what might be called a reactive
conception. Locke's view of philosophy as the under-
labourer to the master-builder, science, and Kant's
of his critical efforts as preparing the ground for
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the construction of the royal road to science are
both reactive in that they conceive science as the
realm of decidable, conclusive issues, something
that philosophy can properly prepare for but not
achieve itself. This view would have it that, as
the engineer is but a privileged bricoleur, 50 sci-
ence is but over-privileged philosophy. That is,
the view to be proposed here is that science, too,
deals with issues and objects which, were it not for
the occlusion of the undecidable, would be recognised
as such.
As a result, it is not by chance that
those philosophies which make reference to the essen-
tially finite nature of issues, those which consider
it possible, for example, to clarify once and for all
the meaning and usage of a word, are those which
privilege the role of logical, reasonable, devices.
Those philosophies share the vulgarly masculine trait
of privileging the potentially concludable nature of
philosophical tasks using logic and reason. This
sort of philosophy is part of what Gallop will be
seen later to call the man's man's domain - the realm
of serious and frank discussion that has a clearly
definable and finite task.
Such a conception of philosophical ac-
tivity, solidary with the concerns and values of the
wider society, has contributed to the denigration of
such supposedly trivial, feminine, tasks and concerns
as housework. Housework, like philosophy on Locke's
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and Kant's accounts, for example, has been presented
as supplementary to the important business, be that
important business the scientific elucidation of nat-
ure or the production of surplus value. Oikos nomos
in the sense of the management of the household has
been subordinated to oikos nomos in the sense of the
production of commodities. And this move is a vul-
garly masculine move, solidary with the values of
self-presence and self-identity that are privileged
in logical, finite and decidable reasoning.
However, the Conference of Socialist
Economists' essay, "Women's Domestic Labour"?l, is
instructive on at least two counts here. The essay
concerns 'the relation of domestic labour to the
expansion of surplus value,?2. The Conference argues
that domestic labour or housework, performed mainly
by women and economically undervalued, actually plays
a crucial role. The claim is that domestic labour
is 'essential for the reproduction of the capitalist
system,73 and, more significantly, that 'the relation
of domestic labour to the production of surplus value
is simply that the former makes the latter possible,?4.
There are at least two closely related
moves illustrated here, both of which are important
for this essay. First, the CSE is saying that a form
of labour that has been considered to be of supple-
mentary status is essential to the existence and main-
tenance of the form of labour that the vulgarly mas-
culine concern has privileged. And second, it'is
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saying that oikos nomos, in the form of the manage-
ment of the household, along ~ith the corollary re-
lations of power and desire, has a constitutive role
to play in the economic production from which it has
hitherto been excluded.
That is, where vulgarly masculine eco-
nomics has represented housework as exterior and
secondary to the production of surplus value, the
CSE shows that it plays a constitutive role in that
production. Thus oikos nomos, as management of the
household, along with the relations of power and de-
sire that it entails, is essentially a part of the
production of surplus value. Such a move will be
seen again later, from a different tradition, in the
discussion of Deleuze and Guattari in chapter seven.
This chapter, too, would argue that the
supposedly supplementary activities which are assoc-
iated with the feminine, housework, are, when seen
in their philosophical guise, rather the stuff of
which philosophy is made. This chapter argues, then,
that philosophy as housework, when it is conceived
non-vulgarly, is essential to what has been presented
as"the real work of the sciences and that the value
of these activities is, following Derrida's account
of writing, undecidable: philosophy as housework is
feminist in a non-vulgar, non-reactive sense.
Thus the view of philosophical activity
proposed in this essay is not reactive in that, in
proposing a critical or transgressive discourse as
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house~ork, it is not advocating a role that is sec-
ondary to that of the sciences. Nor is it suggest-
ing that the hitherto subordinate practices assoc-
iated with housework are simply to be taken over
and privileged. These latter would be reactive and
part of vulgarly masculine economy in that their
meaning and value would derive from the position and
role of the sciences in the first place and from a
simple reversal in the second. Rather, the tactic
proposed here ~ould invaginate the relationship bet-
ween the two: it would sho~ how the supposedly in-
ferior devices associated with housework, and philo-
sophy as house~ork, are interior to those of science.
It would, then, no longer be possible, as it is in
phallocentric economy, to decide which was science
and which was housework in the same way that the bri-
coleur and the engineer are ultimately undecidable.
Derrida and Saussure
Given all this, Derrida refers to a
'tension' in Saussure's work75• This tension could
be explicated in terms of what might be called the
'closet feminism' of the ~ork on anagrams76, or the
'repressed feminism' of the Course. Amounting to
much the same, the tension that Derrida refers to
~ill be dealt ~ith here as that between ec- centric
and centric economy, between differance and the ac-
count of linguistic value that is provided by Sau-
ssure. So, if, as Derrida says elsewhere, there
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are no concepts or operations .metaphysical in them-
selves??, but that it is rather as if a veil passes
between a text and itself?8, this section will beg-
in to account for the movements of the veil that
passes between the ~ork of ec- centric and centric
economy in Saussure's Course.
At 'first sight', Saussure's account
of the economy in which linguistic value is produced
does not appear to be part of or descriptive of cen-
tric economy. The sorts of differences and relations
that Saussure describes as being productive of lin-
guistic value do not appear to be those that were
described in the account of centric economy. Hence
it will be necessary to critique or supplement Sau-
ssure's account to show how it is in this case that
ec- centric economy produces itself as its own self-
occlusion. On the other hand, in showing how what
appears to be an entirely diacritical account of the
production of value ultimately involves the role or
rule of a centre, this section will be showing how
that rOle/rule has been occluded.
These issues will be illustrated by
looking again at the example which was used above
to demonst~ate the differences between syntagmatic
and paradigmatic relations. It will be seen that
the account of the production of value or meaning
is essentially incomplete and needs supplementing
with reference to a centre that ultimately involves
the government of the economy in which linguistic
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value is produced. Insofar as the account is incom-
plete, the role/rule of the centre and the workings
of ec- centric economy may be said to have been oc-
cluded.
It was noted above that the value or
identity of 'the phoneme /p/ in English' was gener-
ated or 'defined by its opposition to other phon-
emes that could replace it in contexts such as I-etl
••• and by its combinatory relations with other
phonemes,79. Such an account of the value or mean-
ing of an element is incomplete and needs supplemen-
ting with reference to a centre, a term the value of
which is not defined by the relations it governs.
The value in this case, which is not presented as a
function of difference and opposition, is 'the Eng-
lish language'.
Only, that is, on the proviso that the
example concerns the English language can it be said
that these particular relations govern the value of
the phoneme Ip/. Insofar as the possibility exists
that there are other languages that do not, for exam-
ple, distinguish the phoneme Ipl from the phonemes
Ibl or Idl, for example, and which may 'allow' it
to precede liquids other than 11/ and Irl, then those
relations which are claimed to generate the value of
Ipl cannot completely account for that value. 'The
English language', which is not, apparently, defined
by syntagmatic or paradigmatic relations, ultimately
qoverns the play of differences and oppositions that
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produce the value of the phoneme /p/.
In that 'the English language' is not
referred to in the Saussurean account of the produc-
tion of the value of /p/, as ultimately governing
that production, then its role or rule may be said
to have been occluded. It neither appears nor is
experienced as the centre of the economy. And, in
that it regulates the centred economy in sovereign
fashion, the workings of ec- centric economy, which
would at once produce and destroy the value of an
element, are said to have been occluded. In the
reduction of ec- centric to centric economy, then,
both the role/rule of the centre as sovereign value
and the origins of all values in ec- centric econo-
my are said to have been occluded.
Another way of saying this would be to
say that, if there is no value that is not produced
in ec- centric economy, then the value of 'the Eng-
lish language' in the Saussurean account has also
been produced in ec- centric economy but that sub-
sequently, that non-full, non-simple "origin" has
been occluded or has produced itself as its own self
occlusion. On the other hand, if the value of 'the
English language' has been produced in ec- centric
economy and, subsequently, in centric economy, been
privileged as beyond the play of oppositive and dif-
ferential relations, then the position of that cen-
tre as regulative of centric economy may be said to
be grounded in ec- centric economy.
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The origins of the centre's position ~
centre, the value that governs, but is immune to or
beyond, the differential relations in which other val-
ues exist, have been occluded and the centre neither
appears nor is experienced as the sovereign value of
centred economy., Saussure's diacriticity is thus not
at all innocent. On the one hand, it is finally gov-
erned by the centre: the syntagmatic and paradigmatic
relations and differences constitutive of the value
of /p/, for example, are ultimately governed by re-
lation to 'the English language', a term that is pre-
sented in centred economy as beyond oppositive and
differential relations. And on the other, it is that
diacriticity that 'first' generates the value of any
term. The value of the centre is produced and oc-
cluded in the play of syntagmatic and paradigmatic
relations.
Thus the 'tension' that Derrida refers
to in Saussure's ~ork manifests itself in the account
of linguistic value. Elsewhere, in the essay "Ling-
guistics and Grammato10gyn80, Derrida shows Saussure's
linguistics to be ultimately organised in terms of a
relation to logos which necessitates the privileging
of the spoken over the~ritten sign in linguistics.
In the same way, but on a different level, this sec-
tion has tried to show that and how the value of the
linguistic sign in the various diacritical relations
is ultimately governed by the relation to the centre.,
In the example used above, that centre was 'the
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English language'. As has been seen, elements of
centric and ec- centric economy coexist with, in-
deed provide for, each other: the ec- centric eco-
nomy of differance both produces or generates and
is ultimately held to be governed by the value of
the centre as that centre is privileged in centred
economy. There is no gap or space, then, only the
movement of a veil.
Given that there are no concepts meta-
physical in themselves, but that there exists, even
in the same proposition, a 'tension' between two
impulses, the roles of power and desire that were
seen to exist in centric and ec- centric economy
may also be seen in Saussure's account of linguis-
tic economy. On the one hand, within centric eco-
nomy, the centre is said to have mastered or redu-
ced ec- centric economy. Thus the centres of the
various economies to be found in Saussure's work,
logos, 'the English language', and so on, are as
sovereign powers which, while grounded in ec- cen-
tric economy, are represented in centred economy as
precisely beyond or immune to the sorts of relations
that give meaning and value to the other terms.
On the other hand, those other terms
or values do not merely coexist. Rather, they are
forces that are organised hierarchically in centred
economy - writing is held to be inferior to speech
in such economy. But they are not organised in the
same way in ec- centric economy-- Oerrida shows how
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the attempt to thus organise writing and speech
must collapse because of the presence of arche 'c-
riture within speech. That is, where the sort of
power to be found in ec- centric economy would both
produce and destroy a term's position of dominance/
subordinance, in centric economy, a term's position
in the hierarchy is determined and fixed.
Similarly, the tension between centric
and ec- centric economy may be seen as one of the
attempted satisfaction of desire by means of pro-
viding something that is lacking, (full, simple ori-
gins), and the realisation that desire is in itself
self-deconstructive or ec- centric. That is, if
what is desired is the full, simple origin of value
and that which would both produce and destroy value
is the ec- centric economy of differance, then desire
for the full, simple origin will never be satisfied
once and for all. It will rather be produced (con-
stituted) and destroyed (satisfied) by differance,
ec- centric economy. For these reasons, the centre
of the linguistic economy posited in an account such
as Saussure's is both produced and destroyed by dif-
ferance. It may be seen as an attempt to or the des-
ire for mastery over the economy of differance, but
it and its desire have been constituted and would
be destroyed by differance.
Conclusion
Thus this chapter has introduced the
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questions of economy and strategy. The etymologies
of the ~ords 'economy' and 'value' were considered
and found to refer to the governance or management
of the household property and to relations of power
and desire. The interrelations of these words also
indicated that the matters they described were of
fundamental importance for human being and that
they affected and were affected by concerns that
~ere supposedly of only academic or philosophical
interest.
The notion of economy was presented as
a relationship between identity, difference and some
form of opposition by looking first at Saussure's
account of linguistic value and then at Derrida's
account of Saussure. The tension between centric
and ec- centric economy was introduced and estab-
lished as a tension between a vulgarly masculine and
a non-vulgarly feminine operation. As a non-vulgar-
ly feminine operation, the work of ec- centric eco-
nomy is a transgressive or critical operation that
will not be immediately and unproblematically appro-
priated by that which it attempts to critique and
transgress.
The following chapters will account for
the possibility of this non-vulgar feminism by look-
ing at the work of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
That is, the thought of dialectics also being the
thought of identity, difference and opposition, and
these three being the decisive thinkers for the work
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of Oerrida, Foucault, Oeleuze and Guattari, the pos-
itions of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger with regard
to dialectics and hence economy will be elucidated.
CHAPTER THREE
HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE
With the exception of Hegel, the thin-
kers to be dealt with in the follo~ing chapters
have all offered versions of the thesis that phil-
osophy since Hegel has been an attempt to distance
or differentiate itself from himl. In their var-
ious ways, they have also offered versions of the
thesis that the histor~ of philosophy is the his-
tory of the occlusion or forgetting of a differ-
ence that does not ultimately reduce to a metaphy-
sical identity. Whether Hegel foresaw these devel-
opments or not, it is not by chance that the con-
cern with identity, difference and opposition,
along with that for what has thus been forgotten,
is as important a matter for the thinkers to be dis-
cussed as they consider it to be for thought itself.
And nor is it by chance that the ac-
count of the thought of identity, difference and op-
position, the thought of economy and the matter of.feminism, begins with Hegel. That is, feminism's
problems have been seen to be problems of economy
and the matter of economy has been seen to be the
matter of a relationship between identity, differ-
ence and opposition. Moreover, this relationship
is itself traversed by relations of power and des-
ire. Thus, since Hegelian dialectics is 'also' the
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thought of identity, difference and opposition, this
chapter will outline his account of economy before
looking at the other thinker's responses to that ac-
count in order to see what it is that they all try
so hard to differentiate themselves from.
Of at least equal significance for the
thinkers discussed in the following chapters is the
work of Nietzsche. And, in addition to describing
Hegel's position with regard to feminism, as it is
found in his work on dialectics, this chapter ~ill
look at Nietzsche's relations to feminist economy.
It will be seen that Nietzsche's thought is decisive
for the possibility of feminism in that he differs
from and opposes centric economy in ways that are
not the ways that centric economy organises differ-
ence and opposition.
Thus Nietzsche provides a discourse
that is transgressive of centric economy and which
is not immediately appropriated by that economy.
He also provides the force that enables the posi-
tions of Heidegger and Adorno to be distinguished
from those of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guat-
tari. That is, Adorno's and Heidegger's positions
with regard to feminism are what they are and dif-
fer from those of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and
Guattari because of their relation to Nietzsche's
work. Nietzsche is thus decisive for the possibil-
ity of feminism as that feminism is exemplified in
these latter.
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HEGEL
Dialectic
Without ~ishing on the one hand to
presuppose the readings of Hegel to be dealt with
in later chapters and while not claiming on the
other to be entirely 'innocent', this section will
first present Hegel's analysis of the reflexions-
bestimmung - the roles of identity, difference and
contradiction as they are to be found in the Science
of Logic. For, as Sarlemijn says, 'the theory of
the determinations of reflection ••• is the core of
the dialectic of this Philosophy,2. Having descri-
bed the account of economy as it is found in the
Science of Logic, this section will consider the
roles of power and desire in that economy as they
are found in the master/slave dialectic described
in the Phenomenmology of Spirit. Finally, this
section will look at the combination of these mom-
entsin the accounts Hegel gives in the Philosophy
of Right of sexual difference, the family and the
state.
In discussing these issues, this sec-
tion will attempt to show that and how the poten-
tially subversive and thus, it has been argued,
feminist moments or forces in Hegel's dialectic
may be described as reducing to un-aufgehoben dif-
ferences which must be 'mastered' in order to be
sublated and incorporated into the movement of the
dialectic. Those potentially subversive moments
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or forces will be seen to be difference as diver-
sity in the Science of Logic, woman with regard to
the family, the Penates with regard to the state
and difference, ('before' it becomes opposition and
therefore admitting of sublation), with regard to
sexual difference.
In the somewhat obscure 'Remark' that
prefaces the sections of the Science of Logic that
deal with identity, difference and opposition,
Hegel asserts that the various propositions which
are set up as laws of thought are opposed to and
contradict one another. Identity can supposedly be
defined by means of the principle 'A=A'. The prin-
ciple of identity, taken on its own, says that 'every-
thing is identical with itself,3. If all a thing is
is to be identical with itself then it cannot be dis-
tinguished from anything else, everything is thus
indistinguishable from everything else and there is,
as it were, no 'room' for differenca4• On the other
hand, difference can also be defined by means of the
principle 'A~ -A'. The principle of difference,
taken on its own, says that 'no two things are the
same ••• everything is different from everything
else'S. If this is the case, then there can, sim-
ilarly, be no 'room' for identity.
As Hegel says, these two principles
contradict one another: 'the assumption of any of
these principles rules out the assumption of the
others,6. Something is either the same as itself
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and everything is indistinguishable from every-
thing else or everything is different to every-
thing else and there is no room for identity.
As in Greek aporiai, the principle of non-contra-
diction, which says that nothing can both be and
not be (something) at the same time, leads to
such 'impassable dilemmas' as people like Zeno
were wont to describe.
In his account, Stanley Rosen sug-
gests that Hegel's intention in the face of such
problems is 'to say what is "unsayable" in trad-
itional logic. He claims thereby to complete or
explain, and not to annihilate traditional logic'?
And, if aporiai may be described as the negation
of the possibility of human thought, then Hegel
intends his Logic as the negation of that negation,
a negation which, as shall be seen, he considers to
be a positive effect. Thus, briefly, contradiction
must be thought as productive and the ground of
thought, (and thus the real), rather than as limit,
obstacle, a dilemma that blocks further thought.
Identity
Non-dialectical thought, what Hegel
sometimes calls external reflection, thought that
does not meet the subject matter on its own ground~,
conceives identity as 'aloof from difference,9.
Such thought says that identity and difference 'are
different, that identity is not difference,lO.
66
However, to say this is to say that 'identity is
different: for ~xternal reflection says that] iden-
tity is different from difference'. This assertion,
that identity is not difference, implies that 'iden-
tity, not externally but in its own self ••• is this,
to be different,ll. External reflection's notion of
identity, according to Hegel, is a 'one sided deter-
minateness which as such has no truth,l2. So Hegel
wants to 'complete,l3 this idea of identity -
'truth is only complete in the unity of identity
with difference'.
If external reflection's notion of iden-
tity were true, if that one sided determination of
identity were true, then statements like 'A plant is
a plant' and 'God is God' would be more than 'abso-
lute verbiage'. On Hegel's view they are 'absolute
verbiage' and a view of identity like that put for-
ward by external reflection, which attempts to con-
ceive identity as simply the same as itself, can say
nothing new of anything.
The reason for this is as follows. If
such statements are seen as trying to bring out some
new truth or determination of the thing and that does
not happen (nothing new is learnt from a tautology)
then 'identical thought contradicts itself'; 'iden-
tity, instead of being in its own self truth ••• is
the passage beyond itself into the dissolution of
itself,l•• Identity, in and for itself, then, must
contain some essential reference to difference and
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difference must, as far as Hegel is concerned, be
an essential part of identity.
Difference
So, even to identify something with
itself, as in the principle of identity, 'A=A', that
'A' must be differentiated from itself: this is what
Hegel calls absolute difference, difference in and
for itself and thus identity contains differencelS•
This absolute difference is to be dis-
tinguished from the 'otherness of determinate being',
where one determinate being is differentiated from
another. This latter sort of difference, the differ-
ence that is posited between things by an external
observer, Hegel terms 'diversity': what he calls ex-
ternal reflection deals with a sort of difference
that is not (a) dialectical difference, (a) differ-
ence, and therefore identity, that are opposed and
in contradiction. For external reflection, identity
and difference are opposed and in contradiction in
that!! identity and difference they are unlike them-
selvesle• Neither is the same as itself insofar as
it is only through external reflection that they
!£! in the first place. So, where external reflec-
tion posits the separateness of identity and differ-
ence, Hegel shows that that separateness is actually
or dialectically a connectedness - identity and dif-
ference are connected or mediated by contradiction.
Given this, absolute difference, the
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difference of something, even the 'A' of the prin-
ciple of identity, from itself, is 'the difference
of difference from itself,17. Difference, then, is
not only itself but also its other: that which is
different from difference is identity and difference
is therefore itself, difference and its other, id-
entity. Absolute difference, the other of essence,
'is the other in and for itself, not the other of
some other existent outside itself,lB. So differ-
ence, as difference of itself from itself, is not
different from identity, (in that identity is also
different in itself from itself), and the dialectic-
al result is the identity of identity and difference.
Contradiction
Hegel notes that 'difference as such is
already implicitly contradiction,19 and, as Rosen
says, to have understood Hegel's ideas on identity
and difference is to have grasped the structure of
contradiction as he presents it.
However, 'the determination of opposition',
that, for example, between the principle of identity
and the principle of difference, 'has also been made
into a law: the so-called law of the excluded middle;
something is either A or -A, there is no third,20.
But, as Hegel says, the third that is indifferent to
the opposition is in fact given in the law itself,
A is given in that law.
That is, as the discussion of identity
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and difference has made clear, identity is at once
both the same as itself and different from itself:
The something itself, therefore, is the
third that was supposed to have been ex-
cluded. Since the opposite determinations
in the something are just as much posited
as sublated in this positing, the third
which has here the form of a dead some-
thing, when taken more profoundly, is the
unity of reflection into which the oppo-
sition withdraws as its ground. II
Contradiction is the ground, then, of
identity and difference: the opposition is grounded
in contradiction and rather than contradiction prov-
ing the limit or reflection, it is its source. As
Hegel says, 'on this point, formal thinking lays
down for its principle that contradiction is unthink-
able: but as a matter of fact, the thinking of con-
tradiction is the essential moment of the notion,22.
Contradiction is thus the identity of identity and
difference23, the 'absolute activity' and 'absolute
ground' that 'contains and supports its determinat-
ions,28.
The resolution of contradiction in any
finite sphere, in appearance, for example, does not
take place 'within' that sphere, for that sphere is,
necessarily, finite and contradictory. Rather it
has a 'higher sphere for its negative unity, for its
ground,25. As Hegel says in the introduction to the
Science of Logic, the result of the negation of neg-
ation 'is higher and richer than its predecessor',
it contains the previous negated stage, but also
'something more,26: onwards and upwards to Absolute
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Knowledge and the attaining of Wisdom.
Thus, 'identity and difference are in-
separable but distinguishable features of opposition
as the general characteristic of positing, or the
manifesting of appearance, a positing which is, es
such, a self-negation,2t.
Finally, and as is fairly well kno~n,
the way in which Hegel conceives himself to be im-
plicated or caught up in the dialectical progression
of philosophical forms is as the completion of that
progression. In understanding the development of
history as forms of philosophically available con-
sciousness or mind, Hegel claims that that history
has been completed2!. This however, is not to say
that Hegel conceives himself as standing outside
history or philosophy. Rosen describes the case
economically:
Wisdom is speculation; the Absolute thinking
itself, albeit within its individual manifes-
tations as wise men, of whom the first in
human history is Hegel. Speculation in man
comes after the completion of theory in prac-
tice whereas in God it is perpetual. Thus,
by achieving the level of speculation, man
identifies himself with God or dwells in et-
ernity, but in an eternity that includes
temporality. To this extent, Hegel's eter-
nity is temporalised. 29
While Hegel has attained wisdom, then,
and completed history, as the sage and akin to God,
he is, nevertheless, part of that history, part of
that temporality.
Thus, basically, does Hegel present the
elements of dialectics, identity, difference and
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opposition, in the Science of Logic. The relation
to feminism, to ec- centric economy, will be dis-
cussed here in terms of the roles of difference and
opposition. That is, Hegel's account of economy
represents a particular version of the production
of value. It ~ill be shown that this version is
phallocentric insofar as it involves various charac-
teristic operations being performed upon difference
and opposition. Those operations consist in the
reduction or mastering of difference to produce an
opposition from ~hich nothing is 'lost' - an oppo-
sition which, far from proving the limit to thought
or the chaotic dispersion of meaning and value, con-
serves and preserves that meaning and value.
Simpl~ the claim is that one sort of
difference, difference as diversity, is mastered by,
or turned, by what Hegel considers its own, internal,
movement, into dialectical, speculative difference.
Similarly, the opposition of two terms in diversity,
~hich has been variously represented as aporia, un-
productive and a falling apart, is mastered by or
turned, again by what Hegel considers the movement
of the dialectic, into contradiction and aufhebung,
the productive ground that accounts for both terms.
In that contradiction does account for both terms
and in that difference is already implicitly contra-
diction, Hegel's dialectic consists in operations
which amount to the ordering and mastering of dif-
ference to produce an opposition (i.e. contradiction)
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from which nothing is lost: aufhebung is thus a
speculative force in more than one sense30•
Aufhebung, that is, organises differ-
ence as diversity into difference as the identity
of identity and difference. A difference that, as
noted, has been represented as aporia, unproductive
and 8 falling apart is organised by the relation to
the centre of Hegelian economics, aufhebung, to be-
come a productive ground. Insofar as it was shown
in chapter two that the role of the centre was phal-
locentric, then Hegel's account of economy may be
described as phallocentric.
Before looking at the roles of power
and desire 1n Hegelian economics, however, reference
should be made to the tension between centric and
ec- centric economy in those economics. Although
this review of Hegel's dialectics is not specific-
ally concerned with that tension here, ec- centric
economy may be said to be found in the references to
identity continually passing beyond itself as its
own dissolution3~. While the identity which is the
result of aufhebung continually dissolves itself in
ec- centric economy, that ec- centric economy is al-
ways mastered or reduced in the 'next' aufhebung and
Hegelian economics consists in the tension between
these two moments.
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Power and Desire
This section is concerned with the
roles of power and desire in Hegel's economics and
uses the description of the relations between mas-
ter and slave to illustrate those roles. The ten-
sian between centric and ec- centric economy will
be seen to be reflected in the role of death as cen-
tre, as the stable value in terms of which the ac-
tions of the protagonists receive the value or mean-
ing that they have. Death as this stable, organising
value exists in a tension with death as a meaningless
negativity, a death that is destructive of meaning
and value and is ultimately privileged above it.
Similarly, that power is required to be represented
and that desire is essentially for something that is
absent in this economy will be shown to be instances
of the versions of power and desire that are found
in centred economy.
At this particular stage iD the produc-
tion of meaning and value, in the appearance of spir-
it as it is described in the Phenomenology, self-con-
sciousness 'exists only in being acknowledged,32.
In the process of recognition, rather than just rec-
ognising itself in the object, (in the object of de-
sire, for example, which is negated in the satisfac-
tion of that desire in being consumed), self-conscious-
ness only exists in recognising itself in and being
recognised by another consciousness. So, not only
does self-consciousness recognise itself in another
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self-consciousness but 'this action of the one has
itself the double significance of being both its
own action and the action of the other as well,33.
Self-consciousness does not relate to
the other as an object, 'merely 8S it exists ••• for
desire', but as a consciousness that has an 'indep-
endent existence of its own,34. Each self-conscious-
ness 'sees the other do the same as it does: each
does itself what it demands of the other'. As Gada-
35mer's exa~ple of the greeting illustrates , 'action
by one side would be useless because what is to hap-
pen can only be brought about by both,36. Thus, they
'recognise themselves as mutually recognising one
another,37.
Having accounted for the notion of rec-
ognition, Hegel deals with the process as it appears
to self-consciousness. To begin with, self-conscious-
ness is what Hegel calls 'simple being-far-self', it
is an individual from which all otherness has been
excluded to be confronted as unessential, negative
object3B• Thus, when one self-consciousness confronts
another, when 'one individual is confronted by ano-
ther individual', they are for each other just shapes
of consciousness. They are like ordinary objects
which have not yet 'rooted out' 'the purely negative
being of self-identical consciousness'. Insofar as
'each is ••• certain of its own self, but not of the
other ••• its own self-certainty still has no truth,39.
Thus, as Hegel says, according to the
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Notion of recognition, essential self-certainty 'is
possible only when each is for the other what the
other is for it,4e: the two individuals must have
exposed themselves to each other as pure being for
self or as self-consciousness. It is at this point
that the relation to death begins to take a part.
The presentation of self that is necessary for self-
certainty to have any truth consists in sho~ing that
it is 'not attached to any specific existence •••
that it is not attached to life,41. This presentat-
ion, Hegel asserts, is a twofold action: as with the
account of the Notion of recognition, action on both
sides is required.
The relation to death begins to take a
part insofar as each seeks the death of the other
and insofar as each must stake its own life in order
that its self-certainty be raised to the level of
truth. In this way, Hegel says that the relation of
two 'self-conscious individuals is such that they
prove themselves and each other in a life and death
struggle,42. Only by engaging in this struggle and
staking one's life is the certainty of being for
self raised to truth since only this will prove that
the essence of that self-consciousness is 'not (just)
being, not the immediate form in which it appears,4J.
Similarly, only in seeking the other's death can the
self-externality of consciousness be avoided, since•
it is in the other that self-consciousness recog-
nises itself and thus recognises itself as being
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outside of itself.
Death as 'abstract negation', however,
4-as 'negation without independence' 4, cannot sort
the masters from the slaves: the simple annihilation
of the other produces nothing that is significant or
meaningful in terms of Hegel's dialectics. The sort
of negation that can elevate self-consciousness to
certainty of itself is not, on Hegel's account, an-
nihilation. It is, rather, the negation that comes
from consciousness which 'supercedes in such a way
as to preserve and maintain what is superceded,45.
In the relation to and experience of death, then,
self-consciousness 'learns that life is as essential
to it as pure self-consciousness,46 and death 8S ab-
stract negation turns the two opposed consciousnesses
into 'lifeless, merely immediate unopposed extremes'
the middle term of which has itself collapsed into
'a lifeless unity'.
So, if consciousness learns that life
is essential to its self-certainty, it must needs
recognise itself in another consciousness that is
not simply annihilated but which rather exists for
another consciousness. Thus consciousness is divi-
ded into consciousness that is for itself, pure self-
consciousness, and consciousness that is not for it-
self but for another. The former Hegel calls master
and the latter slave. That is, the self-conscious-
ness that can put its life at stake in the struggle
and which brings about the self-negation of another
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self-consciousness as being for self is the aspect
of self-consciousness that Hegel calls mastery.
And the aspect of self-consciousness that does so
exist for another, that has not proved itself indep-
endent in the struggle but which has not, equally,
been annihilated, Hegel calls servile consciousness.
Thus, as Rosen puts it, 'the victor in
the struggle for recognition is acknowledged as the
41master of the slave's desire' • And, as Hegel puts
it, 'what desire has failed to achieve (the master]
succeeds in doing, viz. to have done with the thing
altogether and to achieve satisfaction in the enjoy-
ment of it,4S. Where once the thing was independent
and desire was thus dependent upon it, the efforts
of the slave destroy that independence and the mas-
ter 'takes to himself only the dependent aspect of
the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it,4S.
However, insofar as servile conscious-
ness is servile, the truth of the master's self-con-
sciousness, (which is provided in servile conscious-
ness), 'is in reality the unessential consciousness
. 50and 1ts unessential action' • That is, the process
of recognition that transpires between these two mo-
menta of self-consciousness is 'one sided and uneq-
ual'S! insofar as the slave is servile, dependent,
and does not do to the master what the master does
(to) himself, make his other servile and set aside
his being-for-self. Insofar as the recognition is
one-sided and unequal, the master cannot be 'certain
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of being-far-self as the truth of himself,S2.
50, Hegel says, 'the truth of the indep-
endent consciousness is ••• the servile consciousness
of the slave,S3, even if it first appears that the
slave does not know thisS4. It is, as noted above,
death, which Hegel calls the Absolute Master, that
effects the transformation of servile consciousness
o t 't 1 0 ddt 0 , 551n 0 ru y 1n epen en conSC10usness • The slave's
fear of the master is a sort of mundane version of
his fear of the Absolute Master: the former makes
the moment of 'pure being for self' explicit while
i th 1 tt 0 tOO 10 0 tS6n e a er 1 remS1ns 1mp 1C1 • It is through
the service of the master that the slave 'becomes
conscious of "'hathe truly is,S7 since that service
rids the slave of his 'attachment to natural exist-
ence' and forms the beginning of his becoming indep-
endentS8•
That is, the experience of death 'leaves'
servile consciousness nothing but pure being for
self: what is here implicit is explicit in the exper-
ience of the master and the work servile conscious-
ness performs in the service of the master is the be-
ginning of the 'working off' of natural existence,
its dependence on the object. This is because work
is desire 'held in check'. Where the desire of the
master is satisfied in the annihilation of the object
that has been produced by the slave, the desire of
the slave is 'delayed' insofar as his work shapes
and forms the thing. In that the slave's negative
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relation to the thing, work, forms the thing, that
work assumes a permanence outside of the slave.
In the independence of the thing produced, then,
the slave recognises his own independence, something
which the master, who has not worked on the thing,
cannot do.
This, then, is the basis of Hegel's
account of the master/slave relationship. The ver-
sion of un-aufgehoben difference, difference that
resists being negated and conserved in the process
of the dialectic, that is most apparent here appears
in the relation to death. In the struggle for rec-
SSognition, master and slave are said at one point
to remain unopposed: they are lifeless extremes and
are related by the similarly lifeless medium or unity
of death as abstract negation. That is, these two
identities constitute a difference but it has not
yet become an oPPosition, a productive difference.
It is a difference that remains un-aufgehoben.
Thus, of the two sorts of death, it is
death as that which 'supercedes in such a way as to
preserve and .aintain what is superr.eded,60 which
ensures that the truth of self-certainty becomes
attainable to consciousness. Death as abstract neg-
ation contributes nothing meaningful to the process
of recognition involving, as it does, the disappear-
ance of the 'essential moment' at which the two self-
consciousnesses divide into opposed extremes. It is
this sort of difference and this sort of death that
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the Hegelian dialectic cannot cope ~ith: it cannot
master it and preserve it in the next stage. For
Hegelian dialectics, this difference is meaningless
and valueless.
As in the account of identity and dif-
ference, then, the tension between centric and ec-
centric economy manifests itself in the way in which
difference that is not organised or ordered in terms
of a relation to aufhebung or productive death is
considered to be meaningless and valueless. This in-
different difference6! is, by the logic of the dia-
lectic, superceded and becomes meaningful and valu-
able. Master and slave, related as identity and dif-
ference, pass from being unopposed extremes in indif-
ferent difference and having no meaning or value as
self certainty, to being opposed in dialectical dif-
ference in which their meaning and value 8S master
and slave are assured by virtue of their relation to
aufhebung, productive death.
Power and desire are similarly organised
in the master/slave dialectic. It is, basically, the
desire that one's self-certainty be recognised by the
other and thus that one's dominance be represented
which provides the initial movement of this process.
Rather than desire being simply satisfied in the con-
sumption of the object, now that object is itself
consciousness and desire desires the recognition of
that consciousness. If it can manage the negation
of that consciousness in such a way that, although
81
it is negated, it is not thereby annihilated, then
it is dominant or the all powerful master with regard
to servile consciousness.
Desire, then, is the 'motor' of the
dialectic and power is the limit to the slave's des-
ire. The master's power determines that the slave
works for the master's satisfaction rather than for
his own. It is only later, when the truth of the
master's self-consciousness is found to lie in un-
essential servile consciousness, that the slave~s
desire is liberated from this imposition and he comes
to enjoy the object produced as reflecting him.
Family, State, Sexual difference
This chapter has 50 far described the
workings of Hegelian dialectics and followed those
workings through the master/slave relationship, the
process in which consciousness becomes certain of
itself as self-consciousness. However, as Derrida
points out, 'we cannot describe a phenomenology of
spirit, that is to say, following the sub-title, an
"experience of consciousness", without recognising
the onto-economic work of the familyI6~. That is,
if it is the case that consciousness only proceeds
to self certainty in interaction with other cons- .
ciousnesses, it is also the case that consciousness
is always en famille: 'consciousness ••• only bec-
ames for itself - only becomes consciousness - in
the family,63.
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Predating the Oedipal and Anti-Oedipal
dramas of Freud and of Deleuze and Guattari, Hegel's
account of the production of value involves a con-
sideration of familial and hence sexual relations.
Hegel's account of economy, of oikos nomos, may be
found in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philo-
sophy of Right. This section will elucidate the
parts played by sexuality in the production of mean-
ing and value and account for the way in which ec-
centric economy is mastered in Hegel's tale of that
production.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's
account of the family and sexual relations is found
at the point at which he discusses 'the ethical or-
der,64, and the way in which unreflective forms of
ethical life, (ethical substance), develop into ref-
lective or self-conscious forms and ultimately des-
troy the ethical order65• Given that all is gover-
ned by the process of the dialectic, it is no surp-
rise to find that, as in the account of master and
slave, the transition from unreflective to reflec-
tive ethical life involves the negation and preser-
vation of the previous stage. The account of sexual
and familial relations, that is, is structurally
homologous to the account of the relations between
master and slave.
So, the first thing that ethical life
or sUbstance does is to split itself into two, into
human and divine law66• Human law is associated
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in this account with the nation or community and
with the citizens of that nation. Human law is the
known law, that which is conscious of itself67•
Confronting the human law is divine law: 'the ethi-
cal power of the state, being the moment of self-
conscious action, finds its antithesis in the simple
and immediate essence of the ethical sphere,68.
Divine law is associated here with the
family, it is 'the unconscious, still inner Notion
(of the ethical order) [an~ stands opposed to its
actual, self-conscious existence,69. The family,
then, as this unconscious or immediate being of the
ethical order, stands opposed to the nation or state.
Hegel says that the family 'stands over against that
order which shapes and maintains itself by working
for the universal' •. The gods of the household stand
opposed to the universal spirit represented by the
self-conscious state.
As in the production of self-conscious-
ness in the master/slave dialectic, the production
of self-conscious ethical life is accomplished by
leaving the immediate, natural and unconscious, in
reflection in something external and is organised in
terms of the relation to death. The individual,
insofar as it is the individual, a member of the fam-
ily and not a citizen, remains 'only an unreal and
impotent shadow,70. That is, insofar as the indiv-
idual does not take part in the life of the state
and does not, as Hegel has it, 'work for the univer-
sal' that is external to the family, its ethical
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consciousness is not a self-consciousness.
Although the individual in this condi-
tion may attain a sort of universality, it is not,
says Hegel, 'the result of an action consciously
done,7l. This sort of universality is an immediate
or natural universality and corresponds to death.
Like death as abstract negation, as seen in the mas-
ter/slave dialectic, this death is unproductive and
contributes nothing valuable to the ethical sub-
stance. It is rather in the 'work' that the indiv-
idual performs in the state that ethical conscious-
ness 'returns to itself and becomes self-conscious-
ness,72.
This externalisation or passage from
the family to the community or state is thus the
passage from divine to human law and according to
Hegel it is only the males of the family who (can)
do this. The feminine, for Hegel, is associated
with the Penates, the gods of the household, and
since the law of the family, like divine law, is
the unconscious, inner essence 'that is not exposed
to the daylight of consciousness,73, the feminine
may have only 'intuitive awareness of what is ethi-
cal' and may not attain to consciousness of it 74.
So, where 'the sister becomes or the wife remains
the head of the household and the guardian of div-
ine law,75, the 'brother leaves this immediate,
elemental life of the family in order to acquire and
produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself
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and actual,?6.
Thus at this particular st~ge in the
development of economy, of the production of meaning
and value, the feminine is presented as associated
with the 'nether world', the gods of the household,
and is said to stand opposed to the self-conscious
and universal concerns of the state, the affairs of
men. As such, the feminine is the enemy of the state
but at the same time is essential to it. The femin-
ine, that is, is a necessary part of the economy
but one which is subversive of that economy and which
must be supressed or mastered in order that the self-
conscious stage of ethical life, the universal con-
cerns of the community, be produced.
Hegel says, then, that 'human law in
its universal existence is the community, in its ac-
tivity in general is the manhood of the community •••
it !!, moves and maintains itself by consuming and
absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates
or the separation into independent families presid-
ed over by womenkind'?? The feminine is thus pres-
ented as the internal and necessary enemy of the
state, 'the eternal irony (in the life) of the com-
munity,?8, and works, not only to subvert the ends
of government, but also to corrupt male youth. The
latter is accomplished through ridiculing and mock-
ing the universal and 'earnest wisdom of mature age'
so that youth finds nothing worthy in it. Ultimate-
ly, Hegel says, the work of the feminine is to
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transform 'the universal end of government into a
private end' and to 'pervert the universal property
of the state into a possession and ornament for the
family,80.
At this point, Hegel says that the con-
tradictions in ethical life force its ruin and cause
the passage into another form81• However, this next
form does not concern this chapter: what this sect-
ion has been concerned with is the way in which the
feminine, as that which resists being mastered by
the concerns of the state, is presented as the inter-
nal and necessary enemy of the state which must be
negated and conserved in order that the passage to
self-conscious ethical life be effected. It is,
moreover, only at a particular stage that sexual be-
ing acquires what Hegel calls an ethical signific-
ance.
In li!!!, Derrida says that, for Hagel,
male and female are not originally opposed as two
terms of an opposition. Rather, he suggests that
they are opposed as indifference and difference:
'sexual difference is the difference between indif-
ference and diffarence,82. However, in order to be
sublated, (releve), difference must be determined as
opposition. Sexual difference, that is, is not ori-
ginally an opposition that may be productively sub-
lated; it exists as diversity or what has been des-
cribed above as an indifferent difference. So, al-
though sexual identity is a function of a sort of
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difference, it is only the sort of difference in
which the terms exist as opposition, governed by
a relation to a transcendental signified, that is
truly meaningful or valuable in Hegel's account.
Thus it is that Hegel says that only
when the brother, the male, passes from being con-
cerned with human law and the female, the sister,
assumes the guardianship of divine law do 'the
two sexes overcome their merely natural being and
. th· thi I . .f . ,83 5·· I Iappear 1n e1r e ca slgn1 1cance .• 1m1 ar y,
in the Philosophy of Right84, 'the differences in
the physical characteristics of the two sexes' is
said to have a rational basis and consequently ac-
quire 'intellectual and ethical significance'.
Only insofar as difference has been organised in re-
lation to aufhebung, (whether it is presented as the
transition beyond the family, as in the Phenomenology
of Spirit, or as marriage and the dissolution of the
family, as in the Philosophy of Right), does it, and
the identity dependent upon it, assume any meaning
or significance in Hegel's dialectic85•
It is interesting that in his account
of the role and position of women in the ethical
life of society, Hegel prefigures what Freud says.
Both are seemingly committed to the idea that women
occupy a position of marginality or supplementarity
with regard to the central male concern with the
ethical. Women, or 'the feminine', for both Hegel
and Freud, never achieve full ethical consciousness86•
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However, before looking at Freud in chapter eight,
the next section will deal with Nietzsche's atti-
tudes to the matter of economy in order to contin-
ue the task of accounting for the possibility of
feminism as it has been elaborated so far.
NIETZSCHE
Introductory
It might be supposed either that Niet-
zsche is relatively unconcerned with dialectics or
that his work is eminently dialectical. Neither
Danto nor Hollingdale make any reference to either
Hegel or dialectics in the indexes to their works
on Nietzsche and Hayman refers only to Hegel. Alter-
natively, passages like "How The Real World At Last
Became A Myth" and a general conception of will to
power as a collection of conflicting forces might
be understood as dialectical accounts of events or
phenomena.
However, as Deleuze says, 'we have
every reason to assume a profound knowledge of the
Hegelian movement in Nietzsche ••• Hegelian themes
are to be found in this work as the enemy to be op-
posed,8? So, apart from the fact that they 'define
Nietzsche's positions' with regard to dialectics,
those elements of his work that will be discussed
here are also those which will be seen later to det-
ermine and polarise Adorno's, Heidegger's and
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Derrida's, Foucault's and Deleuze and Guattari's
responses to Hegel and dialectics.
Critique of identity
In Daybreak, § 474, Nietzsche tells us
that both dialectics (Plato) and its antithesis,
(Schopenhauer) are 'wrong' - 'for the thing to which
they wish to show us the way does not exist'.
Thus the first and perhaps most obvious
of Nietzsehe's critiques of dialectics concerns the
absence of any telos: there is no end point, and
indeed, no simple origin, (as The Genealogy of Morals
makes clear), that could provide a key to the mean-
ing or direction of history. It is suggested that
the idea of eternal return may be seen as a critique
of all arche- and telos- positing philosophies. The
eternal return indicates that there never was nor
could be a simple arche, (in a Husserlian sense, for
example), and that there is not, nor could there be,
a telos, (in precisely, for this essay, a Hegelian
sense), that could organise and render meaningful,
either once and for all, (in the state of Wisdom),
or.in particular cases, (in the aufhebung of contra-
diction), the elements of history, philosophy, dis-
course and so on.
Part of the argument, such as it is,
for the eternal return, is to be found in The Will
to Power. In I 1062, Nietzsche says that 'If the
world had a goal, it must have been reached. If
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there were for it some unintended final state, this
also must have been reached ••• The fact of "spirit"
as a form of becoming proves that the world has no
goal, no final state and is incapable of being'.
The talk of 'spirit', 'becoming' and 'final states'
here is undoubtedly talk of Hegelian themes and as
such suggests that the eternal return is to be under-
stood as being, if not directed against, then at
least concerned with Hegel's treatment of these
themes. As Nietzsche says, the ideas of eternal re-
turn and will to power are interpretations and here
he seems to be interpreting the 'same' phenomena
as Hegel to give a result that is completely differ-
ent to the interpretation that Hegel gives.
In The Will to Power, I 516, Nietzsche
says that 'we are unable to affirm and deny one and
the same thing: this is 8 subjective empirical law,
not the expression of any necessity, but only of an
inability'. The subjective empirical law that pro-
hibits us from affirming and denying one and the
same thing is the logicians principle of non-contra-
diction, logic being 'bound to the condition: assume
there are identical cases,a8. However, either the
principle of non-contradiction 'asserts something
about actuality, about being, as if one knew this
from some other source; that is, as if opposite at-
tributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the propo-
sition means; opposite attributes should not be as-
cribed to it,89.
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Since we have no knowledge of entities
prior to there being entities known, 'the proposi-
tion therefore contains no criterion of truth, but
an imperative concerning what should count as true,90.
Our 'coarse and false' senses, which would give the
'instinctive proof; I cannot have two opposite sen-
sations at the same time"', under the influence of
'ceaseless experience, which seems ••• to confirm
it', lead us to the belief in stable, self-identical
things and hence to the stable, self-identical 'A'
of 10gic91•
Thus Nietzsche says that 'the 'A' of
logic is ••• a reconstruction of the thing': 'Logic
applies only to fictitious entities that we have
created,92 and rests upon the 'sensualistic preju-
dice' that leads to the 'fundamental falsification
of all events,93. That is, the senses would give
the 'proof', 'I cannot have two opposite sensations
at the same time', which falsifies events and things.
Consequently, logic reconstructs events and things
to give the stable and self-identical 'A' of the
principle of non-contradiction. Logic, then, sup-
posedly based upon the principle of non-contradic-
tion, along with all that is in turn held to rest
upon logic, (dialectics, knowledge, language and so
on), deals only with things that have been (taken
apart and) put (back) together in terms of this log-
° f Od tOt 941C 0 1 en 1 y~ •
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Will to Power I
In The Will to Power, 8 46, Nietzsche
says that 'there is no will,95. This is qualified
later when he says that 'the will of psychology
hitherto is an unjustified generalisation ••• this
will does not exist at all,96. Like the 'A' of log-
ic, the will of psychology is a reconstruction and
a falsification of a more 'primordial' will - 'the
Thus, if 'pleasure is every increase of
to power,9?
98power' ,
most intimate essence of being is will
then such questions as '••• ~ feels pleasure?
••• who wants power?' are absurd, since 'the essen-
ce itself is power-will and consequently feelings
of pleasure and displeasure,99. The 'who' of the
subject comes after, or is an effect of, the reduc-
tion and mastering of will to power and to ask who
feels pleasure is absurd when it is power-will that
is feelings of pleasure and displeasure.
What gets talked about as will, (and
what must be unlearned or 're-learned', in some
sense, in order to talk about power_will~OO) is a
particular form of will - one that involves the re-
construction of will to power according to the logic
of identity. And what gets talked about as power is
a particular form of power which involves the idea
that there is first of all a subject, a 'who' that
possesses and enjoys power and which has similarly
reconstructed and occluded will to power.
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Will to power, then, is a version of
~hat Foucault has referred to as 'micro-power' or
power with a small 'p': 'the moving substrate of
force relations which, by virtue of their inequal-
ity, constantly engender states of power,lOl.
This will to power, this shifting substrate ef
forces, coupled with 'an insatiable demand for the
demonstration of power,l02, provides the basis for
what appears and is experienced as the will of psy-,
chology taking possession of and enjoying the exer-
cise of power, of sovereign pewer or what Foucault
would call power with a capital 'p'.
On the other hand, insofar as will to
power is 'an insatiable demand for the demonstrat-
ion of power', for an increase in the feeling of
pleasure and is nen-subjective, it bears resemblan-
ces to, indeed, Descombes says that it is, what
Deleuze and Guattari call desire. In their Anti-
Oedipus, desire is not subjective until there is
'repression' of it, until it has been codified or
reconstructed according to the logic of identityl03.
Dialectics, then, insofar as it con-
ceives of power as the representation or recons-
truction of power, may be said to deal only with
finished objects and cannot cope with the produc-
tion of those objects in will to power. The master
in Hegel's master/slave dialectic requires that his
power be recognised, thus he desires that it be
represented. On Nietzsche's account, this would
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be to conceive and 'dialecticise' power 'after the
event': in the same way as the 'A' of logic is a
reconstruction and occlusion of the thing, the po-
wer of the master is a re-presentation and falsi-
fication of a more original and non-representable
form of power that Nietzsche calls will to power.
Will to Power II
Such an interpretation is consistent
with elements of the readings of Nietzsche to be
found in the work of Pautrat, Klossowski, Oerrida
and Bataille. As Pautrat says in his Versions du
50leill04, Nietzsche's version of history is a
destin sans eourguoi which only finds its place
in another h1story which is eccentric to that
of meaning and more comprehensive than any dia-
lectic. It is a history that is as prior to
meaning as it is to non-meaning: the history
of life as will to power. 104
And, in a footnote to the same, he says that
we could say that history in Nietzsche unfolds
itself as a history that exceeds the dialectic,
ruled by the accidental necessity, (l'accidental
necessaire), by a necessity which is not the
necessity of meaning. 105
That is, history as will to power is that which
must be and has been reduced and occluded in order
that history as meaning and non-meaning, as dialec-
tical movement, can be written. History as dialec-
tic, then, involves objects that have been organi-
sed in terms of meaning and non-meaning: they have
been reconstructed according to a 'necessity of mean-
ing' which fixes and limits them, reducing their ex-
cess to something manageable.
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Thus dialectics deals ~ith already con-
stituted objects and cannot account for the (non dia-
lectical) constitution of those objects as invested
by will to power in eternal return. And thus some-
thing of value is lost in the limiting of the econo-
mic play of will to power that takes place with dia-
lectics or any other necessity of meaning. It is
interesting to note that in The Will to Power, § 1067,
Nietzsche describes the world as 'a household ~ith-
out expenses or losses but likewise without increase
or income': through the history of the words oikos
nomos, Nietzsche is aware of the relation between
the transvaluation of values and the management of
the household.
Another aspect of the claim that dia-
lectics cannot cope with the excess that is found
experience and which Nietzsche refers to as will to
power is found in his discussion of language and
sensation in Daybreak. In I 195, Nietzsche says 'we
are deceived by a similarity of words and concepts;
but behind them lies a sensation that ~ to be for-
eign, incomprehensible and painful to modern sensi-
bility'., This sensation is the one which the sen-
sualistic prejudice noted above cannot account for
since it renders equal or the same what are dispar-
ate experiences and they are these sensations or ex-
periences that are lost in the ordering of phenomena
and events by the dialectic or a necessity of mean-
ing.
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These ideas, that ~e are deceived by the
seeming identity of word and concept, and that dia-
lee tics cannot cope with or account for the exper-
ience of will to power in eternal return, will be
discussed again later in the sections on Adorno's
negative dialectics, which employ precisely this
quote, and Derrida's deconstructive strategies.
Dialectics and Nihilism
So, will ta power in eternal return
may be described as ec- centric economy and it is
mastered or reduced by centric economy, of which
dialectics is an example; Nietzsche's position with
regard to dialectics cannot, therefore, be a simple
one. Thus he says in Ecce Homol06, that 'I contra-
dict as has never been contradicted before and yet
th et f . e it,107 Ne tam e oppos~ e 0 a no-say~ng sp~r • ~e z-
sche claims to say things 'differently' and 'appo-
sitively' about difference and opposition in such a
way that he is 'different to' and the 'opposite of'
the thought of Hegelian dialectics.
As noted, difference for Hegel was
already contradiction, it 'already' had the inter-
nal structure of opposition. This contradiction,
moreover, was not to be thought of as a contingency
or abnormalityl08. It was, rather, 'the root of
all movement and vitality', the ground of identity
and differencel09• Hegel's difference, as contra-
diction, the unity of identity and difference, is
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always already mastered or sublated via the negation
of negation. Nietzsche's differences, on the other
hand, are to be enjoyed and affirmed: they do not
contradict, like Hegel's difference, and thus are
not to be relieved in the identity of a third term.
Deleuze suggests that it is the role of
the negative in Nietzsche's work that separates him
from Hegel's version of dialecticsllO• Nietzsche's
widersprechen, his speaking against and differently,
is not the contradiction that is Hegel's difference
in that it would permit differences to exist but not
as contradiction, not, as Foucault has it, 'under
the rule of the negative, as an instance of non-be-
ing,lll, since this would be the prelude to the Heg-
elian negation of negation, the lifting up, inter-
iorising and preserving that would reduce the dif-
ference to the identity of identity and difference.
In this way, Nietzsche's contradictions
or differences appear as the articulation of differ-
ences outside, beyond or as they exceed the dialectic,
the centred economy of a necessity of meaning.
Strictly, it appears as the articulation of differen-
ces, intensities and mobilisations of forces, of will
to power. Thus it is that Nietzsche can differ from
himself without either collapsing into a state in
which every pronouncement is equally worthless or
providing some arche or telos that would provide the
source and measure of the meaning of each of those
pronouncements. A no saying spirit is the spirit
98
of nihilism and the problem is how he that contra-
dicts, 'how he that says No ••• to everything to
which one has so far said Yes can nevertheless be
th it f .. it,ll2e oppos e 0 a no-saY1ng sp1r •
Moreover, in the same way that Nietzsche
can differ from and contradict other thinkers, he
may also be said to differ from and contradict him-
self. He does this on numerous occasions - on the
matter of dialectics, for example. He says in rh!
Will to Power that when one wields the dialectic,
'one has a merciless weapon in one's hands,ll3. And
in Twilight of the Idolsl14, dialectics is said to
be the philosophy of slaves, that it 'can only serve
a defensive arm'. In Ecce Homol15, Nietzsche says
that apart from being a decadent, he is also the
opposite.
These pronouncements do not make any
simple, coherent sense, as would be provided by an
;arche or a telos. Nor do they prove completely mean-
ingless, as they would if they were simply contradic-
tory. And nor can they be clearly reconciled into
the identity of Hegelian difference. As Nietzsche
says, they are only his truths. And as Oerrida
comments, they are multiple, variegated, contradic-
tory, even~116.
Nietzsche may be seen as attempting to
be the opposite of the spirit of nihilism, as com-
pleting and thus overcoming European nihilism inso-
far as his no-saying, his differences, are not the
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no-saying and differences of the dialectic but are
rather that which exceeds the dialectic. They are
the differences of will to power, of the different
and conflicting forces in will to power, rather
than the stable, codified differances of dialectic.
As such, they are not different to Hegel's differ-
ence in the way that Hegel's difference operates -
Nietzsche can differ, contradict and say No without
being a no-saying spirit.
He is thus an 'active nihilist,ll7,
the 'completion' of European nihilismlll, insofar
as he enjoys and exploits the differences, those in-
tensities and mobilisationa of will to power, that
have been 'effective' all the tima but which have
been falsifiad, reconstructed and mastered by weak,
passive and reactive accounts of no-saying and dif-
ference. Among those weak, passive and reactive ac-
counts of difference, those passive nihilism., are
the Platonic/Hagelian dialectics on the one hand and
Schopenhauer's account of will and representation on
the other.
Nietz.che's work is not such e reactive
nihilism, it is claimed, and thus doas not admit to
either an original, sansa-giving arche or telos or
to the state in which each of his pronouncements
are equally m.aningless. Ha is, rather, e strateg-
ist, articulating the different intensities and
directions of forces in will to powar for strategic
and specific purposes.
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Philosophical Practice
Where who could be called traditional
philosophers, (Hume, Kant, Hegel and so on), will
daal with their critics in philosophically tradit-
ional or respectable ways, Nietzsche ~ill caricat-
ure, insult, parody and use generally eccentric and
non-traditional forms, (the aphorism, irony, rhet-
orical questions and so on), to deal with his oppo-
nents. Traditional philosophers will oppose, by
means of logic, strict argumentation, premisses and
conclusions. Nietzsche, alternatively, ~ill call
Kant the Chinaman of Koenigsberg, and profess to
hearing the croaking of frogs from the swamp of con-
temporary philosophy. He will establish a difference
between himself and the others by means of both the
content and the form of his writings.
As he says in The Genealogy of Morals,
'what have I to do with refutation?'; Nietzsche is
not in the business of logical and traditionally
philosophical modes of argumentation, he does not
attempt to refute ideas, he merely puts on gloves
before theml19• Thus he will not oppose, but will
establish and enjoy a difference, both with regard
to what he says and how he says it, since to oppose
would be to set himself up aa an identity, something
the same as itself. This, as has been seen, he con-
siders to be a falsification of life as will to
power: only in centred economy, logic and dialectics,
for example, are there stable, self-identical beings.
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It is suggested that this may be seen
as taking up a number of positions with regard to
the thought of dialectics which are not immediately
incorporated into, (mastered and reduced by), that
dialectic either in terms of what is said or how it
is said. Nietzsche's philosophical practice is s
form of Yes-saying, affirming and enjoying differ-
ences, that is also the most contradictory. It ap-
proximates, thus, to an active nihilism, a nihilism
that would complete and thus 'overcome', via trans-
1 t· t hi ·h·l· 120va us 10n, he story of European n1 1 lsm •
Nietzsche's philosophical practice and textual acti-
vity may be seen as an instance of the attempt to
complete nihilism: he will affirm differences, be a
no-saying spirit, without trying to aufhebung the
thinker from whom he differs into his work, without
being the spirit of nihilism.
Nietzsche and Feminism
Nietzsche's account of will to power in
eternal return thus offers an account of economy in
which value and identity are at once produced and
destroyed. Nietzsche's economics are thus ec- cen-
tric in that there is no privileged value that regu-
lates the relations, the differences and oppositions,
from which value is generated. In that Nietzsche
describes ec- centric economy, his position is that
of a non-vulgar feminism or feminist.
As has been seen, Nietzsche's account
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of identity connects with the idea of will to power
in eternal return in that this latter would both
produce and destroy identity. The 'conflict' of
forces in will to power would produce identity in
that, like Saussure's diacriticity, they are differ-
ences, forces and differences between forces, that
generate identity. And it would subvert or post-
pone identity in that those forces are never stable,
never organised into centric economy. Will to power
in eternal return ensures, that is, that there is
no privileged term or force that could put an end to
the shifting conflict of forces that produce and
destroy identity, value and meaning, at the same
time.
Likewise with difference, Nietzsche's
account of difference, insofar as it has not been
summarised above, would not be the sort of differ-
ence that is found in centric economy. Difference
in the account given by centric economy, if it is
productive at all and not simply meaningless diver-
sity, would be productive only of contradiction.
It would, as such, be valued only as either the in-
ternal structure or prolegomenon of aufhebung, the
recuperative sublation that provides a stable value
to the 'outcome' of contradiction in a greater
whole.
As has been seen, Nietzsche's differ-
ences do not constitute opposition and nor are they
sublated in a third term. Yet they are 'productive'
103
they are productive of the undecidable. Thus Niet-
zsche's differences and oppositions are not the dif-
ferences and oppositions that are to be found in
centric economy and the values and identities that
they produce are not those of centric economy. The
absence of privileged values such as arche ortelos
that is entailed by will to power in eternal return
demands that Nietzsche's differences and oppositions
are both productive and destructive and thus that
the values that are 'produced' and 'destroyed' are
strictly undecidable.
This non-vulgar feminism is exemplified
in the things he says about women. As Derrida, for
example, has noted121, there are many women and many
types of women to be found in Nietzsche's works.
Derrida refers to the 'hordes of mothers, daughters,
sisters, old maids, wives, governesses, prostitutes,
virgins, big and little girls,122 that are to be en-
countered in his work. And in sections 63 to 75 of
The Gay Science alone, there are to be found mothers,
young and old women, housewives, corrupt, upper class
and masterful women.
As there can be no identity or value in
itself, no truth in itself, that is not also destroy-
ed or postponed by will to power in eternal return,
so there can be no truth in itself of women in them-
selves. Nietzsche's women are a multiplicity that
will not reduce to a single, ordered, value or iden-
tity. Thus, when he offers his thoughts on the
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notion of woman as such, even the things he says
are emphasised 85 being 'only - my truths,123.
As Oerrida comments on Nietzsche's treatment of
these questions of identity and woman, 'there is
no truth in itself of ••• either man or woman in
itself,124.
That is, the women to be found in
Nietzsche's works are, amongst other things, sorts
of prisms or magnifying glasse5l25 'that allo~
one to make visible a general but elusive and
creeping calamity'. He refers to these various
forms of women, (for example, persons generally are
said to function as these glasses), as a crystalli-
sation of more widespread, non-representable forces.
Each of the types of women, then, serve as a glass
which enables Nietzsche to articulate, to perceive
and describe, the workings of forces in will to po-
were Each type of woman serves as a sort of model
for a different codification of forces that usually
remain un-represented, will to power in eternal ret-
urn. They do not, as will to power does not, con-
stitute a self-present identity - their identity is
produced and destroyed as investments of;forces.
Whether 'male' or 'female', those who
would attempt to identify 'woman as such', 'woman
in itself', are masculine, according to Nietzsche.
The concern with the production of a self-identical
value or definition of what woman is is the vulgar-
ly masculine concern. Thus Nietzsche condemns
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those women, 'Madame Roland, Madame de Staal, or Mon-
sieur Georges Sand,126, for example, who attempt to
'enlighten men about "woman as such"'. 'Enlighten-
ment in this field has hitherto been the affair and
endowment of men': the concern with the proper iden-
tity and identification of women has hitherto been
the vulgarly masculine affair127• So, where both
male and female may share the vulgarly masculine
concern with identifiable and stable values, non-
vulgar femininity, (including Nietzsche himself+28),
recognises the work of will to power as productive
and destructive of value and identity.
It is this non-vulgar femininity that
Nietzsche also calls life: 'it is covered by a veil
interwoven with gold, a veil of beautiful possibil-
ities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashful-
ness, mockery, pity and seduction. Yes, life is a
woman,129. So, not only is this version of femin-
inity described as life, it is also denotative of
will to power and associated with the figure of Oio-
nysos. It is the work of the undecidable, the non-
vulgarly feminine, that connects life, will to power
and Dionysan themes in Nietzsche's stands against
the vulgarly masculine concern with identity and
self-presence.
The value of woman, then, as invested
by forces in will to power, is both produced and
destroyed by that investment. It is this 'creative'
duplicity that the figure of Dionysos attempts to
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capture and which makes him/her the paradigm of
non-reactive affirmation for Nietzsche. Having
both male and female characteristics, then, Dio-
nysos is the double-born offspring of woman and
Zeus's thigh. Associated with the theatrical arts,
the mask and representation, Dionysos offers the
personification of will to power as productive and
destructive of value and identity.
Conclusion
Thus this chapter has accounted for the
positions of Hegel and Nietzsche with regard to the
matter of dialectics, the thought of the relations
between identity, difference and opposition. Since
feminism·s problems are those of economy, power and
desire, this account has also outlined their rela-
tions to feminism. It remains for this chapter to
sum up the relations between their positions.
Briefly, Hegel's position with regard
to economy, power and desire tends towards that of
centric economy in which the disrupting and discon-
certing is reduced to manageable identity. Simil-
arly, the sort of power that is represented and
that it represents along with the desire to be found
in relation to that power are those to obe found in
centric economy. Hegel's version of power is the
power that governs in the manner of omnipotent law-
giver and the desire that is to be found in relation
to it is the desire for that form of mastery.
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And Nietzsche's position on identity,
difference and opposition, along with the power and
desire that traverse them, tend toward that of femin-
ist or ec- centric economy in which identity and
value are at once produced and destroyed. His ver-
sion of power and desire, will to power in the mode
of eternal return, is similarly that to be found in
ec- centric economy. That is, will to power in et-
ernal return is the power/desire that would both
produce and destroy the appearance of the power that
Hegel's position represents.
The account of economy that Hegel rep-
resents is a version of the vulgarly masculine con-
cern in that it organises differences into centric
economy by means of a centre or transcendental sig-
nified to produce stable identities and values.
The enigmatic play of difference, which would sub-
vert the masterly dialectical progression, has been
seen to have been reduced or organised in Hegel's
economics to opposition and heirarchy. Rather than
being the collapse of identity into meaningless div-
ersity, difference for Hegel is productive of con-
tradiction which is stable and self-identical inso-
far as it may be negated and conserved in the aufhe-
bung.
Nietzsche's position on economy, power
and desire, however, is feminist in that he attempts
to chart the workings of what was presented in chap-
ter two as the economy of differ!nce. Nietzsche's
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differences, the differences of forces in will to
power, do not collapse into meaninglessness. Nor
do they go to form a stable, even dialectically
stable, identity or meaning, although they are doubt-
less productive. Rather, the absence of either
tIerche or telos, the absence of a transcendental
signified, that i. indicated by the eternal return
describes the production and destruction of mean-
ing and value.
So, where Nietzsche's differences are
productive and destructive, thus 'constituting'
undecidable entities, Hegel's are simply productive-
the 8ufhebung profits from the contradictions to
which they give rise. And thus Nietzsche repres-
ents an instance of ec- centric economy, a non-
represents
vulgar feminism!8nd Hegel~a version of the vulgar-
ly masculine concern with centric economy.
The next chapter will look at the work
of Heidegger and Adorno in order to ascertain their
positions with regard to centric and ec- centric
economy, the possibility of feminism.
CHAPTER FOUR
HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO
In his essay "Hegel and Heidegger",
Gadamer characterises the difference between Adorno's
and Heidegger's responses to 'the self apotheosis of
thought implied in Hegel's idea of truth,l. He says
that ~here the former contradicts it, arguing that
'the Whole is the fa15e,2, the latter 'den[iesJ it
outright and juxtapos[es] it to the temporality and
finitude of human existence,3. It is the task of
this chapter to examine the responses of Adorno and
Heidegger to the thought of Hegel and Nietzsche in
order to ascertain their positions on the matter of
economy and hence their relations to the or a pass i-
ble feminism.
Heavily influenced by both Hegel and
Nietzsche, Heidegger in turn plays a substantial
role in the motivation behind Derrida and Foucault.
Adorno is also much concerned with Hegel and Nietz-
sche and his presence in this chapter allows the
comparison to be made between the reception of the
latter's thought in both contemporary French thin-
king and in another critical tradition indebted to
Hegel, Marxism.
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HEIOEGGER
Introductory
The opening of Heidegger's early ~ork,
Being and Time, is illuminated by a statement from
Plato's Sophist. Supposedly one of the later dia-
logues, The Sophist deals ~ith existence, non-exis-
tence and difference, among other things, and takes
place between Theatetus and the Eleatic Stranger
who is a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno. The Sophist
thus relates, thematically and temporally, to the
Parmenides, a dialogue which, as Gadamer points out,
appears to have exercised 'seminal power' in terms
of both plan and terminology, upon the chapter of
Hegel's Jena Logic in which he deals ~ith the laws
of identity and contradiction4•
The following sections will attempt to
elucidate Heidegger's own thought on Being and beings,
ontological difference and the Nothing in order to
evaluate his relation to the work of Hegel on dia-
lectics, the thought of identity, difference and
opposition, and thus the matter of feminism. Whether
Heidegger's position can be described in terms of
denial and juxtaposition, (for elsewhere Gadamer
himself says that it cannot), and what sense is to
be made of Oasein's temporality and finitude, it is
the task of this chapter to describe.
The Nothing and Negation
'Why does all dialectics take refuge in negation,
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when it cannot provide dialectical grounds for
this thing itself?' 5
••• the nothing is the origin of negation,
not vice versa' 6
Thus does Heidegger pose and begin his
dealings with the question of Being as it relates
to dialectics in Being and Time and "What is Meta-
physics?", two of his early works. Three and a
half decades later, while the name of the task has
changed, the question remains the same?, and Heid-
egger is found in "The End of Philosophy" saying
that '••• dialectical thinking ••• remain(s] dep-
endent upon openness which already dominates, upon
the opening'S. It seems that dialectics, as a ver-
sion of metaphysics, needs 'grounding', its 'origins'
are to be 'accounted for' but in a way which is not
metaphysical, which cannot simply be described as
grounding or accounting for.
The essay "What is Metaphysics?"9 asks
the ambiguous and multifaceted question, "How is it
with the nothing?". Characteristically, Heidegger
unfolds and elaborates this question with an account
of the received versions of the nothing. The version
of the nothing that he receives from science is that
the nothing is to be rejected as a simple 'nullity',
as what there is notlD. And from logic, which first
teaches science of the nothing, he learns that the
nothing is a form of negation. As such, it is a
'specific act of the intellect' and effects 'the
negation of the totality of beings,ll. Science,
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consequently, wishes to know nothing of the nothing,
it being an 'outrage and a phantasm', while for lo~
gic, thinking must act in a way contrary to its own
essence when it thinks of the nothing12.
However, and equally characteristically,
Heidegger proceeds in the rest of the essay to show,
to the contrary, that the nothing is anything but a
simple nullity. 'The nothing does not merely serve
as the counter concept to beings: rather it origin-
ally belongs to their essential unfolding as such,l3.
Similarly, the nothing being originally experienced
in the fundamental mood of anxiety, the 'possibility
of negation as s specific act of the intellect, and
thereby the intellect itself, are somehow dependent
upon the nothing,14. And, if metaphysics, 'the
question concerning the nothing', that is beyond or
over beings, is the basic occurence of Ossein, then
thinking only enters into its essence when it thinks
of the nothingl5•
"What is Metaphysics?" presupposes and
develops what is said in Being and Time about the
nothing and its disclosure in anxiety. In I 40 of
Being and Time, Heidegger says that if 'the "noth-
ing" - that is, the world as such - exhibits itself
as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this
means that Being-in-the-world itself is that in the
face of which anxiety is anxious,l6. The nothing
is that from which beings come to be the beings that
they are for Dasein and thus that by means of which
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Oasein comes to have or be the sort of being that it
has or is. By means of 'having to do with something,
producing something, attending to something and look-
ing after it ••• ', a '~orld' is disclosed to Oasein
such that the Q! and the !!in of Oasein are as they
arel?
Anxiety, then, is the state in which
18Oasein feels unheimlich, not at home in the world
and in which 'everyday familiarity collapses,19.
In anxiety, the nothing is revealed in that Oasein
is brought face to face with itself as being in the
world. Its finitude end thrownness, the 'that it is
and has to be', are disclosed as matters that are of
the utmost significance and which must be concern-
fully and authentically dealt with. The nothing,
the world as world, is disclosed in anxiety, then,
insofar as those various ways of being-in, (having
to do with something, producing something and so on),
into which being-in-the-world has always already
been 'dispersed', become apparent as the ways in
which the Q! and the !!in of Oasein are constituted.
As what Heidegger calls an 'existentiale',
Being-in-the-world is the basic state or structure
of Oasein20• As such, Oasein is held out or hover-
ing in anxiety21 and, although this experience of
the nothing is for the most part covered up or dis-
torted,22, it is in the sense that Oasein is essen-
tially constituted by its concern for its 8eing-in-
the-world that Heidegger says that Oasein's essence
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lies in its existence23• If this is the case, then
metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein24,
since metaphysics is the enquiry over or beyond be-
ings 'to' the question concerning the nothing.
And thus thinking only 'becomes' essential ~hen it
attempts to think what is here called the nothing.
Similarly, if the nothing is properly
part of the process by means of ~hich the ~ and
the ~ of Oasein are constituted, and if it is
originally disclosed in terms of the fundamental
mood of anxiety, then it is in a sense 'prior to'
the beings and the acts of the intellect that at-
tempt the negation of those beings. Thus the noth-
ing 'does not remain the indeterminate opposite of
beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being
of beings,25. And thus 'the action of the nothing
that oppresses Oasein in anxiety ••• will not sub-
mit to calculation in terms of annihilation and ne-
gation,26.
In these ways, Being and Time and "What
is Metaphysics?" introduce Heidegger's position ~ith
regard to the matter of dialectics. Beings, and the
negation which dialectics would practice upon those
beings, are 'grounded' in Being and the nothing.
These latter are strictly undecidable in terms of
presence/absence and annihilation/negation, the ~ays
in which Being and the nothing are usually thought
by science and logic, by metaphysics. Thus Hegel's
proposition, that 'pure Being and pure Nothing are
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therefore the same', is correct on Heidegger's ac-
count but because Being only reveals itself in the
transcendence of Dasein beyond beings into the no-
thing27.
Identity and Difference
'The principle of identity is consider-
ed the highest principle of thought,28. The usual
or customary formulation of this principle, A = A,
says that one A is equal to another, according to
Heidegger. Thereby 'it conceals precisely what [it]
is trying to say'. As usual, thinking has problems.
For Heidegger, what the principle is trying to say
is that 'A is A ••• every A is itself the same'; by
making it necessary that two elements are equated in
the principle of identity, the customary formulation
obscures the identity of • thing with itself. It
took Western thought more than two thousand years
to recover the sense of mediation within identity,
to recover the 'essence, in itself synthetic, of id-
entity' that was lost after Plat029•
Thus does Heidegger begin his dealings
with the principle and matter of identity in ~-
tity and Difference. Given this, it is, as he says,
unlikely that the problems still involved and unres-
olved in the 'essential source of identity' will be
dealt with in a day30. It appears that even the
synthetic sense of identity that is prepared and for-
mulated in the tradition of speculative idealism
116
and which culminates in Hegel is insufficient for
the attempt to 'find out ••• what identity i5,31.
In the form 'A is A', the principle 'tells us how
every being is ••• ; it itself is the same with
itself'. In this way, the principle speaks of the
Being of beings and as such, as a 'principle of
Being', it says that 'to every being as such, there
belongs identity,32. The doctrine of Western meta-
physics thus says that identity belongs to the Be-
. f b • 'i 't bIt B' ,33~ng 0 e~ngs: dent1 y e ongs 0 e1ng •
However, if we consider one of Parmen-
ides' enigmatic fragments, we shall have to 'ack-
nowledge the fact that in the earliest period of
thinking, long before thinking had arrived at a
principle of identity, identity itself speaks aut,34.
The fragment reads, 'For the same perceiving (think-
ing) as well as being'. Heidegger perceives this as
saying that 'thinking and Being belong together in
the Same and by virtue of this Same'; crudely put,
where metaphysics says that identity belongs to
Being, Parmenides says that 'Being belongs to an
identity,35. Moreover, this identity that Parmen-
ides' fragment speaks of 'stems from further back
than the kind of identity' represented by metaphy-
sical thinking.
If we are to make sense of this origi-
nal form of identity, identity as a belonging to-
gether,_we cannot do it in terms of thinking of a
belonging together since that would be to 'represent
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The thought of identity as a belonging together,
on the other hand, opens the possibility 'of no
longer representing belonging in terms of the un-
ity of the together but rather of experiencing the
together in terms of belonging,37.
Even this belonging together cannot
be understood, however, 'as long as we represent
everything only in terms of categories and media-
tion, be it with or without dialectic,38. Thus,
when Heidegger says that 'man and Being are appro-
priated to each other,39, he is suggesting that this
belonging, the relation, is more original than, in-
deed productive of, the terms that are related, that
are together. He says that a leap or spring is req-
uired in order to move away from representational,
metaphysical, thinking to where we always already
are - to where Being and man are appropriated, be-
long together, and from where each first receives
the determinations that are represented in meta-
physics.
Man's relation to Being, which presents
itself in what Heidegger calls the framework and as
being accomplished via technology, is not originally
of man's calculation and construction - it is not
itself something technological. Beings are presen-
ted to man and man is delivered over to beings in
the mode of technology by virtue of the event of
appropriation. The Being of beings and man, as
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calculable and calculative, are appropriate 'and ap-
propriated to one another by virtue of the event of
appropriation. Man and Being, then, are related in
the appropriation in such a way that beings appear
to man as appropriate to his nature and vice versa40•
The question now arises as to what ap-
propriation has to do with identity. Heidegger ans-
wers, 'Nothing. Identity, on the other hand, has much,
h th· .th . t· ,41per aps every 1ng, to do W1 appropr1a 10n •
Where metaphysics 'represents identity as a ••• char-
acteristic of Being', Parmenides' fragment and B
consideration of belonging together, introduce the
possibility of a more original sense of identity that
is a property of the event of appropriation42• Thus
what metaphysics presents as identity has a more ori-
ginal sense that cannot be articulated in the terms
of metaphysics. As far as representational thinking
is concerned, this sort of identity must remain enig-
matic but for Heidegger's more original thinking, an
appropriate sense may be given to it.
The second essay in Identity and Oiffer-
~, "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Meta-
physics", deals with a number of highly complex and
interrelated issues. Before looking at the account
of difference that is offered there, it should also
be noted that the essay explains how that account
affects or effects Heidegger's relation to past
thinkers in general and dialectics in particular.
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The essay is set up as a conversation with Hegel:
Heidegger says he will discuss the same thing in
this essay as Hegel, Being. But, he says,Being
'with respect to its difference from beings,43.
Consequently, where Hegel's position with regard
to dialectics obliges him to sublate past thought,
Heidegger says that 'for us, the character of the
conversation with the history of thinking is no
longer aufh_bung but the step back,44.
That is, for Hegel, the force of a
past thinker lies in what he has thought, 'in that
their thought can be incorporated into absolute
thought as one of its stages,4S. But for Heidegger,
the force of past thought lies in what has remained
unthought but from which all thinking 'receives its
essential space,46. Heidegger will not attempt to
master or incorporate past thought in totalising,
dialectical fashion, nor will he attempt the negation
of that thought. Rather, he will attempt what he
calls the step back into that which first gives us
thought, gives us to think. Thus does Heidegger's
pOSition on the matter of dialectics affect or effect
his relation to the thought of tradition.
On page 71 of Identity and Difference,
Heidegger summarises his position by saying that
'Because the thinking of metaphysics remains invol-
ved in the difference which as such is unthought,
metaphysics is both ontology and theology in a uni-
fied way, by virtue of the unifying unity of
UO
perdurance'. That is, Heidegger says that 'the dif-
ference between beings and Being is the area within
which metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire
nature, can be what it is,47. If it is the oblivion
of the difference that 'gives us thought,48, then,
in ~ thinking that difference, and in attempting
to account for the beings that are either in terms
of a general ground or a highest being, metaphysics
is onto-logy and theo-logy. Metaphysics is both,
and in a unified way, because it is 'originally'
what Heidegger wants to call 'difference as such •••
difference as the perdurance of unconcealing over-
coming and of self-keeping arrival,49 that gives
Being and beings in the first place.
Thus, when metaphysics represents the
Being of beings as, or with regard to, 'the ground
that is common to all beings as such then it is logic
as onto-logic'. And when it represents the 'Being of
beings as, or with regard to, 'the highest being that
accounts for everything' then it is logic as theo-
10gicSO• In both cases, ho~ever, Heidegger wants to
say that metaphysics represents 'beings in respect
of what differs in the difference without heeding
the difference as difference,Sl. Two terms or dif-
ferends, Being and beings, differ in the difference
but neither onto-logic nor theo-logic consider that
difference as difference.
The question Heidegger wants to ask is
'what do you make of the difference if Being as well
121
as beings appear by virtue of the difference ••• ?,52.
That is, what if difference as difference, as the
'perdurance of unconcealing overcoming and self-keep-
ing arrival,S3, first give both Being and beings?
If this were the case, and Heidegger wants to argue
that it is, then Being and beings would not be sep-
arated by a between into which we could then repres-
entationally insert differenceS4• Original differ-
ence 'grants and hold apart the "between",S5 in
which overwhelming and arrival may relate to one
another but which is forgotten in metaphysical thin-
king. In this latter form of thinking, it is the
terms of the difference that are presented as Being
and beings, ground and grounded, that are considered
in favour of the difference as .difference.
Thus it is no longer possible to think
of the Being of beings in the ways that metaphysical
thought does. Thought originally, difference as pro-
ductive of both Being and beings means that 'Being
does not leave its own place and go over to beings,
as though beings were first without Being,56. There
is, then, a sense of identity in difference - Being
and beings are differentiated and first appear as
such by virtue of the perdurance of the being apart
and being toward each other of overwhelming and arri-
val. As Heidegger says, 'Being of beings means Be-
ing that is beings'S?, now that difference has been
thought more originally. And thus Heidegger can say,
in The End of Philosophy, that, thought in terms of
U2
the appropriation of Being and beings in original
difference, 'difference is "identity",58.
In this way, then, difference as differ-
ence, as perdurance, does not admit of representat-
ion and calculation in the terms of metaphysics.
Difference in this sense, as Heidegger says, 'directs
our thinking to the realm which the key words of meta-
physics - Being and beings, ground and grounded - are
no longer adequate to utter,59. And, insofar as this
is the case, the original sense of difference must
be forever enigmatic and undecidable as far as meta-
physical thinking, (which thinks difference as the
difference between two opposed terms, as what differs
in the difference), is concerned.
Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that this
enigmatic difference may be given a proper sense and,
although original difference may be said to dissolve
the difference between identity and difference, he
may be said to be concerned with the identity of
identity and difference.
Heidegger's strategy
It may be said that Hegel was concerned
with the identity of identity and difference and Nie-
tzsche with the disruptive before, during and after
of identity and difference. And it was suggested ab-
ove that Heidegger was concerned with the identity
in or of difference - he wants to re-awaken an appre-
elation of the original and proper sense of difference.
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Before looking at how this strategy manifests it-
self in his other ~orks, a prior indication of ~hat
the concern with the identity in or of difference
consists in may be gained from a brief passage in
the "Letter on HumanismnSO•
In the letter, Heidegger says that
logic and metaphysics think what is involved in 'the
possible' and 'possibility' 'solely in contrast to
nactuality",Sl. Logic and metaphysics, that is,
think 'possibility' as one of two dichotomous or an-
tithetical terms: its meaning is generated!! the
oppositive or different term to 'actuality'. The
task of essential thinking, on the contrary, is to
think 'possibility' in a more original ~ay, in
terms of Being. Thought 'before' or more 'origin-
ally' than the possibility of logic and metaphysics,
Heideggar says that possibility is 'the "quiet power"
of the favouring-enab1ing,S2. Thought in this ~ay,
'possibility' can no longer be represented and oppo-
sed to the 'actuality' of logic and metaphysics.
Being, with a capital 'B', therefore,
is undecidable with regard to the terms of logic and
metaphysics: it does not admit to calculation or det-
ermination as possibility or Bctuality, (nor as ex-
istence or essence, or Bny of the other oppositions
in terms of which metaphysics deals ~ith Being), as
those terms are used and thought in metaphysics.
'Before' the terms of metaphysics/logic, Heidegger
locates a 'between', an interval, ~hich is undecidable
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as far as those terms are concerned and attempts to
give it an original and proper identity, an original
and proper meaning.
Perhaps the most obvious example of
this strategy, at least the clearest, is to be found
in the e~say "LangUagen63• Here, Heidegger is deal-
ing with the difference between world and thing as
the 'unitary fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and
divinities'. Ho~ever, the word 'difference' no long-
er means what it usually means; it is not a 'generic
concept for various kinds of differences,64 and nei-
ther is it to be opposed to what is customarily ref-
erred to as identity. Hyphenating, or introducing
an interval into the word itself, Heidegger says
that' ••• dif-ference is neither distinction nor
relation,65. It cannot be made sense of or identi-
fied in the terms of metaphysics and, as such, con-
stitutes an undecidable. Oif-ference is not 'merely
a relation between world and thing, so that a repres-
entation coming upon it can establish it,66.
Rather, seeking the original and proper
sense of dif-ference67, Heidegger says that dif-fer-
ence 'first determines world and thing in their pre-
sence'. A 'relation' that is no relation in the
sense that metaphysics understands, which comes be-
fore and is productive of the terms so related, must
be 'thought' if Heidegger is to describe dif-ference.
That is, before any calculative and establishing
representation can describe the 'separateness and
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toward ness of world and thing,68, the two already
'traverse a middle,69. Traversing this middle,
world and thing first come to be what they are.
Thus Heidegger says that 'in the midst of the two,
in the between of world and thing, in their inter,
division prevails: a dif-ference,70.
This between or interval that Heideg-
ger calls dif-ference is not a difference that is
added to world and thing 'after the fact'. Rather,
it first 'opens up the separateness and towardness
of world and thing' such that things bear world and
world grants things?l. Things, then, are present
by virtue of world, only through world do they ap-
pear, and world is born(e), or as Heidegger has it,
is gestured/gestated by things?2. That which 'first
determines world and things in their presence, i.e.
in their being towards one another', the interval
or between, is dif-ference. Heidegger describes the
work of dif-ference by saying that 'dif-ference for
world and thing disclosingly appropriates things in-
to bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates
world into the granting of things,73.
If dif-ference is that which, itself
incalculable and unmeasurable, 'first' produces the
things and acts that may be represented and calcu-
lated, then Heidegger may be said to be concerned
with the identity of difference. He is attempting
to (re)awaken an appreciation of, and give a sense
to, the interval that comes before and is productive
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of the values and identities that metaphysics deals
with as dichotomous opposites.
In the essay, "What is Metaphysics?",
the nothing was seen to be incalculable ~ith regard
to the terms of metaphysics. Nihilation could not
be described in the terms of science or logic as neg-
ation or annihilation/nullity. But on the other
hand, Heidegger attempted to re-awaken a sense of
its identity as nihilation74 as in a sense productive
of the terms and acts of science and logic. Simil-
arly, in Being and Time, Being may be seen to be un-
decidable and incalculable with regard to any number
of metaphysical oppositions, man/world, subject/ob-
ject being just two such oppositions. Nevertheless,
Being is made sense of, ultimately, in terms of the
existentiales constitutive of being-in-the-world.
Another version of this move may be seen
in the grounding of the metaphysical couple correct-
ness/incorrectness by means of the enigmatic process
of aletheia's veiling/unveiling, the undecidable
truth of Being which cannot be calculated or meas-
ured but which first sets the standard for every
measure75• In the "Conversation on a Country Path",
the sort of thinking that Heidegger wants to call
'meditative' and which would constitute Gelassenheit
zu den dingen, is shown to be undecidable with reg-
ard to metaphysical thinking. If part of what meta-
physical thought has consisted in has been described
as either activity or passivity, willing or non-willing,
[ScientistD Then Gelassenheit lies, if we may
use the word lie, beyond the distinction bet-
ween activity and passivity •••
Scholar: ••• because Gelassenheit does not
belong to the domain of the will. ?6 ---
And, finally, in "The Question concer-
ning Technology"??, the supposedly antithetical val-
ues of art and technology are shown to issue from
the undecidable and potentially threatening 'reveal-
ing' of poesis. Poesis, itself neither art nor tech-
nology, may 'go either way', according to the ren-
framing'. In all of these examples, what is 'orig-
inal' or primordial, according to Heidegger~cannot
~e simply accounted for or represented by the oppo-
sitional terms of metaphysics. And, in all of these
examples, Heidegger attempts to ascribe or describe
non-representationally what is thus original and
proper. He attempts, that is, to re-awaken an ap-
preciation of a proper sense, an original identity.
That is, what is original, (be it nick-
named aletheia, Being, the Nothing or whatever), and
therefore the difference between what is original
and what is derivative or grounded is, on Heideggerrs
account, strictly undecidable in the terms of meta-
physics. Yet Heidegger wants to provide some sort
of non-representational, non-calculative, 'account'
of the original and the difference. Insofar as he
does thus want to give a proper and original sense
to what is incalculable in the terms of metaphysical
thought, then he may be said to be concerned with
the identity in or of difference.
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Heidegger and Nietzsche
Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be the
last metaphysician, to have provided the vollendung,
the final and complete stage of a way of thinking
that is, if not predetermined, at least in some way
destined. What is perhaps less well known is that
it is again the role of the nothing in their thought
that ultimately determines the positions they adopt.
This section will look at Heidegger's Nietzsche and
The Question of Being in order to account for Heideg-
ger's position with regard to Nietzsche and the
thought of the nothing, the thought of nihilism.
Heidegger's account of Nietzsche may
be described in nuce as the claim that, for various
reasons over which he had little or no control,
Nietzsche misconstrues nihilism and the nothing.
Heidegger says 'If ••• nothingness prevails in nih-
ilism and the essence of nothingness belongs to Be-
ing ••• then the essence of metaphysics is shown to
be the place of the essence of nihilism,78. Con-
sequently, if Nietzsche is the last metaphysician,
then, the history of metaphysics being co-terminous
with the history of nihilism, it will come as no
surprise to hear that Nietzsche also offers the 'com-
pletion' of nihilism79• Both nihilism and metaphy-
sics fail to recognise the essence of the nothing.
Nihilism ignores the work of the nothing which, as
seen above, does not admit of calculation by meta-
physics, to present representable values, and
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as a result Heidegger considers Nietzsche's con-
cept of nihilism to be itself nihilisticSD• And
metaphysics ignores that enigmatic no-thing to
represent representable values as all there is,
as what there is.
Insofar as nihilism and metaphysics
represent the nothing nihilistically and meta-
physically, as an act of the intellect that would
effect the negation of all beings, for example,
Heidegger says that they constitute the 'essential
non-thinking of the essence of the nothing,Sl.
That is, as seen in "What is Metaphysics?", nihil,
the nothing, is anything but the simple negation
of or counter concept to beings. Rather, it belongs
to the essential unfolding or disclosure of beings
as such. So, if, as Heidegger says, 'the essence
of nihilism is nothing nihilistic,S2, then valuative
thought, that which represents representable values
and beings as all there is and which constitutes
Nietzsche's nihilism and metaphysics, thinks the
f B" " "t 83essence 0 e1ng 1n 1 s non-essence •
Nietzsche's project of the transval-
uation of all values is thus seen in Heidegger's
work as the triumph of European nihilism, the final
and complete stage of valuative thought. For
Nietzsche, there is no Being 'behind' beings -
there is will to power in the mode of eternal return.
It is will to power that invests beings with value
and identity, the thought and experience of which
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would effect the transvaluation of all values.
For Heidegger, however, that there is no Being
'behind' beings in Nietzsche is evidence of the
fact that valuative thought has completed itself
in Nietzsche's work and that nihilism, in the
guise of the thought and experience of the deval-
uation of all values, rules the world.
On Heidegger's account, then, Niet-
zsche has made Being itself into a value, there
is no Being behind beings but rather Being itself
'exists' as a value, as a configuration of will to
power in eternal return. Nietzsche's nihilism,
active as it may be, thus misses the role of the
nothing as the unthought and forgotten of Western
metaphysics as far as Heidegger is concerned. And
insofar as all of Being exists as a configuration
of will to power for Nietzsche, Heidegger considers
his work to form the last stage of the valuative
and representational thought that was begun with
Plato.
It is in The question of Being that
introduces the practice of writing 8eing
Prefiguring Derrida's practice of the
sous rature, the kreuzweise durstreichung, or cros-
sing of Being hints at what Spivak has called the
'inarticulable presence' of the work of Being and
the nothing85• It is this work, which has remained
unthought, that constitutes the presence of Being
and the nothing in beings.
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but remains effaced, it is there but is no thing,
no being and can only be read as its own efface-
ment, its own self-concealment in the face of beings.
After Nietzsche, then, the only way to conceive
Being is under the kreuzweise durstreichung - it
may not be simply described in the language of
valuative and representational thought.
ADORNO
Introductory
Hegel's position was described as in-
volving the identity of identity and difference.
Nietzsche's was described as being concerned with
the 'before' and 'after' of identity and difference,
the affirmation of the differences and oppositions
that must be falsified and reconstructed to form
the stable and identical entities which can then be
spoken about in terms of the identity of identity
and difference. And, in the last section, Heideg-
ger was shown to be concerned with the identity in
or of difference. In this section, Adorno's posi-
tion will be explicated as being concerned with
the non-identity of identity and difference.
Negative Dialectics
Adorno's dialectic 'does not tend to
the identity in the difference between each object
and its concept: instead it is suspicious of all
identity, its logic is one of disintegration,86.
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Such a conception of dialectic can be seen to relate
to Nietzsche's ideas, noted above, concerning the
way in ~hich ~e are deceived by the similarity bet-
wean words and conceptsB7• Adorno says that 'the
non-identical element in an identifying judgement
is clearly intelligible insofar as every object sub-
sumed under a class has definitions not contained
in the definition of the class,88.
That is, behind or beyond the identifi-
cation of the thing as such and such a thing, by
means of the concept, there are sensations like those
referred to by Nietzsche that are not included in
the definition of the concept and ~hich disrupt the
identity of concept and object posited in Hegelian
dialectics.
Consequently, negative dialectics, the
'cognition of non-identity ••• identifies in other
~ays and to a greater extent than identitarian thin-
king,89. And, ~here contradiction was once a vehicle
of total identification, (that is, in Hegel, where
contradiction is the ground, the productive support
of movement), it is now up to (negative) dialectics
to pursue the contradiction or inadequacy between
thought and thing, to bring about the experience of
contradiction in the thing.
A concise account of the difference
between Adorno and Hegel might consist in the follow-
ing. Where for Hegel dialectics involves the unity
of subject and object and the unity or identity of
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object and concept and ~here that identity is given
positive value, is both desired and possible, for
Adorno, that identity is neither possible nor des-
ired, it has a negative value.
Identity thinking, the thought of
Hegel's dialectic, 'says what something comes under
••• and what, accordingly, it is not itself,90 for
Adorno. Critical, non-identitarian thought, the
thought of Adorno's negative dialectic, ~ould find
such non-identities and attempt to make that con-
tradiction manifest as part of its critical activ-
ity.
Positive and Negative Dialectics
So, for Adorno, it is the position or
value accorded to identity that determines whether
a dialectic is positive or negative. As noted in
Negative Dialectics, the dividing line from Hegel
is dra~n by the dialectician's intent as far as
Adorno is concerned. In a positive dialectic,
Hegel's, for example, identity is the ultimate,
the absolute and should be encouraged and reinfor-
ced - identity has a positive value that results
from the negation of negation. In a negative dia-
lectic, identity is conceived as the universal co-
ercive mechanism, something to be escaped from.
On the latter vie~, the negation of an original
negation remains negative: 'to equate the negation
of negation with positivity is the quintessence of
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identification ••• what thus wins out in the inmost
core of dialectics is the anti-dialectical principle,Sl.
So, where, in Hegel, the one-sided
truth expressed by non-dialectical or external ref-
lection is completed by the aufhebung of contradic-
tion, in Adorno that contradiction is pursued, its
apoetic logic is made manifest and displayed:
A successful work, according to immanent critic-
ism, is not one which resolves contradiction in
a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the
idea of harmony negatively by emboying the con-
tradiction, pure and uncompromised, in its inner-
most structure.
As might be expected, a negative dialec-
tic sounds like the reversal of a positive dialectic.
Where the identity that results from the aufhebung
is positively valued in a positive dialectic, it is
of negative value in a negative dialectic. Where
'positivity' is itself valued, (as far as the 'homi-
cidal praise of positive forces,S3), in a positive
dialectic, it is not in a negative dialectic. And
where the negation of negation is affirmative for
Hegel, it is not for Adorn094•
Thus, Adorno says that 'the Hegelian
system ••• must presupposed the identity of subject
and object' whereas 'the concrete unfolding' of the
system of spirit 'negates the identity it ascribes
to its sum total'. Adorno's dialectics would break
he 95up the identity which~says Hegel ~ presuppose •
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'The Method'
-Susan Buck-Morss, tn her The Origins of
Negative Dialectics, suggests that 'Adorno argued,
on the one hand, that actual past history was not
identical to the concept of history, (as rational
progress), because of the material nature to which
it did violence. At the same time, the 'natural'
phenomena of the present were not identical to the
concept of nature, (as essential reality or truth),
because they had been historically produced'. Such
a 'demythifying process', she continues, 'relentles-
sly intensified the tension between thought and
reality instead of bringing them into a harmony,96.
Within this tension, Adorno saw the hope for 'the
future realisation of freedom,97.
Thus, in his "The idea of Natural His-
tory", Adorno points out that 'nature itself is
transitory. It thus contains within it the moment
of history. Whenever the historical appears, it
refers to the natural which passes away within it.
Conversely, where convention confronts us, it is
de-ciphered by the fact that its meaning becomes
cl - 1 - -t t °t ° ,98ear preC1se y 1n 1 s ranS1 or1ness • And,
in Negative Dialectics, Adorno will demonstrate the
thesis that being an object is part of the meaning
of being a SUbject99, that the meaning of one is
generated by the relation to the other.
So, of a pair of dichotomous concepts,
one is said to elucidate the non-identity of the
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other ~ith its object and, at the same time, that
other is used to bring out the non-identity of the
first with its object. In the distance or space
between concept and object, in that non-identity,
Adorno perceived the hope for a demythified and
free consciousness.
This, briefly, is the method of Ador-
no's negative dialectics. As Buck-~orss notes,
'the fluctuating meanings of Adorno's concepts,
their purposeful ambivalence, is a major source
f th diff· It f· t t· h· k 100o e 1CU y 0 1n erpre 1ng 1S war s •
It was Adorno's intention, then, to frustrate what
he saw as the twentieth century's habit of only
thinking in rigid categories by means of these
shifting and ambivalent concepts.
An early version of Adorno's thesis
here may be found in his Inaugural Lecture, "The
Actuality of Philosophy", where he says that it is
'only in traces and ruins' that reason is 'prepared
to hope that it will ever come across correct and
just reality'. The idea of totality being beyond
the grasp of reason, it is left to reason in the
form of negative dialectics, itself the child of the
lost totality, to find in 'traces and ruins' the
signs of the Good Life,IOl.
These ideas are more fully developed
in Negative Dialecticsl02, where Adorno is consid-
ering the non-identity of concept and object.
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Developing the account of negative dialectics that
was introduced above, he says that, although it is
hubris to define identity 'as the correspondence of
the thing in itself to its concept', (as the form
of thinking that Rose would call 'rational identity
thinking' would do), identity must not simply be
discardedl03•
Rather, according to Adorno, 'living
in the rebuke that the thing is not identical with
the concept is the concept's longing to become iden-
tical with the thing,104. Although, that is, the
will to identity may be the 'ideological element
of pure thought', hidden in that will is also the
pledge 'that there should be no contradiction, no
antagonism'. Thus, what Adorno calls the 'Utopian
element' is to be found even in the pragmatist,
nature-controlling, identifying judgementlOS
In terms that prefigure what will be
described below as the logic of the supplement or
hymen, Adorno describes the two sorts of identity
as follows. 'What is, is more than it is. This
"more" is not imposed upon it but remains immanent
to it, as that which has been pushed out of it.
In that sense, the non-identical would be the thing's
own identity against its identification,106. The
'thing's own identity' would be that identity which
would constitute Utopia, when identitarian thought
had been overcome, and 'its identification' refers
to what could be called the 'bad identity' of
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identitarian thought.
'For the sake of Utopia', then, in the
form of 'hope' for that Utopia, identity in the sense
in which we speak of identifying with people and
things is 'contained' in the identifying judgements
that ~e make and while these judgements are, never-
thelessi the vehicles of ideology. Adorno says that
'Utopia would be above identity and above contradic-
t· of d· ·t ,10710n, it ~ould be a togetherness ~verS1 y •
Thus, not only is a mistrust of the
work of identity compatible with the hope for Utopia,
it is sanctioned and even demanded by that mistrust:
it seems that, on Adorno's account, Utopia is 'on the
way' anyway - the very form of judgement implies a
desire for Utopia and the possibility of Utopia.
Consequently, it may be said that Adorno
appropriates enough Nietzsche to mistrust the work
of identity, conceived as a positive value, in the
Hegelian dialectic. Similarly, where Nietzsche
speaks of the way in which philosophical concepts
belong 'just as much to a system as do the members
of the flora and fauna of a continent,IOB, Adorno
will speak of what he calls 'constellations'.
This idea is found in the Inaugural
Lecture, among other places:
••• just as riddle solving is constituted, in
that the singular and dispersed elements of the
question are brought into various groupings for
so long until they close together in a figure
out of which the solution springs - so philosophy
has to bring its elements ••• into changing
constellations ••• until they fall into a
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figure which can be read as an answer. 109
Constellations are the sedimented sys-
terns in which elements become meaningful as 'second
nature' or conventionllD: within these constellat-
ions, it is possible to articulate the oppositions
between the elements that make them up. The riddles
noted above would be where the author had contradic-
ted himself, unintentionally and helplessly, because
of the nature of the concepts he was using. In the
ruptures of the text, then, in the gaps or spaces
noted above, Adorno will locate unintentional truth,
contradiction, and see these truths embodying the
hope for a demythified and critical consciousness.
Where Hegelian dialectics would locate
untruth, in the contradiction, non-identity or
inadequacy between thought and thing, Adorno sees a
different truth reflected, he sees social truth and
the possibility of critique.
Reversal/Displacement
It is claimed that Adorno appropriates
Nietzsche's critique of identity thinking, of the
will to identity, but that he (Adorno) employs the
insights from that critique in the terms of a rever-
sal rather than, as is claimed for Nietzsche, a dis-
placement. Similarly, Nietzsche's contention that
(philosophical and other) concepts develop within
constantly changing economies is used in the idea
of a constellation but again that it is used with
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regard to already constituted elements. On Niet-
zsche's account, these elements would eventually
confuse and subvert the attempt to posit relations
between them which could be claimed to make sense
of them. In short, it is claimed that Adorno em-
ploys Nietzsche against Hegel within centric or
limited economy, an economy in which the value or
meaning of the elements is already fixed, and thu5
that Adorno operates a reversal, from positive to
negative, for example, rather than, as is claimed
for Nietzsche, a displacement~ll.
However, the idea that Adorno simply
reverses the terms and the hierarchy involved in
identitarian thinking will be supported by looking
at his reading of Nietzsche's ideas regarding
amor fati. It is claimed that it is the idea of
eternal return which determines and polarises Ador-
no's and Oerrida's responses to Nietzsche and Hegel.
Briefly, amor fati, the embracing of
one~ destiny or fate, plays a role in the idea and
experience of eternal return. As Nietzsche says,
the thought of eternal return is his most abysmal
thoughtl12 and it ~ould take a truly Dionysan char-
acter to withstand that thought and experience.
Amor fati involves the idea that 'one wants nothing
to be different ••• not in all eternity' and that
one does 'not merely bear what is necessary ••• but
love it,ll3- . The thought of will to power in
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eternal return is a sort of testll4, and the small
man, the base, passive and reactive type could not
cope with the thought and experience of it - only
the noble and Dionysan could embrace and affirm the
thought of it - .mor fati.
Although the work of Utopia is more
complicated in his thought than simply playing the
role of some conceivable telic state, Adorno may
be described, as Lyotard has donellS, as being 'nos-
talgic'. Adorno is nostalgic insofar as he still
hopes for the Good Life as the reversal or non-id-
entity of presently constituted and accepted iden-
tities and values. That is, Adorno conceives and
rejects Nietzsche's amor fati as 'the resignation
that bows down in the face of the powers that be,116.
Far from being the transvaluative experience that
Nietzsche intends it to be, Adorno says that 'the
origin of amor fati must be sought in the prison':
'love of stone walls and barred windows is the love
of someone who sees and has nothing else to love,lI7.
Now, the problem becomes that of ac-
counting for how Adorno can say that Utopia would
be a 'togetherness of diversity', above and beyond
contradictionl18, when what!! thus beyond identity
and contradiction is Nietzsche~ eternal return.
Since Adorno has rejected the eternal return and
amor fati, the only thing he can mean by a together-
ness of diversity is a togetherness between the
things that are together here and now, between
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the elements of an already constituted economy.
This economy is centred economy, economy that has
not been transvalued by the thought and experience
of eternal return as has ec- centric economy.
If, that is, eternal return is con-
ceived as the transvaluing experience that would
transform both man and world to bring about heav-
119en on earth, as Haar, for example, has suggested, ,
and if Adorno is hoping for Utopia as beyond or
120infinitely distant from the bere and now , then
he may indeed be described as nostalgic. Thus it
is claimed that Adorno is operating within an al-
ready constituted set of terms, 'the powers that be'
and the 'prison', and failing to see the non-dialec-
tical constitution and subversion of those terms
in will to power. He does not take account of the
experience of eternal return.
With regard to what might be called the
question of woman, on the other hand, it might be
claimed that Adorno's appropriation of the already
formed concepts of history and nature and his idea
of negative dialectics, (as a reversal of Hegelian
dialectics), prevent him from dealing with the ques-
tion of the woman in Nietzsche's work as anything
more than something to be excused and dismissed.
Adorno considers Nietzsche's treatment of women to
be the question that finally brought his thought
, d th f b . . t ,121un er e sway 0 ourg&o~s soc~e y •
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According to Adorno, Nietzsche simply
'took over a second-hand and unverified image of
feminine nature from the Christian civilisation he
otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted' and failed to
see in this case that 'whatever is in the context
of bourgeois delusion called nature is merely the
scar of social mutilation,122. Thus it is claimed
that, insofar as there are many women and many dif-
ferent sorts of women in Nietzsche's work, each of
them 'employed' for different strategic purposes,
for the articulation of different manifestations
of will to power, and such that they would, as
fernina vita, utterly confuse and postpone the attempt
to posit precisely the sort of identity that Adorno
would conceive himself as objecting to, Adorno has
read his own image of feminine nature and his own
privileging of identity into Nietzsche's work.
And thus he may be said to be taking over the terms
that have been constituted in society by means of
the 'necessity of meaning' based upon the logic of
identity in order to reverse those terms.
Implication
The relation between a thinker and the
tradition of which he is a part is a dialectical
relation according to a dialectician: the way in
which a thinker conceives that relation will there-
fore depend upon how that thinker conceives the na-
ture of dialectics. There appear to be at least two
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ways in ~hich Adorno conceives himself to be related
to past thinkers. Phrases indicating a decisive
break with, or a stepping outside of, the tradition
are to be found_alongside phrases which would indi-
cate a more sophisticated conception of that rela-
tion. In either case, however, the position of the
immanent critic with regard to tradition is deter-
mined by the practice of negative dialectics.
That is, sometimes Adorno will speak
of a 'decisive break' with Hegel123, or of a 'fare-
well to Hegel,124, and he will say that negative
dialectics 'names the difference from Hegel,125.
Statements like these would tend to suggest that
Hegel and the Hegelian tradition have been left be-
hind or negated. Insofar as negative dialectics
'names the difference from Hegel', it would appear
that Adorno conceives his work as an identity that
could be put in opposition to Hegel.
On the other hand, a more sophisticated
account is also to be found in Adorno's work. This
account appears to be informed by Hegel's contention
that 'the genuine refutation must penetrate the op-
ponent's strong-hold and meet him on his own ground;
no advantage is gained from attacking him elsewhere
and negating him where he is not,126. The idea of
the sUblation of a work, 'through its own immanent
dialectic,127, finds its expression in Adorno's idea
of immanent critique.
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According to Adorno, 'dialectic's very
procedure is immanent critique'. Rather than oppo-
sing a philosophical ~ork, a literary ~ork or indeed
a culture, by means of a 'position' or 'model' that
is external and 'alien' to it, immanent critique will
'push' that work or culture 'to where it cannot af-
ford to go,128. Immanent criticism, then, does not,
on this account, oppose or critique by means of ex-
ternal models or positions.
Elsewhere, ho~ever, immanent criticism
is sai~ to involve positions of both interiority
and exteriority with regard to its subject matter.
In Negative Dialectics, for example, we are told that
immanent criticism of the privileging of identity
means, 'paradoxically enough', 'to criticise it from
outside as well'. And, in Prisms, we learn that
'the dialectical critic of culture must both parti-
cipate and not participate in culture,129. Finally,
as Adorno says, 'the very opposition between know-
ledge which penetrates from without and that which
bores from within becomes suspect to the dialectical
method which sees in it a symptom of precisely that
reification which the dialectic is obliged to accuse,130.
So, there are a number of ways in which
Adorno conceives his position with regard to tradi-
tion, completely outside it, completely inside it,
both within and without and neither ~ithin nor with-
out. Presumably, Adorno could provide as many reasons
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for the differe~taccounts of the position of the nega-
tJ(.Ie
tive dialectician as there(accounts of that position.
However, it is claimed that whatever Adorno says is
his position, it is actually described in 'the method'
of negative dialectics and that his repeated and var-
ious relations to outside and inside are indicative
of the fact that dialectics, whether negative or not,
deals with fixed, stable entities that may be seen
to be identical, non-identical, and opposed to one
another.
Thus Adorno's work may be describing _
the non-identity in the identity that characterises
tradition. Where Husserl, for example, will expound
his doctrine of perception, Adorno will elucidate the
antinomies of that doctrine. He will demonstrate
the non-identity, the contradiction, within that
doctrine or identity. So, if the thinkers of the
past conceive tradition to be a process in which a
standpoint is raised to a higher one by means of its
own immanent dialectic13~, Adorno will demonstrate
the contradiction in such a conception and exhibit
that contradiction be means of immanent critique.
That Adorno continually talks of the
outside and the inside, of the constitutive role
played within conceptuality or nature, for example,
by that which is supposedly outside that conceptual-
ity or nature, is, it is suggested, indicative of
the fact that he does not radicalise the insight into
that constitutive work. Had that insight been so
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radica1ised, it would be possible to suggest, with
Nietzsche, for example, that that work is undeci-
dable with regard to the terms of the opposition
and that it is the 'source' of that opposition.
That is, the work of the inferior term of the op-
position in the other, superior, term is reduced
or managed in order to provide an account of the
non-identity of the superior term rather than an
account of the work that is constitutive of both
terms 'in the first place'. More will be made of
these points in the chapter that follows and with
respect to the difference between Adorno's prac-
tice and that of Derrida.
Conclusion
The differences between Heidegger and
Adorno and their relations to Derrida's feminism
will be discussed in greater detail towards the end
of the next chapter, after Derrida's feminism has
itself been discussed. However, it should be clear
that Heidegger's position on the matter of economy
is fairly complex and at times approaches that of
a non-vulgar feminism, one that is instructive for
both Derrida and Foucault. That Adorno's position,
while appearing to be a more or less vulgar feimin-
ism, a reversal, also approaches that of a non-vul-
gar feminism, may be less clear.
Conceiving identity, difference and op-
position as they are found in Hegelian dialectics
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to be in need of grounding, Heidegger says that their
origins have been forgotten. That is, metaphysics
presents the elements of economy as representations
or valuations, and one, be it '~, ousia, energei~'
or ~hatever132, is privileged and held to be the
unifying or governing value which regulates the value
or identity of all the others. On Heidegger's ac-
count, identity, difference and opposition are con-
ceived metaphysically as representations or valua-
tions and are regulated by some other representation
or value, what was called the centre above.
Thus, he says that they need to be groun-
ded, that their grounds should be remembered, brought
out of occlusion: some non-representational and non-
valuative source must be found for their value. And
thus he says that, considered more originally and
authentically, identity is to be thought, via belong-
ing together, as the event of appropriation. Differ-
ence is to be thought as a special sort of identity
and opposition as a stepping back into the essential
unthought of past thinkers. Similarly, it has been
seen that negation, another ingredient in Hegel's
dialectic, is to be thought as having its grounds in
the Nothing rather than the other way round, as is
held by metaphysics.
Adorno, however, thinks that the priv-
ilege accorded one of the constitutive terms of
economy, identity, is misplaced and that it should
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be given to that which is equally part of the prod-
uction of value but which has been forgotten, dif-
ference or non-identity. On Adorno's account, then,
identity, difference and opposition are organised
metaphysically in that identity is privileged and
regulates the value of all the other terms.
Both Adorno and Heidegger may be said,
therefore, to be approaching and 'missing' a non-
vulgar feminism and from different directions.
Although, clearly, it is not being suggested that
a non-vulgar feminism has a 'proper place', (that
idea was dealt with in chapter two), Heidegger may
be seen to be approximating to a version of ec- cen-
tric economy, feminist economy, in that he says that
the terms of metaphysics are inadequate to describe
the original and primordial grounds of themselves.
That is, Being, for example, is strictly undecidable
in terms of beings, in the terms of metaphysics.
And Adorno may be seen to tend toward such a posi-
tion in that the meanings of the terms he uses
fluctuate according to what he is trying to do with
them and as a result of the work of non-identity.
Therefore, in that Heidegger is con-
cerned with an economy in which value or identity
is undecidable in the terms of metaphysics and is-
sues from a source that cannot be described in the
terms of metaphysics but which may, nevertheless,
be given a proper and original sense, he is ap-
proaching and missing non-vulgar feminism from
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the side of ec- centric economy. He is always led
back, by this concern ~ith the proper sense of the
origin, to centric, vulgarly masculine, economy.
And Adorno approaches ec- centric economy in that
the value or identity of the terms he uses fluc-
tuates but is ultimately prevented 'access' to a
non-vulgar feminism by the role of Utopia in his
thought. The undecidable is, or may always be
seen, in the last instance, to be reduced to cen-
tric economy by the task he is trying to carry
out and the role of Utopia as telos, even if it
is a negative telos.
CHAPTER FIVE
DERRIDA
In chapter two, reference was made to
the tension between centric and ec- centric economy.
In the attempt to present economy, the production
and legitimation of meaning and value, that distinc-
tion was presented as a matter of a relationship
between identity, difference and opposition and as
traversed by various relations of power and desire.
Having followed that account through the work of
Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno, using the
idea of dialectic as a guide, it remains for the
present chapter to recapitulate those themes and to
consider the ways in which they affect the workings
of economy, power and desire as they are found ex-
plicitly in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze
end Guattari.
Consequently, this chapter will deal
with the work of Derrida on economy in order, on
the basis of the 'genealogy' of the previous chap-
ters, to show how that work provides for the possi-
bility of feminism. Having done that, the differ-
ences between his position and those of Adorno and
Heidegger on the matter of economy and hence femin-
ism will be pointed uP. In chapters six and seven,
the work of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari will
be used to show that and how power and desire are
l~
organised in economy to produce and legitimate the
sort of economy and the sort of values and mean-
ings that have been characterised thus far as phal-
locentric.
Differance
Derrida considers differance, with an
'a', to operate a displacement that is both radical
and infinitesimal with regard to Hegel's dialectics
and to mark the point at which one breaks with the
system of the aufhebungl• The following sections
will continue to elucidate the idea of economy with
reference to dialectics and they will begin here
with Derrida's position.
That position is elliptically summar-
ised in "The Double Science" by his saying that 'it
is not only the difference, (between desire and its
satisfaction), that is abolished [bY the thought of
the hymen] but also the difference between differ-
ence and non-difference,2
However, Derrida is more than usually
careful when it comes to dealing with Hegel: he
quotes with apparent approval Engels' remark to the
effect that 'the fellow demands time to be digested,3,
he refers to the relations in which his works exist
with those of Marx and the Marxist tradition and he
says that 'I attempt to bring the critical operation
to bear against the unceasing reappropriation of this
work of the simulacrum by a dialectics of the
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Hegelian type,4. The simulacrum, differance with an
'a', for example, must be constantly and critically
surveyed in order that it does not succumb to being
appropriated by Hegelian dialectics, to being defin-
ed as Hegelian contradiction, for example, as it
seems Houdebine and Scarpetta would like to doS.
To say that the logic of the hymen6,
or any of the other strategically employed undeci-
debles that are to be found in Derrida's work?, abo-
lishes the difference between difference and non-
difference sounds like Hegel's saying that differ-
ence, as difference of itself from itself, is not
different from identity. The lack of difference
between difference and non-difference that Derrida
assures us the hymen effects sounds like the lack
of difference between identity and difference that
Hegel says difference, in and for itself, is.
However, it is difference with an 'a'
that effects the radical and infinitesimal displace-
ment of Hegel's system and, as Derrida says, differ-
ence with an 'e' sounds like differance with an 'a'.
To see how this differance makes the difference,
the next section will look at difference and eternal
return.
Differance and eternal return
Differance, with an 'a', is Derrida's
version of Nietzsche's eternal return; as he says,
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the same ••• is not the identical. The same
is precisely differance ••• as the diverted
and equivocal passage from one difference to
another, from one term of the opposition to
the other ••• It is out of the unfolding of
this 'same' as differance that the sameness
of difference is presented in the eternal
retu~n 8
Differance, as the 'origin' of differ-
ences, which appears in the coupled oppositions or
differences of which both philosophy and everyday
language are made, as the reference/detour of one
term to another, is the same. The same, on the
other hand, is the way in which differance appears
in the coupled oppositions of philosophy and every-
day language to effect the reference/detour of one
term to another. There is, then, nothing to stop
this unfolding, (which is the 'condition' or 'non-
full, non-simple "origin",9 of meaning), nor, in-
deed, anything with which it might have begun.
Insofar as this is the case, differance is Derrida's
version of eternal return.
The eternal return is the return of the
same but not of the identical, (this, it is claimed,
is the point that Adorno did not appreciate when
he disapproved of amor fati as a bowing down to the
powers that be), since for it to be the eternal ret-
urn of the identical, (which is in fact a contradic-
tion in terms), the terms that were returning would
have to be full, simple presences that did not
obtain any value they had by appearing as the differ-
ance of some other term.
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It is thus differance with an 'a' that
breaks with Hegel. It is thus that differance with
an 'a' breaks with difference with an le' while, nev-
ertheless, sounding like it. And it is thus that
the abolition of the difference between difference
and non-difference breaks with, while sounding like,
the identity of identity and difference. In this
~ay, it is suggested, does Derrida appropriate, take
over and transform, Nietzsche's thought and exper-
ience of eternal return: differance, as the 'unfol-
ding of the "same"' provides the 'non-full, non-
simple "origin"' of the differences which may then
be thought as dialectical differences and taken up
into a dialectic 'of the Hegelian type'.
The displacement is radical insofar as
differance, with an 'a', 'predates' the Hegelian
dialectic of identity and difference. Where Hegel-
ian contradiction is an active and productive ground
for identity and difference, differance is the
'"active" ••• discord of the different forces and
of the differences between forces' that constitute
Nietzsche's will to powerlO and which would both
constitute and postpone identities and differencesll•
In this way, the difference is radical in that it
shows the difference between centric or restricted,
(Hegelian), economy and ec- centric or general,
(Nietzschean and Derridean), economy.
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The displacement is infinitesimal in
that, as noted above, Hegelian difference, as the
identity of identity and difference, sounds like
the Derridean hymen, as the abolition of the dif-
ference between difference and non-difference.
The displacement is infinitesimal insofar as, as
will be seen later, it is not as if there is any
'gap' or space between centric and ec- centric eco-
nomy. It is not, that is, as if there were con-
cepts or operations that are metaphysical in them-
selves: as Derrida says in "The Retrait of Meta-
phor", there is no metaphysics in itself, and as
he says in Dissemination, it is rather as if a veil
passes between a concept and itself.
If, as suggested here, differance is
Derrida's version of the etarnal return, then the
'deconstructive program', such as it is, may be
'conceived' as an attempt to put to work Nietzsche's
idea of a non-reactive or affirmative nihilism -
an attempt, thus, to complete nihilism. It is af-
firmative and non-reactive in that there is no
(apparent) question of 'nostalgia' for an arch~ or
a telos with differance.
Restricted and general economy
As will be seen, this distinction bet-
ween restricted and general economy is another way
in which Derrida signals the difference between
centric and ec- centric economy. The difference
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between these two economies is, literally, sense-
less; 'it is the difference of sense, the unique
interval bet~een meaning and a certain non-mean-
ing,13.
The difference, then, is the differ-
ence between differance and difference, between the
ec- centric economy of differance and the centred
economy of differences that exist between stable
entities and are governed by what Derrida calls the
centre or transcendental signified. In that this
difference is also radical and infinitesimal, and
for the same reasons, as the difference between
Hegel's system and differance with an 'a', it might
well be referred to as the difference between res-
tricted and general economy.
It might be noted at this point that
the move from centric to ec- centric economy in
Derrida's work reflects what Nietzsche says about
the transvaluation of values - the change in the
element from ~hich value derives, the change in the
value of values. Where in centric economy the val-
ue of values derives from' a privileged term or val-
ue, the transcendental signified, in the economy of
differance, value is at once produced and destroyed
by the play of differential relations14•
With rega~d to restricted and general
economy, the translator of Writing and Difference
notes on page 335 that' ••• aufhebung means to neg-
ate and conserve at the same time. In the
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Phenomenology of Mind each step along the way
is lifted up and interiorised, negated and con-
served in the next step. Thus the aufhebung
leaves nothing behind and is the best of speculat-
ors because it wastes nothing and profits from ev-
erything. Bataille, Derrida is demonstrating, is
not a "speculator" because he is concerned with
precisely ~hat is left behind, with the excess
which the aufhebung excludes because it cannot pro-
f't (. ). ,I~':1, 1.e. make sense, from 1t .
Hegel's dialectic is thus centred eco-
nomy,it 'restricts itself to conservation, to circu-
lation and self-reproduction as the reproduction of
meaning,l6. It restricts itself to already consti-
tuted values and cannot account for or make sense of
the absence/loss of sense that is the non-full, non-
simple 'origin', the ec- centric economy of differ-
ance.
Thus the difference between these eco-
nomies, between Derrida's differance and Hegel's
dialectics, is radical insofar as differance is pro-
ductive of the oppositions and differences that
Hegel's dialectic ~ill cancel and preserve on a high-
er level by means of the auf hebung. It is infinit-
esimal because the 'gap' between the two economies
is no gap at all, rather it is as if a veil passes
between Hegel and himselfl? There are no concepts
that are purely and simply 'part of' centred eco~omy,
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purely and simply metaphysical18, as there would
have to be in order to speak of a 'gap'.
Rather, the concepts, operations and
procedures that are constitutive of philosophy are
all governed by or produced within an economy with
a transcendental signified, a restricted or centred
economy. Thus the reading of Hegel allows for the
reading of the general economy that Hegel must res-
trict in order to write but which cannot itself be
ec-written. General economy,~centric economy, cannot
be written, as grammatology is the name of a ques-
tion rather than the name of a science, save through
recourse to the few strategic ploys that can be used
to disrupt centred economy.
Implication
One aspect of the way in which Derrida
conceives his relation to past thought or tradition
has been noted in the introduction to this essay.
In Spurs/Eperons, he says that 'if the form of op-
position and the oppositional structure are them-
selves metaphysical, then the relation of metaphy-
sics to its other can no longer be one of opposit-
ion,l9. Thus Derrida does not consider himself to
be opposed in any simple fashion to those thinkers
he deals with: his relation to the thought of trad-
ition, like Adorno's, is determined by his concep-
tion of and relation to the thought of dialectics.
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The traditional and metaphysical forms
of opposing what one chooses to term metaphysics and
tradition are discussed by Oerrida at a number of
places and may be seen to fall into two basic types,
that of refusal and that of reversal.
There are two forms of refusal. The
first consists in refusing the terms and values im-
plicit in any discourse. And the second consists
in refusing or rejecting the terms and values impli-
cit in a particular form of discourse and replacing
them with another form of discourse. However, as
Derrida says, 'the step "outside philosophy" is
much more difficult to conceive than is generally
imagined by those who think they made it long ago
with cavalier ease and who are in general swallow-
ed up in metaphysics by the whole body of discourse
which they claim to have disengaged from it,20.
Both these forms of refusal, of step-
ping outside philosophy, are difficult and highly
risky, then, if not impossible, for there is, on
Derrida's account, no discourse that is foreign
to that of metaphysics. One risks either silence
or the simple repetition of the offending material.
On the other hand, even if it were possible to simp-
ly step outside of all the discourses of tradition
and metaphysics, it is unlikely that what is thus
outside those discourses would be communicable.
And the attempt to oppose and replace one discourse
with another is doomed since it is the organisation
of discourse in terms of a transcendental signified
that constitutes metaphysics 'in the first place'.
Thus. opposing tradition and metaphysics is not 'a
question of opposing a graphocentrism to a logocen-
trism, nor, in general, any centre to any other cen-
tre,21.
There are, similarly, t~o forms of rev-
ersal. The first form consists in privileging the
hitherto supplementary term because the things it is
said to be are 'really' more valuable than the
things those terms having the properties of the trans-
cendental signified are said to be. On such a strat-
egy, writing, for example, would be privileged bec-
ause being the sign of a sign was held to be more
valuable than the presence of the spoken word. And
the second form of reversal consists in privileging
the hitherto supplementary term because it is 'really'
all the things that the privileged term is held to
be and is thus of at least equal value.
However, as they stand, Derrida asserts
that these forms of opposition amount to little more
than 'a clamorous declaration of the antithesis,22.
Both privileged and supplementary terms are produced
within the economy of discourse and so is the idea
of privilege/supplementarity: reversal, therefore,
affects neither the 'form' nor the 'content' of a
centred economy, of tradition.
A crude characterisation of these forms
of opposition ~ould be to say that refusal attempts
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to step outside of tradition while reversal oppo-
ses wholly from within tradition and metaphysics.
The form of opposition and the oppositional struc-
ture are thus metaphysical insofar as outside and
inside are categories which have been produced
'within' metaphysics.
The question or matter of a 'double
strategy', of 'struggling ••• upon two fronts, on
two stages, and in two registers,23 manifests it-
self here in that what seems to be required is a
form of opposition that is not metaphysical inso-
far as it is neither a form of remaining wholly
within metaphysics nor a form of stepping complete-
ly outside metaphysics. Sensitive to the Hegelian
law, noted above24, which dictates that 'one cannot
speak out against ~ReasonJ ••• except by being for
it', Derrida says that, from 'witbin its domain,
Reason leaves us only the recourse to strategems
and strategies,25. Thus, the language of metaphy-
sics, the only one available26, must be shown to
be both produced and destroyed in ec- centric eco-
nomy.
Thus Derrida says that the 'thought
that means nothing', the thought that exceeds mean-
ing and meaning-as-hearing-oneself-speak by inter-
rogating them - 'this thought, announced in gramma-
tology, is given precisely as the thought for which
there is no sure opposition between inside and
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outside,27. While the language one is compelled to
speak will oblige one to speak of outside and inside,
strategems and strategies will enable one to 'oppose'
metaphysics and tradition in such a ~ay that one's
positions are ultimately undecidable; one is neither
outside nor inside, outside and inside become undeci-
dable.
In effect, the difference or tension
between centric and ec- centric economy constrains
opposition to centric economy to recognise that mo-
ments of centric economy possess a form of strategic
necessity as well as being, precisely, that which is
to be critiques or transgressed. Moments of centric
economy, whether in the guise of a telos or the lan-
guage of metaphysics, are necessary in that they are
the only recourse strategy has. But, in that they
exist as a tension between centric and ec- centric
economy, they are to be critiqued, exposed as such
and shown to be ultimately undecidable.
It was noted above that the difference
between centred and ec- centric economy could not be
given a sense, that it is the 'unique interval which
t . ft· . ,28separa es mean1ng rom a cer a1n non-mean1ng •
Derrida employs a number of strategic pseudonyms or,
as he has it, 'non-synonymic SUbstitutions,29, for
that interva130, for that thought which means noth-
ing. He calls it differance, supplement, pharmakon
and hymen, among other things31• It is 'the logic
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of the hymen,32 then, that, while accounting for
Derrida's position with regard to metaphysics and
tradition, will describe the strategies to be em-
ployed in dealing with that tradition and account
for the relation to the thought of identity, differ-
ence and opposition, the thought of dialectics.
This 'logic' or 'graphic,33 of the
hymen may be seen at work in Derrida's reading of
Rousseau. In Rousseau's discussions of writing and
masturbation, he will say that they are supplementary
operations and that they are to be excluded from the
realms of communication and sexuality proper.
Writing, as in Saussure, Husserl and back to Plato,
involves the representation of the speaker's inten-
tions, for example, that are fully and simply pres-
ent in speech. Masturbation, on the other hand, is
to be excluded from the realm of sexuality proper
because it '"cheats" ••• "nature",34 and involves
the absence of a sexual object who is simply present
in proper intercourse. Both writing and masturbation
are condemned as dangerous supplements.
So, where Rouseau condemns writing and
masturbation for involving the unnatural and poten-
tially dangerous lack of presence that is found in
a pure and simple form in speech and sexual inter-
course, Derrida shows that he also wants to say that
only in his writing is his true or proper self to be
found35 and that his desire was most 'real', its full
strength was most manifest, precisely when the loved
lS5
~oman was absent36• Thus Derrida brings out the ~ay
in which, in Rousseau's text, writing, supposedly
inferior and to be excluded, contained outside speech,
is definitive of speech, interior to it. And he
shows the way in which sexuality 'proper' is a ver-
sion of masturbation, in that it is the absence,
either actual or possible, of the sexual object, that
renders either in any way satisfactory. Derrida thus
shows how, in the works of Rousseau and the others,
that which represents a force in the forms of writing
and masturbation interior to intercourse and speech
and essential to them has been contained outside them37•
Except that such a demonstration has
confused what was meant by vulgar conceptions of both
speech and writing to such an extent that there is no
longer any simple, identifiable difference between
the inside, what is proper to, and the outside, what
is inessential to, of speech and intercourse. Ideas
as to what their identities consisted in, necessary
for writing to be contained outside and inferior to
speech, for example, have been rendered undecidable.
Thus does the logic of the hymen Question and prob-
lematise what were thought to be simple oppositions.
In terms of a relation to tradition and
metaphysics, then, Derrida does not oppose himself
to or claim to stand outside of that tradition.
Rather, he inhabits as he reads a text - his version
of deconstructive practice is parasitical in:-a. way
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that would, nevertheless, show that received notions
of the parasitical were inadequate. He will account
for the production of differences in a text and show
how each appears as the differance of the other rath-
er than posit an alternative set of oppositions or
differences. So, if the relation of metaphysics to
its other can no longer be one of opposition, Derrida
will not oppose metaphysics, nor will he attempt to
contradict or negate it. His deconstructive practice
will rather be informed by the 'logic of the hymen':
it will be 'an operation that both sows confusion
between opposites and stands between the opposites
at once,38.
Consequently, if the logic of the hymen
involves the abolition of the difference between
difference and non-difference, the confusion of fix-
ed and stable identity, and thus the surplus that the
8ufhebung cannot account for and sublate, (that sur-
plus being ultimately irreducible to identity, 'an
excess facing, un debord, ••• that cannot be master-
ed,39, then Derrida's differance may be said to 'come
before' dialectics. As noted above, the centred or
restricted economy of dialectics must reduce, master
or tie down the ec- centric economy of differance in
order for there to be anything like identities, dif-
ference between those identities and then the aufhe-
bung of those differences.
Differance, then, the conflictual and
productive play of differences~~ and detours among
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those differences, cannot be conceived as a ver-
sion of dialectics since it would produce and dest-
roy at the same time4l the values and identities
that dialectics can master. And, where Adorno's
negative dialectics would show the detour of nature
via history, for example, an instance of non-iden-
tity between concept and thing, Derrida would show
it as the undecidable, non-full, non-simple 'origin'
of differences42 that has to be, but which can
never be, reduced in order to then speak of iden-
tities and differences.
The hymen, then, is 'neither identity
nor difference ••• neither inside nor outside •••
that is, simultaneously either/or,43. It 'can no
longer be included within philosophical (binary)
opposition' and, although it would inhabit that oppo-
sition, it would not allow the opposition to exist
as either Hegel's or Adorno's contradiction. It
would never 'leave room for a resolution in the form
of speculative dialectlcs44•
Derrida, Heide9ger and Feminism
Oerrida's account of ec- centric economy
is thus feminist and an account of feminist economy
insofar as the latter would both produce and destroy
value and meaning without ascribing a self-present
and self-identical value as source and insofar as
the former does not attempt to provide such a re-
assuring origin. Before looking at the ways in
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which power and desire operate and are operated upon
in centric and ec- centric economy, the differences
between Oerrida's and Adorno's and Heidegger's fem-
inisms will be explained.
Of the two forms of transgressive prac-
tice noted above, Adorno's will be seen to tend to-
wards that of reversal while Heidegger's tends to-
wards that of refusal. In the former, the work of
the undecidable remains unappreciated and is ultimate-
ly mastered by the dichotomous oppositions that are
correctly identified as the 'roots' of the problem.
And in the latter, although the undecidable remains
undecidable in terms of oppositional and represen-
tational thinking, meditative thought believes it-
self capable of giving an appropriate sense to that
undecidable.
So, where Jameson confesses to being
tempted to characterise Oerrida and the rest of the
Tel quel group of the period as 'Left Heideggerians,45,
and where both Gasche and Wordsworth have suggested
that Oerrida's version of deconstruction looks like
Adorno's immanent critique46, the following sections
will attempt to distinguish it from both. It will
be seen that, whatever affinities his work bears to
theirs, it is ultimately the role or 'presence' of
Nietzsche that divides his work from 'the Left'
and from Heidegger.
The general features of Heidegger's
relation to feminism should be fairly clear. In
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Of Grammatology, Derrida refers to the impossibility
of separating the two moments of Heidegger's situa-
tion with regard to the metaphysics of presence47•
Continuing that discussion in Spurs/Eperons, he des-
cribes the ways in which Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic
interrogation is disrupted by the enigmatic process
of propriation in the later texts48• Although Hei-
degger's thought of ec- centric economy is marked by
an 'ineradicable preference' for centred economy,
that thought is all the more surely led (back) to
ec- centric economy49 and Heidegger is at once con-
tained in and transgressive of metaphysics50• That
Heidegger's position with regard to feminism is fair-
ly ambiguous should be clear.
Insofar as Heidegger is concerned with
Being, the Nothing, appropriation and so on, the non-
representable, non-calculable and hence undecidable
source of value and meaning, his thought is trans-
gressive of metaphysics, centred or phallocentred
economy amd may be said to be feminist. Insofar as
he wants to give a proper, or, as he has it, authen-
tic, sense to this non-origin, to identify it non-
representationally, his thought is contained in, as
a refusal of, metaphysics. It may thus be described
as phallocentric. It is the play between the desire
or preference for the proper and authentic sense of
Being, for example, and the disruptive work of that
undecidable non-origin that accounts for the ambig-
uous nature of Heidegger's position with regard to
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feminism.
In terms of the relation to feminism,
then, the differences between Heidegger and Derrida
reduce to the following. For both Heidegger and
Derrida, that which is productive or the origin of
the representable and calculable terms of metaphy-
sics is itself undecidable. For Heidegger, though,
that origin constitutes some sort of identity, it
may be given a proper sense and thought appropriate-
ly and it does not produce terms that are themselves
undecidable. On Derrida's account, however, there
is no suggestion of a desire to give that non-origin
a proper sense or identity, nor to suggest that the
terms of metaphysics are themselves simply and un-
problematically calculable.
So, Heidegger's 'between' or 'interval'
is said to be undecidable in terms of representatio-
aI, calculative and valuative thought and to be
productive of the terms with which metaphysics has
to doSl• At the same time, those calculable and rep-
resentable entities are presented as simply and un-
problematically representable and calculableS2, and
meditative thinking is called upon to give a proper,
non-representational, account of that interval. On
the other hand, Derrida's 'between' or 'interval,S3,
as general economy, is undecidable in the terms of
centred economy, in terms of metaphysical thinking
and is both productive and destructive of those terms.
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At the same time, however, those terms are not them-
selves simply calculable or representable - like Der-
rida's Hegel and unlike Heidegger's beings, they are
separated by a veil or tension from the general eco-
nomy which cannot itself be simply represented but
which must be restricted or represented in order for
there to be representation.
It should come as no surprise, there-
fore, to see that where Derrida presents the economy
of differance as a version of will to power in eter-
nal return, Heidegger considers Nietzsche's will to
power to be the final expression of Western metaphy-
sics as the will to will. As on that of economy,
Heidegger's position on will to power, on power/des-
ire, is that he is concerned to find a 'prior stage'
or 'beyond' to power and desire as they are represen-
ted metaphysically. Thus Derrida says that his ver-
sion of deconstruction is not undertaken in order to
see opposition disappear, that he is Nietzschean to
the extent that it is the conflict of forces in will
to power that produces values and meanings54•
And thus Heidegger says, in the "Conver-
sation on a Country Path", that Gelassenheit would
lie beyond the domain of the will. Heidegger's
strategy consists in a refusal of the will to will,
something which may also be seen in the "Letter on
Humanism", where power is said to be the 'quiet power
of the favouring-enabling'. There is no room in
Heidegger's thought, as there is in Derrida's, for
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dominance or submission except as the metaphysical
representation of power/desire.
So, where Heidegger's origin is non-
representable and lies beyond what he considers to
be the calculable and representable terms of meta-
physics, Derrida's differance is both constitutive
and subversive of the terms of metaphysics. For
Derrida, there is no beyond to the lIIillto power in
eternal return. His version of will to power is it-
self unde chdab Le with regard to representability
and would both produce and destroy terms, values
and meanings. Insofar as these terms, values and
meanings would be both produced and destroyed, they
are similarly undecidable. Heidegger's beyond is
undecidable in that the terms of metaphysics cannot
'get at it', cannot account for it, because they are
representable and calculable. Derrida's differance
is undecidable but precisely because it constitutes
both the production and the destruction of the values
of the terms employed to 'get at' it.
The difference between Heidegger and
Derrida as feminists, then, consists in the fact that
Heidegger is refusing what he considers to be metaphy-
sics whereas Derrida is explicating the ways in which
ec- centric economy is mastered or occluded by or in
centred economy. If Heidegger's metaphysics is cen-
tred economy, in that Being has been occluded in the
epochal reduction to particular beings which are then
held to be the source of value, then his version of
ec- centric economy, feminist economy, is a refusal
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of the terms of metaphysics. Derrida's metaphysics
is similarly centred economy but his feminism does
not consist in refusal since there is no non-repres-
entational beyond. Rather, differance, ec- centric
economy, inhabits as it takes apart or deconstructs
the values of centred economy.
That is, chapter two has argued that ec-
centric economy, constitutes the feminine operation,
(in a non-vulgar sense), in that it would consist in
both the production and destruction of value and mean-
ing and is not based upon a self-present and self-id-
entical value. Metaphysics, which consists in the
operation by which ec- centric economy is mastered
by centric economy, an economy in which value is pro-
duced by relation to a self-present, self-identical
value, has been seen to be the vulgarly masculine
operation in that it is the result of forces, desires
and privileged values that have traditionally been
considered to be definitive of masculinity. Heideg-
ger's feminism is thus a refusal of metaphysics, phal-
locentric economy, in that it seeks a beyond and to
give a proper sense to that beyond. And Derrida's
feminism has been seen to consist in the illustration
of the ways in which ec- centric economy is occluded
as productive and destructive of the values and iden-
tities of centric economy.
So, the presence of Nietzsche in Derrida's
thought differentiates him from Heidegger in that,
for Derrida as for Nietzsche, there is no Being
1?4
behind or beyond will to power in the mode of eternal
return. The 'non-full, non-simple "origin"' of mean-
ing and value is the conflictual play fa forces in
will to power for both Derrida and Nietzsche whereas
for Heidegger there is a beyond that is similarly un-
decidable but nonetheless available to authentic
thought.
For example, as ~as seen in chapter four
in connection with the Discourse on Thinking, Heideg-
ger says that the meditative thinking which would
constitute Gelassenheit zu den dingen lies 'beyond'
the distinction between activity and passivity - it
lies beyond the domain of the will. As such, it
would lie beyond valuative and calculative thought
which deals with beings and is intimately connected
with the domain of the will. David Krell refers to
this issue when he says that 'in valuative thought,
Heidegger sees the main obstacle to Nietzsche's ad-
vance beyond metaphysical modes of thought,55.
So, as was seen in Heidegger's Nietzsche,
Nietzsche remains a metaphysical thinker for Heideg-
ger, providing, indeed, the fulfillment of metaphy-
sical thought56• And, as seen in Derrida's Spurs/
Eperons, 'the reading of Heidegger' or 'Heidegger's
reading ••• is opened up by 8 certai~ dehiscence'.
Heidegger's reading is 'forced to open onto still
another reading which for its part refuses to be con-
tained there'S? That is, there is a certain 'ten-
sion' in 'the reading of Heidegger' - Heidegger's
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text is itself between centric and ec- centric economy,
and is itself opened up by that same tension as it is
found in Nietzsche's text. Nietzsche thus escapes,
as far as Derrida is concerned, Heidegger's 'last meta-
physician' charge.
Nietzsche escapes because, for Derrida,
metaphysics is centred economy which can include both
representational and non-representational thinking,
whereas, for Heidegger, metaphysics is representation-
al thought which he equates 8S coterminous with valua-
tive thought. For Heidegger, the other of metaphysic-
al thought is meditative, non-representational, thought
whereas, for Derrida, it is ec- centric economy which
can also include representational and non-representat-
ional thought.
Consequently, Heidegger can say that
Nietzsche's style is nothing less than his relation
to Being58 and that because his style is bound up with
59a play of valuation, the thought of will to power ,
Nietzsche is a metaphysician. And Derrida can say
that Nietzsche's styles effect what 'escape' he is
able to make from metaphysics. The heterogeneity of
Nietzsche's text60, his strategy of writing, the dif-
ferences and deviations in Quills, in styles, deter-
mine that he does not simply erect a discourse against
centric economy and that his texts exploit ec- cen-
tricity.
Nietzsche's styles are ec- centric for
Derrida whereas they are calculative for Heidegger.
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Arche-ecriture is similarly ec- centric for Derrida
and Being 'is' non-valuative for Heidegger. The
latter's Being, however, is nevertheless at least
partially constituted by centric economy as far as
Derrida is concerned and that Heidegger 'misses' the
question of the woman in Nietzsche's text is testi-
many to the limits of Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic
project - the points at which it is disrupted by
ec- centric economy_ As Derrida has said, 'if style
were a man ••• then writing would be a woman,61.
Heidegger's project, that is, cannot
cope with and/or is regularly disrupted by the ec-
centric workings of undecidability - by what Nietzsche
terms Vita Femina or will to power, and what Derrida
terms arche-ecriture or differance. Nietzsche's
styles, as ec- centric, are non-vulgarly feminine
and do not submit easily to Heidegger's project of
non-representationally describing the proper or ori-
ginal truth of Being. Nietzsche's styles, then,
return, eternally, to his woman, Vita Femina, who
'is (her own) writing,62 whereas Heidegger's style
would tie itself to, fix upon, the truth or meaning
of Being.
Derrida, Adorno and Feminism
The differences between Derrida's and
Adorno's feminisms, between their critiques of phal-
locentric economy, may be summarised by saying that,
where Adorno's feminism consists in a reversal of
177
the privilege accorded one of the terms of an oppo-
sition, Derrida's consists in a reversal 'followed
by', (for he assures us that the operation(s) take(s)
place 'in a kind of disconcerting simul63), a dis-
placement. This section will illustrate how the two
practices differ and account for those differences
by considering each thinker's relation to Nietzsche.
For Adorno, the metaphysical or ideolog-
ical element of thought is identity. In a positive
dialectic, like that of Hegel, for example, the iden-
tity of identity and difference that results from
the negation of negation is given a positive value -
it is both desired and possible. That identity is
given negative value in Adorno's negative dialectic.
It is conceived as the universal co-ercive mechan-
ism and is neither desired not strictly possible -
only ideology presents it as either64• Consequently,
for Adorno, metaphysics consists in (a) centred eco-
nomy in which identity is privileged as centre. In
such (an) economy, the values of the terms involved
is generated by their relation to identity.
In this way, metaphysics or ideology
may present something as natural and privilege it
over the historical by virtue of the supposed iden-
tity of that thing with the concept of nature and by
the supposed identity of the concept of nature and
its object. Adorno's negative dialectic, then, does
'not tend to the identity in the difference between
each object and its concept' 6~
17B
That identity, in terms of which ideolo-
logical value is generated and legitimated, is rather
to be distrusted and the ways in which it disinteg-
rates or breaks down under its own immanent forces
t b d Ob d b th t' dO 1 t' ° 66are 0 e escr1 eye nega 1ve 1a ec 1C1an •
Thus Adorno says that a successful piece of immanent
criticism 'is not one which resolves contradiction
in a spurious harmony, but one which ••• embod[ies]
the contradiction, pure and uncompromised, in its
innermost structure,67.
For these reasons, the meanings of the
words that Adorno uses will change according to the
use he is trying to make of them. Where it is the
natural that is presented as privileged over the
historical by ideology, it will mean something other
than what it will mean when Adorno is trying to show
how ideology presents convention or the historical
as privileged. As noted above, Buck-Morss describes
this strategy by saying that 'Adorno argued, on the
one hand, that actual past history was not identical
to the concept of history, (as rational progress),
because of the material nature to which it did vio-
lence. At the same time, the 'natural' phenomena of
the present were not identical to the concept of na-
ture, (as essential reality or truth), because they
had been historically produced,6B.
Thus Adorno's negative dialectics will
show the non-identity or contradiction within what
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metaphysics presents as the identity of concept and
object. It will attempt to show the constitutive
role of the non-conceptual in the conceptual or the
69-historical in the natural, for example , and in so
doing will reverse the privilege accorded to_both
the terms and to identity. That is, where, by vir-
tue of its supposed identity with its object, the
concept of nature is privileged over the historical,
Adorno will reverse the privilege to show the role
of the historical in the natural and thus sho~ the
non-identity between concept and object.
Derrida, however, does not 'simply'
reverse the privilege accorded one of two terms in
centred economy. The form, which is in each case
hierarchical, of opposition, is also treated by
Derrida's strategies so that what he terms 'displace-
ment' takes place. By means of displacement, neither
term may be clearly represented and identified as
enjoying 8 privilege over the other. Thus he says
that deconstruction is a 'double strategy' and that
unless the reversal of the poles is followed by dis-
placement, the work of the undecidable, then critique
amounts to little more than a declaration of the anti-
thesis. And thus the role of the telos in deconstruc-
tive strategy is at once necessary and to be avoided -
it is at once produced and destroyed by the forces
at work in displacement.
Metaphysics for Derrida, too, involves
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the privileging of one term of an opposition by vir-
tue of a relation of proximity to the centre of (the)
economy. But, on his account, to reverse the privil-
ege accorded the terms and identity is insufficient
to subvert the operations of centred economy - dis-
placement is also necessary.
Thus, as seen in his treatment of Rous-
seau's account of speech and writing, for example,
Oerrida will not only reverse the privilege accorded
speech in Rousseau's work, nor will he simply show
how writing plays a constitutive role in speech,
(which would be Adorno's ploy here). Rather, he will
attempt to show that what has been contained outside
speech as inferior or supplementary is actually a
force within speech and thus that the values of writ-
ing and speech are ultimately undecidable. It is
not, on Oerrida's account, as it is on Adorno's, as
if speech and writing were different things, the lat-
ter having a constitutive role within the former,
but rather that their relation is such that they are
undecidable with regard to identity and self-presence;
speech is a form of writing.
So, where negative dialectics consists
in a reversal, concerned to show the non-identity
between concept and object?D, Derrida's difference
'cannot be preceded by eny identity,?l. The 'divert-
ed and equivocal passage from one difference to
another, from one term of the opposition to the other,?2,
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describes the movement of the undecidable and points
to the 'non-full, non-simple "origin"' of differences73;
of the hierarchically organised terms of the opposit-
tion.
And thus Adorno's 'fluctuating meanings',
the 'purposeful ambivalences,74, are not the same as
Derrida's undecidables. There is no prior identity
to the terms of Derrida's economy to which non-iden-
tity might be opposed. And there is, similarly, no
theological, telic, presence, in terms of which the
differences could be resolved.
The difference between Adorno's fluctuat-
ing meanings and Derrida's undecidables may be char-
acterised as the difference between polysemia and
dissemination, as that difference is outlined in ~-
itions. Here, Derrida says that, although 'polysemia
••• doubtless represents progress' in relation to
the linearity of monothematic reading, which is al-
ways anxious to anchor itself to the principle signif-
ied of a text, it is nevertheless organised 'within
the implicit horizon of a unitary resumption of mean-
ing,75. 'Dissemination, on the contrary ••• can be
led back neither to a presence of simple origin •••
nor to an eschatological presence,76.
There is no end, then, to the play of
signification that is involved in dissemination, but
Adorno's fluctuating meanings constitute polysemy in-
sofar as they begin from already constituted entities
and do not chart the production and destruction of
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those entities. They also constitute polysemy
in that they are governed by the pledge that is
contained in judgement that there_be no non-iden-
tity. This pledge, as seen above, is that what has
been called the bad identity of concept and thing
be replaced by the good identity that would make
up Utopia.
As for the differences between these
two, it is again the reading of Nietzsche that is
decisive. Adorno, like Derrida's version of Heideg-
ger, conceives Nietzsche to be trapped within contra-
diction and to be stuck at the level of reversing
the Platonic privilege accorded System, Being and
so on. Adorno's reading of the ideas surrounding
eternal return, however, suggests that he, too, is
trapped within the contradictions he finds.
That is, if Nietzsche's account of et-
ernal return and amor fati is intended to describe
a transvaluative and selective experience, one that
would, as Deleuze says, complete nihilism and elim-
inate or transform all that cannot affirm eternal
return, and if Adorno conceives it simply as a form
of bowing down to the powers that be??, then Adorno
may be said to have missed or rejected something in
that account.
What he has thus missed or rejected is
precisely what Derrida makes so much of in the idea
of differance. It is displacement, dissemination,
the invaginated logic of the hymen - the idea that
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the return of the same is not the return of the
identical. It is the idea that even a laziness
may return but that if it could will its own ret-
urn, amor fati, it would not be the same, base,
t· 1· 78reac 1ve aZ1ness • So, as claimed above, Adorno's
ambivalences differ from Derrida's undecidables as
polysemy from dissemination. Nietzsche's eternal
return, what Derrida calls 'the sameness of differ-
d t·t· ,79 . th ht· Adence an repe 1 10n ,rema1ns un oug 1n orno
except as the thought that the injunction to 'Live
Life' appears barbaric and cynical.
So, differance is a version of eternal
return. As such, it attempts a non-reactive, trans-
valuative completion and overcoming of nihilism.
To say that there is no stable origin is to affirm
the conflict of forces in will to power that would
at once produce and destroy, (and thereby transvalue),
all values and meanings without either simply rever-
sing the privileges accorded those values or saying
that all is equally valueless. Adorno does not say
that all is equally valueless - it is the non-iden-
tical element that generates meaning and value and
which promises Utopia. But, insofar as he rejects
or misses amor fati, he employs will to power as a
critique of identity only by reversing the privil-
ege ideologically accorded self-present and self-id-
entical values in order to then privilege non-iden-
tity.
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The differences between Derrida's and
Adorno's feminisms may be summarised as follows.
Adorno reverses the privilege accorded one of the
terms of an opposition and reverses the value held
to be the centre, (in relation to which those terms
are supposed to derive their value). Thus, where
identity was presented in ideology as the centre of
economy and where one term was held to enjoy a priv-
ileged position with regard to that centre, (and
thus to be dominant with regard to the other pole),
Adorno will posit non-identity as that which gener-
ates meaning and value and will privilege the hither-
to supplementary term.
Derrida, on the other hand, will reverse
the privilege accorded one of the two terms by show-
ing that it is actually a force within the supposed-
ly superior term. Displacement consists in the rad-
icalisation of that process to show how one term's
appearance as the differance of the other accounts
for both the production and destruction of the terms
and ultimately renders them undecidable.
Conclusion
Although it has been seen to be much
else besides, insofar as Derrida's account of economy
is a version of Nietzsche's will to power in eternal
return8D, 1."t 1."sId " 81a 50 an account of power and eS1.re •
One of the most important lessons to be learnt from
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Derrida's account of economy is that difference is
not originally opposition and one consequence of this
lesson is that phallocentric or metaphysical economy
cannot be simply differentiated from ec- centric or
feminist economy. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, to see that not only does Derrida not
deal explicitly with the workings of po~er and des-
ire in the texts examined so far but also that what
he does say leaves him open to charges of not being
sufficiently critical.
That is, Derrida says that metaphysics
consists in the powerful and irrepressible desire
for a centre, for a stable and self-identical source
of value and identity that would curtail the endless
deferral and referral that both constitutes and des-
troys value and identity82. Similarly, he says that
the role of the centre in phallocentric economy is
to limit, govern and organise the differences in
terms of which value and identity are produced and
83destroyed in ec- centric economy • Both of these
~;t eo
claims~ the charge of referring only to power and
desire as they are found in metaphysical, phallocen-
tred, economy.
The desire that motivates centric eco-
nomy is presented as the desire for something that
is simply absent and as if it is always and every-
where the same. And the power that is employed to
govern the production of value is presented as,
186
precisely, something that is employed in a predom-
inantly negative and prohibitive role. Neither of
these claims are strictly consistent with the rest
of Derrida's economics in that those economics do
not appear to support such a simplistic view of the
workings of power and desire. While the account of
ec- centric economics is feminist, that is, the
account of power and desire within those economics
is not always consistent with that ec- centricity.
In order to see how these claims are to be expli-
cated, the next two chapters will deal with the
work of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari. Chapter
six will look at Foucault and chapter seven will
look at Deleuze and Guattari in order to account for
the workings of power and desire in economy.
CHAPTER SIX
FOUCAULT
The reading of Foucault to be under-
taken in this chapter attempts to show the role of
power in the production of value. It has been ar-
gued, in chapters two and four, that non-vulgarly
feminine economy, being both productive and dest-
ructive of value and identity, is occluded, master-
ed, or, as Derrida has it, produces itself as its
o~n self-occlusion. Ec- centric economy is occluded,
then, and masculine, centric economy appears to be
and is experienced as the source of all value and
identity. Foucault's work will be used to show how
power operates and is operated upon in these forms
of economy. It will be seen that, as it is found
in feminine, ec- centric, economy, power also pro-
duces itself as its own self-occlusion and that, ap-
pearing in the ways in which it does in centric,
vulgarly masculine, economy, it ensures its own leg-
itimacy and the legitimacy of the values which are
produced in centric economy. Power in ec- centric
economy, that is, will be seen to be both productive
and destructive, (constitutive and subversive), of
of the form of power that is found represented in
phellocentric economy in the same way that ec- cen-
tric economy is productive and destructive of (the
values and identities of) centric economy.
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Juridico-discursive power
It was suggested in the conclusion to
the previous chapter that, unless one was fairly
careful, Derrida's account of the roles of and re-
lations between power and desire as they are found
within centred economy on the one hand and between
centric and ec- centric economy on the other would
appear to belong to that group of accounts that Fou-
cault has labelled 'juridico-discursive'. As such,
it would, in Foucault's view, be traditional, meta-
physical and inadequate - ultimately unable to chart
the movements of power and desire in economy. Before
elucidating Foucault's analytics of power, this sec-
tion will outline the sorts of power and desire that
are to be found in Derrida's account of economy and
supplement that account with Foucault's own presen-
tation of juridico-discursive power.
Inconsistent as it appears with the ideas
that there exists a tension between centric and ec-
centric economy and that differance is both produc-
tive and destructive of identity, Derrida says that
ec- centric economy, differance, is 'mastered', or
'neutralised' by centric economyl. He also says that
ec- centric economy is 'supressed' or 'repressed' by
centric economy2. Within centred economy, not only
is differance organised so as to appear and be exper-
ienced as opposition, but that opposition is also
organised in terms of a 'violent hierarchy' - one
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term has 'the upper hand,3.
As seen in chapter two, it is the re-
lation to the centre, whether privileged or not, that
determines one term's position in the hierarchy.
Supplementary terms are thus said to be 'limited'
for 'motivations and relations of force yet to be
analysed,4. And the centre is said to 'govern'S the
terms within centred economy, forbidding by means of
an 'interdict' certain relations and substitutions
of terms6• In preparation for Foucault's and Oel-
euze and Guattari's account of those motivations and
forces, the consistency of Derrida's outline with
Foucault's presentation of the juridico-discursive
model of power will be illustrated.
In an interview with Lucette Finas?,
Foucault gives a sort of thumbnail sketch of what he
considers the traditional, inadequate and metaphysic-
al notion of power to consist in. Such a notion pre-
sents power as 'essentially a juridical mechanism
which says the law, which interdicts, which says 'no'
••• and is associated with a whole litany of nega-
tive effects'. Resembling those to be found in Der-
rida's account, these negative effects take the form
of 'exclusion, rejection, obstruction, denegations,
occultations etc,B. Also involved in this idea is
'the idea that power is something that is possessed,9
and that it is possessed either by people or by groups
of people. In a role seemingly analogous to Oerrida's
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centre, the sovereign or state bureaucracy, for exam-
ple, are said to possess po~er and to exercise it by
means of interdiction and so on.
These principle features are given a lit-
tle more definition in the first volume of The History
of SexualitylO. Under the heading of 'the negative
relation', Foucault notes that on this vie~, po~er
'can do nothing but say "no",ll. Po~er never estab-
lishes any relation that is not negative and these re-
lations take the form of rejection, denegation, ref-
usal and so on12• On the juridico-discursive model,
then, po~er is never considered as being in anything
but a negative relation to whatever it is in relation
to: to that, sexuality, for example, or those, the
ill or insane, for example, with which it has to do.
The juridical aspect of this conception
of power is discussed under the heading of 'the insis-
tence of the rule'. Power having dictated its law to
whatever it is in relation to, sexuality, for example,
that thing is organised in terms of a binary system -
'licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden,13. In
so doing, power prescribes an order on the basis of
which that thing may be said to be intelligible. So
the juridical aspect of power is manifest in that it
lays down the law to whatever it is in relation to.
The discursive aspect is also discussed
here. Foucault says that power's hold or control
over what it is relation to is established and main-
tained through language or the act of discourse.
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,[power] speaks and that is the rule'. Power, then,
is juridical insofar as it is cast or manifests it-
self in the form of law and it is discursive insofar
as it is paradigmatically 'through the act of dis-
course,14 on the part of the legislator that the rule
of law is established and maintained.
These laws that po~er uses to establish
its contra! over whatever it is in re!ation to are,
on the juridico-discursive account, no more than laws
of prohibition15• They say 'thou shalt not ••• ':
'thou shalt not go near, touch, consume, experience
pleasure etc,l6 and, according to this notion of
power, these !aws are all that is available to power.
This genera! form of prohibition or interdiction
takes three specific forms; 'affirming that such a
thing is not permitted, preventing it from being said
[and] denying that it eXists,l? These three forms,
although perhaps difficult to reconcile, may, as Fou-
cault suggests, be taken as the 'paradoxical logic
of a law that might be expressed as an injunction of
non-existence, non-manifestation and silence,18.
And finally, it is supposed, on the jur-
idico-discursive view, that power 'is exercised in
the same way at all levels', that it operates accor-
ding to the 'simple and endlessly reproduced mechan-
isms' that have just been described, law, ,taboo and
censorship. That is, 'from state to family, from
prince to father, from the tribunal to the small
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change of everyday punishments ••• one finds a gen-
eral form of power varying in scale alone,19. Cor-
responding to the homogeneity of the form of power
noted above, then, is a 'general form of submission
in the one who is constrained by it,201 whether the
subject who is 'subjected' is the 'citizen opposite
the state, the child opposite the parent or the dis-
ciple opposite the master,2l, the form of submission
is always held to be the same on the juridico-dis-
cursive model.
These are the principal features of what
Foucault calls the juridico-discursive conception of
power. It is essentially a power to say 'no'; 'capa-
ble only of posting limits, it is in no condition
to produce,22. Appearing in the same form on all lev-
els, it has the same methods or modes of operation
at its disposal. And it is based on a juridical and
discursive model, that of the declaration of the law
by a sovereign power which may be the prince or the
state apparatus. It remains to outline Foucault's
unease with this conception and to elaborate the
moves he makes to deal more adequately with the work-
ings of power.
On Foucault's account, there are at least
three reasons as to why this conception is inadeq-
uate. The first is that such a notion cannot account
for the 'productivity there is in power,23. In
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identifying po~er with the 'force of an interdict',
it is difficult to account for what Foucault sees
as the fact that it 'runs through and it produces
things, it induces pleasure, it forms knowledge,
(savoir), it produces discourse,24. A power that
could do no more than say 'no', than repress and in-
hibit, could not, claims Foucault, be of any use in
accounting for the productivity of power, for the
fact that it has a sort of creative role. The trad-
itional, juridico-discursive, notion of power cannot
account for or consider power as 'a productive net-
work that runs through the social body,25 and would
be entirely insufficient for Foucault's task in such
works as Discipline and Punish, for example, where
power is productive of any number of practices and
discourses.
The other side of this problem is that,
working with this traditional notion of power, it is
equally difficult to account for how positions of
dominance are ever tolerated by those in positions
of subordinance, for how dictates issuing from posi-
tions of power are ever accepted as legitimate. As
Foucault says, 'if power was never anything other
than repressive, if it never did anything other than
say 'no', do you suppose that we should ever manage
to obey it?,26. According to the juridico-discursive
model, the story is that, since time began, sovereign
power has been exercised over various groups always
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in the same fashion and always having recourse to the
same impoverished operations. It is also suggested
that these groups have never managed to question or
or resist their subordination. Foucault argues that
this cannot be the case: if power really did work
like the juridico-discursive model says it does, we
should never manage to obey it.
Thirdly, Foucault seems to think that
what has appeared and been experienced in western pol-
itical science 8S the juridico-discursive version of
power, the exercise of the power that lays down the
law and prohibits, can only occur on the basis of
some other form of power. In the same way as power's
legitimacy cannot be simply taken for granted, and as
the effects of power on discourse cannot be explained
only by using the idea of power as 'no' saying legis-
lative decree, so sovereign power cannot be accounted
for simply on its own terms.
Foucault says that sovereign power is
'only the terminal form ••• power takes,27 and that
its existence and legitimacy must be explained by
recourse to another form, or as he has it, another
conception of power28. This other form or conception
of power must, on Foucault's account, play something
like the role of 'condition for the possibility of
the functioning,29 of sovereign power.
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Micro-power
It is the first of these three problems
that Foucault perceives ~ith regard to the juridico-
discursive notion of po~er that furnishes the clue
to the treatment to be adopted with regard to the
others. Dreyfus and Rabino~ suggest that it is to
Foucault's lasting credit to have argued that power
does not simply stifle or inhibit knowledge but that
more significantly it is productive of knowledge30•
There is, however, more to be said of Foucault's
account than that. Having ascertained the productive
nature of power, Foucault goes on to suggest that it
is partly this productivity which ensures that it
appears to be legitimate - that it is tolerated or
obeyed. As he says, what makes power acceptable is
'quite simply the fact that it does not ••• weigh
like a force that says "no",3l.
It is power as a productive substrate
which runs through the entire social body32 that en-
sures that dictates made from positions of po~er are
accepted. However, this productive network which
ensures power's acceptability only does so on condi-
tion that it is hidden, that it does not appear and
is not experienced as sovereign power. Foucault
says that it is partly the fact that power 'masks
a substantial part of itself,33 which ensures its
acceptance. Thus the productive nature of power and
the fact that most of its operations remain occluded
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ensure that power is accepted and tolerated as 1eg-
itimate.
So it is this form of power, which is
not experienced and does not appear as sovereign
'power, that provides the basis, as it were, for the
representation of sovereign po~er. Foucault says
that sovereign power, with its negative resouces and
prohibitions, 'can only take hold and secure its
footing where it is rooted in a whole series of mul-
tiple and indefinite power relations that supply
the basis for the great negative forms of power,34.
This productive, (and, as shall be seen later, des-
tructive), form of power that is occluded and not
experienced as sovereign power is, nevertheless,
held to provide the basis for the terminal forms of
power, sovereign power.
That 'other' form of power, as a set
of 'multiple and indefinite power relations', must
now be elaborated. The account of this other 'eco-
nomy' of power35 that founds what is experienced
and appears as sovereign power may be found in Part
4, chapter 2 of The History of Sexuality. Foucault
introduces this account by distinguishing 'Power'
from 'power,36. He says that, by 'power', he does
not mean 'Power', he does not refer to power as it
is represented on the juridico-discursive model of
power. His 'power' does not take the form of 'a
group of institutions and mechanisms that', by
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means of juridical declarations, 'ensure the subser-
vience of the citizens of a given state,37.
More originally, or in the first instance,
he says, power should be understood
as the multiplicity of force relations imma-
nent in the sphere in which they operate and
which constitute their own organisation. 38
Power is essentially relational, then39, and is to
be found within, rather than outside of, the sphere
or area with which one is concerned. That is, rath-
er than power being exercised from without and over
or via those areas as a means of dominating subor-
dinates, power is more originally manifested within
them. The sorts of oppositions of forces within them
operate as the grounds for what appears and is ex-
perienced as the workings of sovereign power.
Those 'spheres' or areas include those
systems of relations, power relations, between 'a man
and a woman, in a family, between a teacher and a
pupil,40, as well as those between workers and bos-
ses, priests and laity, doctors and patients, since
'between each polnt of the social body ••• there pass
relations of power'. To refer back to the last crit-
icism noted of the traditional notion of power, this
form of power or these relations of forces 'are not
the projection of the great sovereign power over in-
dividuals: rather they are the mobile and concrete
ground upon which that power comes to be anchored,4l.
Power must also be understood as 'the
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process ~hich, through ceaseless struggles and con-
frontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses'
the balance of forces in those re1ations42• Po~er
is also a sort of movement, then, a process in
~hich relations of force are transformed or consol-
idated in the interaction of those various points
of the social body. The ceaseless struggles and
confrontations, the interrelating that goes on bet-
~een parent and child, foreman and operative, for
example, in the everyday business of life, 'trans-
forms, strengthens or reverses' the relations bet-
ween those members. In so doing, po~er is the pro-
cess which changes, consolidates or reverses, the
relations and tactics that exist between those
points and the sort, the relations and tactics, of
power that could be grounded upon them.
These forces and the relations between
them are themselves related. They are, in a sense,
diacritical. Foucault says that po~er manifests
itself as 'the support that these power relations
find in one another ••• or on the contrary, [as]
the disjunctions and oppositions that isolate them
from one another,43. So power is also the ~ay that
these relations of force enter into relations, of
either support or opposition, with other relations
of forces. Some relations between parent and child,
for example, may be either supported by or in oppo-
sition to other relations that exist between the
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parents and the medical profession or the school
and the parents, for example.
These relations would find support in
one another if, ~ithin the family, for example, both
of t~o parents wanted to punish an unruly child and
in disjunction if only one did. These intra-famil-
ial relations also exist in relation to a body of
medical, physiological and psychiatric relations,
for example, which could be used to support or oppose
any of the positions taken on the punishment of the
child.
Closely related to, indeed almost a
generalised version of, this point is Foucault's
assertion that power should be conceived 'as the strat-
egies in which ••• ~elations of force bet~een the
points of the social body, along with the process
in which they undergo transformation and the system
of support/opposition which is set up among or by
those relation~ take effect, whose general design
or institutional crystallisation is embodied in the
state apparatus, in the formation of the law,44.
Without referring to subjective agency45, this char-
acteristically concise and opaque formulation refers
to the way in which relations of force between var-
ious points of the social body are exercised or mani-
fested in relation to wider trends or movements in
society.
If, for example, it was the case that,
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~ithin the family, the values of strong discipline
and conscientiousness were important and esteemed
and that these characteristics also were popular
with industry, that they were informative of society
as a ~hole, then the strategies within the family
might be said to be embodied in the state apparatus.
The family would be 'in tune' with the wider society.
As Foucault says, 'for the state to function as it
does, it is necessary that there be between the man
and the woman or the adult and the child quite spec-
ific relations of domination,46. The existence and
organisation of the state and state power are depen-
dent upon the organisation of forces within the fam-
ily.
Thus, and it is a point of central im-
portance for this chapter, 'power's condition of pos-
sibility ••• must not be sought in the primary exis-
tence of a central pOint,47. It is not, on Foucault's
view, as if there is a central and sovereign point
which forms the origin or source of power and from
which minor and subordinate powers may be said to _
emanate. Nor is it, as it is on the juridico-discur-
sive account, as if the meaning or intelligibility
of actions is generated by their relation to that _
central or sovereign point and its embodiment in the
law. Po~er's condition of possibility and the intel-
ligibility of its operations are to be found in what
has just been described as 'the moving substrate of
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force relations which, by virtue of their inequality,
48constantly engender states of power' •
For these reasons, then, one must say
that power is omnipresent, not because everyone and
everything is under its sway, but rather because
everyone and everything, the relations of force that
exist between everyone and everything, are productive
of power. Mirroring a move to be seen later in the
chapter on Deleuze and Guatttari, power on the juri-
dico-discursive model would seek to arrest the move-
ment of these shifting relations. It would seek to
'consolidate everything under its invincible unity,49,
even while it rests or is dependent on them. So,
rather than being a certain strength that either we
or institutions are endowed with, which can be exer-
cised over others, power is 'the name that one attri-
butes to a complex strategical situation in a partic-
ular society'SO.
Resistance and Strategy
Foucault summarises and develops this
position by advancing five propositions. First, and
most briefly, power is not originally something that
may be acquired, possessed and lost. Being produced
from 'innumerable points, in the interplay of mobile
and non-egalitarian relations', it cannot be repres-
ented in that waySl. Secondly, 'relations of power
are not in a position of exteriority with regard to
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other types of relations,52. Relations of force are
immanent to economic, educational, sexual and medi-
cal relations, for example, and, rather than having
a purely prohibitive role within those relations, are
both the effects and the conditions of the 'divisions
inequalities and disequilibriums,53 that are to be
found in those relations.
If this is the case, then there can be
no 'binary and all-encompassing opposition between
rulers and ruled at the root of power relations,54.
The interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations
is rather the basis for what appears and is experien-
ced as 'dominations'. So, instead of power consist-
ing originally in the rulers, the possessors of power,
employing that power to dominate those who are power-
less, these myriad confrontations should be conceived
as the basis, as the support and condition, for the
great negative forms of power that are represented
in the juridico-discursive model.
Fourthly, and most obscurely, Foucault
says that 'power relations are both intentional and
non-subjective,55. The sort of relation of force
that he wants to chart are intelligible, they may be
made sense of, but, as noted above, not because of
some relation to some sovereign point from which pow-
er emanates and not because subjective agency can
necessarily be seen in them. There are any number
of strategies within which any particular tactical
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operation of power may be inscribed or against which
it might be directed. Thus, (despite what Foucault
calls the 'local cynicism' of power, the cases in
which the rationality of power is 'quite explicit'),
there is no 'transcendental subjectivity', either in
the form of governing caste, controlling groups or
decision makers, that could be appealed to as the
source or origin of the intelligibility of any of
the operations of power.
As Foucault says, the various and mul-
tiple strategies of power may 'become connected to
one another,S6, support and give rise to each other,
and eventually form comprehensive and comprehensible
systems. Their aims and objectives may be clear but
'no-one is there to have formulated them,S7. Con-
sequently, Foucault says that the sort of power rel-
ations that constitute what appear and are experien-
ced as sovereign power are 'intentionel and non-sub-
jective'.
Finally, and again most importantly for
this chapter, we learn that 'where there is power,
there is reslstance,58 or that resistance, that to-
wards and against which power is 'directed', is nev-
er 'in a position of exteriority with regard to power,59.
However, 'that one can never be "outside of power"',
that there are no 'golden sands of basic freedoms',
'does not mean that one is in every way trapped,60.
If, and as has been suggested above, power is
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essentially and originally relational, then power
depends for its existence on 'a multiplicity of
points of resistance,61. Consequently, although
there can be no outside of power, since power dep-
ends for its existence on resistance, that resis-
tance is 'all the more real insofar as it is there
where power is,62.
Another consequence of this point is
that there is and can be no 'soul of revD1t', no
'pure law of the revo1utionary,63. 'Instead there
is a plurality of resistances,64 to each instance
or manifestation of power, there is resistance.
But these resistances do not form a merely passive
and reactive 'rebound' or 'recoil', nor are they
'doomed' to perpetual defeat. And neither are they
a 'lure or promise' that is always and of necessity
betrayed. Although there may occasionally be radi-
cal ruptures and decisive breaks, revolutions in the
popular or vulgar sense of the word, it is only 'the
strategic codification of these points of resistance'
that make them possible.
These points of resistance that are to
be found everywhere that power is are what Foucault
refers to elsewhere as 'plebness'. Avoiding the
decidedly 'sweet' thesis that 'the pleb' is the nat-
ural locus of revolutionary energy by a hairsbreadth,
Foucault accounts for 'plebness' or resistance as
'the odd term in relations of power' and says that
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they are 'inscribed in the latter as an irreducible
oPPosite,6S. Plebness, then, is that excess which
power cannot cope with, that it cannot endure and
which always escapes its workin~s to at least sug-
gest its downfall.
As he says, the 'pleb' 'undoubtedly has
no sociological reality,66 - it will not be encoun-
tered as a sociological category or walking the
streets. '"The" pleb, undoubtedly, does not exist':
it is not as if there is an essence of the pleb or
of resistance that could be distilled and put into
handy handbook form. But if power is originally rel-
ational and al~ays in relation to resistance, then
resistance will constitute the 'limit' of power rel-
ations, their 'underside' or 'counterpunch' and may
be found in bourgeois and proletarian movements alike.
An example of plebness, perhaps, would be the ways
in which sovereign power was undermined by the festiv-
ities that accompanied the great displays of power
at executions and which are described in Discipline
and Punish.
Power and power
This, then, is the basis of Foucault's
account of power, of what he calls the 'economy' of
power6? Before looking again at certain features
of that account, and indicating their relevance for
this chapter, it should be pointed out that, and in
what sense, this is a particular reading of Foucault.
206
There are other versions of Foucault to be found,
in commentaries and, indeed, in Foucault himself.
The one to be presented here should be distinguished
and defended from them. That is, Foucault and his
interpreters present various versions of ~hat is
happening in his texts. This essay, however, will
assume and attempt to explicate the idea that ~hat
is referred to as 'micro-po~er', power ~ith 8 small
'p', is the occluded ground of what appears and is
experienced as sovereign power. This is claimed
to happen in the same way as ec- centric economy was
seen to be the occluded ground of centred economy in
chapter two.
The first version, and one which Fou-
cault has himself suggested, especially in connec-
tion with Madness and Civilisation, assumes that bet-
ween the 17th and 19th centuries the actual nature
of power changed. It proposes the idea that, between
these dates, one sort of power was replaced by another
sort. It proposes that sovereign power was superced-
ed, 8S a result of certain tactical developments and
in order to achieve certain advantages, by micro-pow-
er, the sort of power that involves surveillance and
minor controls in the fine fibres of a society. Such
a view may be found, then, in Madness and Civilisation
and in Power, Truth. Strategy. In this latter, Fou-
cault says that micro-power 'came into being' and
that power 'changed' 'from binary to complex and
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multiform,68.
The second version is one that has been
proposed by Finas, among others. It is that Foucault
is offering a 'new conception' of power and the ways
in ~hich it operates69• This idea, that until now
power has been thought or conceived wrongly and must
be rethought, also finds its support in Foucault's
words. In volume one of The History of Sexuality,
for example, he is found saying that political science
and philosophy have for too long been restricted to
a particular grid of thought and that, if power is
to be thought adequately, they must 'advance ••• tow-
ard a different conception of power,70.
And the third view of Foucault's works
would suggest that there were two sorts or forms of
power, two different ways in which it appeared and
was experienced. On such a view, political scientists
would need to replace the theory of power, which as-
sumed that power manifested itself and operated in
the same ways and at all times. It would need to re-
place that theory, (or those theories constitutive
of that way of theorising), with an 'analytics' which
would chart the particular and specific movements of
force relations?l. Should these dichotomous fictions
exist as ideals, the sort of power that an analytic
would concern itself with would, presumably, be as
inaccessible to a theory of power, and for the same
sort of reasons, as the workings of the bricoleur's
2.08
mind ~ould be to the engineer.
While in no way suggesting that any or
all of these versions are incompatible with the others
or that they are misrepresentations of Foucault's
work, (each of them is eminently compatible with at
least one other and all are to be found endorsed by
Foucault at some point), this section must disting-!
uish the version to be proposed here from them.
It is suggested that these accounts are strategic,
and therefore partial, accounts of what Foucault is
doing in his work. They are strategic in .that each
is adopted in order to perform a particular task,
to counter some tendency in the matter of the theor-
isation of power with another. And they are partial
in the sense that they therefore give more or less
weight to certain aspects of that strategy while
leaving out certain others.
Thus, while the nature of power may well
have changed between the 17th and 19th centuries, if
the thesis that Foucault's micro-power is the set of
shifting force relations that go to support the great
negative forms of power is to be retained, then it
cannot be the case that one form of power simply gave
way to another. Rather, it will have to be said that
in order to achieve sovereignty, those desirous of
power had to, in any case did, adopt a different set
of strategies. The ground for their sovereignty had
to be prepared in a more meticulous method than was
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sufficient before.
Similarly ~ith regard to the second and
third versions of ~hat Foucault is doing. It is not
as if ~hat he calls the juridico-discursive theory
of power should simply be discarded and replaced by
the analytics. And it is not as if all experience
and appearance of po~er are ideological or the result
of some unfortunate mishap of consciousness72•
Rather, and again, if what is distinctive of Fou-
cault's account is to be taken seriously, that power
is productive and that micro-power underlies sover-
eign power 8S basis or footing, then these accounts
will be seen to be in need of supplementing. No-one,
least of all Foucault, will deny that sovereignty
and domination are experienced73 but, in order to
account adequately for those phenomena, Foucault is
saying that their bases in micro-power must be ana-
lysed.
Thus the version of what Foucault is
doing that will be adopted here is that power is not
originally to be found in the form of sovereign power
which is possessed and exercised in prohibitive, 'no'
saying fashion. Nor are there two sorts of power and
two corresponding accounts to be given of it, one
juridico-discursive and the other analytic. Rather,
it is suggested that what appears and is experienced
as sovereign power is grounded in a whole series of
of force relations that are essentially productive
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and immanent to the sphere in which they are found.
Micro-po~er is productive, (and destructive, as will
be sho~n below), of sovereign power and there can,
therefore, be no question of there being two forms
of power or t~o accounts to be given of it in the
sense that those two versions could be simply dis-
tinguished as the three accounts noted above would
suggest.
Power and Economy
Having outlined Foucault's account of
the juridico-discursive model of power, of what he
considers to be wrong with it and of what he intends
to do about it, this section will continue by giving
a little more detail to that outline and relating
the more important themes to the notions of centric
and ec- centric, masculine and feminine, economy_
As far as this chapter is concerned, the themes in
Foucault's account of power that are most important
are those concerning power and its relation to res-
istance and the ways in ~hich power is both constit-
utive and subversive of sovereign power. The task
will be to relate the former to the notion of the
disruptive and hence feminist element in the matter
of economy, (the undecidable, difference), and the
latter to the ~ays in which ec- centric economy is
both constitutive and subversive of the values and
identities to be found in centric economy.
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Basically, the idea is that Foucault's
account of the ways in which micro-power occludes
itself as the production and destruction of sover-
eign power is an account of the power relations bet-
ween and within centric and ec- centric economy.
Chapter two has shown how, and in what sense, ec-
centric economy is feminist and centric economy is
phallocentric economy. Thus, the account of power
that can chart the relations of forces between and
within centric and ec- centric economy will be of
special use to a feminist or transgressive discourse
that will not be immediately accomodated by that
which is being opposed, phallocentric economy.
So, po~er as 'the interplay of non-egal-
itarian and mobile relations' of forces74 is both
constitutive and subversive of sovereign power in
that it is the former upon which the latter is based.
As has been seen above, sovereign power depends for
its existence on the grounding it receives from these
shifting relations of forces and power, with a small
'p', is thus constitutive of sovereign power. And,
as has also been seen, there is no sovereign power
that is not dependent upon micro-power: power's con-
dition of possibility or intelligibility is not to
be sought in a central, self-present or self-power-
ful point. In this sense, micro-power is destructive
of sovereign power: it would take apart the appear-
ance by which sovereign power passes itself off as
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the source of all other subordinate powers.
Power as the interplay of mobile and non-
egalitarian relations is to power as sovereignty,
then, as ec- centric economy is to centric economy.
It is productive insofar as it provides the grounds
for 'the great negative forms of power'. And it is
subversive or destructive insofar as it is no ground
at all in the sense of a fixed or limited origin but
would rather disperse or defer sovereignty as an ef-
fect of a set of shifting force relations.
Similarly, if the undecidable is that
which cannot be accounted for or mastered by centric
economy, then 'plebness', resistance, is that which
cannot be accounted for or mastered by sovereign
power. Power is essentially relational, as Foucault
says, and it is always in relation to resistance.
As such, plebness ~ill constitute the underside or
limit of power, that 'region' where, in Adorno's
words, po~er as sovereign cannot afford to go.
Between sovereign power and micro-po~er, as between
centred, phallocentred, and ec- centric, feminist,
economy, then, there is a relation of constitution/
subversion. The supposedly stable, self-present and
self-identical values of the former are ultimately
rendered undecidable. And within the operations of
centred economy and sovereign power is a force that
is produced but not mastered or accounted for by
those operations, the pleb or undecidable.
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Conclusion
It was noted at the end of chapter
five that, although power and desire played large
roles in the production and legitimation of value,
Derrida's account of economy had surprisingly little
to say about them. It was also suggested that what
was said appeared to refer only to power and desire
as they manifested themselves in phallocentric eco-
nomy. Having briefly developed what Derrida said
about the role of power in economy, this chapter
showed in what respects it would be conceived as
inadequate and metaphysical on Foucault's account.
The few remarks that were to be found
in Derrida's account were shown to belong to the
juridico-discursive conception of power. Foucault's
presentation of the main features of this model
was outlined, as were the various points at which he
considered its inadequacy and metaphysicality to be
manifest. Finally, the notion and workings of the
sort of power relations that Foucault conceived the
notion called juridico-discursive needed in order to
exist, along with the relations between them, were
illustrated.
At the same time, however, and despite
working on quite different levels, Foucault's account
of micro-power was seen to be analogous to Derrida's
account of differance. Where the economy of differ-
ance was said to both produce and destroy the value
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of a term that appeared to be stable and self-iden-
tical in centred economy, the power relations within
ec- centric economy were seen to be both productive
and subversive of ~hat appeared and was experienced
in centric economy to be sovereign or absolute power.
Similarly, as the sorts of power rela-
tion that Foucault called juridico-discursive re-
quired an occluded and forgotten basis in micro-power
in order to exist and be seen as legitimate, so ~hat
metaphysics presents as the centred production of
value requires a 'non-full, non-simple "origin",76
in ec- centric economy. And where the value of the
undecidable, that which could not be accounted for
in centric economy, ~ undecidable was occluded by
centric economy in order that value be seen to issue
from some self-identical source, so resistance or
'the pleb', as that without which power could not
exist, was occluded in order that sovereign power
be seen as a simple, 'external' limit and so be
accepted.
Thus this chapter has accounted for
the sorts of power relations to be found within eco-
nomy. It has accounted for the sorts of power rela-
tions that exist within centric and ec- centric eco-
nomy, on the one hand, and for the power relations
that exist between centric and ec- centric economy
on the other. The next chapter will consider the
work of Deleuze and Guattari in order to elucidate
the wo~kings of desire as they are found within and
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between centric and ec- centric economy.
What is metaphysical and inadequate ab-
out Derrida's presentation of desire as desire for
something that is simply absent and as something
everywhere and always the same will be detailed.
Of course, Derrida's account of economy and the role
of desire within it as it will be dealt with here
dates from 1966: whether he would still be happy
with that account nearly twenty years later, his
work on ontological/sexual difference, geschlechte,
will 'tell'.
CHAPTER SEVEN
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI
In "An Anti-Sociology", Jacques Donzelot
suggests that Deleuze and Guattari used Foucault's
work, ~adness and Civilisation, as their starting
point for volume one of Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
Anti-oedipusl• In ~odern French Philosophy, Vincent
Descombes asserts that Deleuze and Guattari's version
of desire is none other than Nietzsche's will to po-
wer2. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari will be
read as providing an analysis of the nature of desire
as it is found within and between centric and ec- cen-
tric economy. That is, where Foucault has been seen
to account for will to power from the side of the '
ways in which sovereign power occludes its basis in
micro-power, Deleuze and Guattari will be read as ac-
counting for will to power from the side of that with
which power is always already in relation, desire.
On Foucault's account, power is always
already in relation to resistance, that resistance is
what Deleuze and Guattari analyse as desire. The
metaphysical and inadequate account of power which
presents and experiences power as sovereign power is
based on a sort of power that is to be 'presented'
and 'experienced' as its non-full, non-simple 'origin'.
And thus the account of desire 8S it is presented,
or rather occluded, in phallocentric economy, as
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being in relation to sovereign power, must be shown
to be based on a different sort of desire. This
latter desire is that which is always already in
relation to micro-power. It is so in such a way
that, as Foucault says, it provides the 'grounds'
in which the desire that is supposedly in relation
to sovereign power occludes itself.
Foucault analyses sovereign power as
being dependent for its existence on what has been
seen above to be an ec- centric economy of power.
This chapter will read Deleuze and Guattari 8S pro-
viding an analysis of that which is always already
in relation to it as resistance, its negation, des-
ire3• It will use Deleuze and Guattari to show how
the desire that is metaphysically, phallocentrically,
presented and experienced as being in relation to
sovereign power is at once constituted and subverted
by what might be called 'micro-desire', desire that
is in relation to, the other side of, Foucault's mic-
ro-power. This desire is what Deleuze and Guattari
analyse as schizo-desire.
So, where power is to be conceived as
the strategic situation in which force relations ex-
ist and which is productive of the effects of know-
ledge, commodities and so on, and which serves to leg-
itimate, (by occluding the origins of), what appears
and is experienced as the possession and exercise of
sovereign power, desire may be conceived as the other
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side of power. It may be conceived as one half of
the power/desire complex in that it is at once the
'force' behind the exercise of power and that with
which power is always in relation. Consequently,
there are at least two accounts to be given of the
two versions of desire depending on whether it is
(metaphysically) conceived as being within or for
centred economy, in relation to sovereign power, or
within or for ec- centric economy, in relation to
that micro-power that Foucault has analysed.
Thus, if one can conceive of sovereign
power requiring, as non-full, non-simple 'origin',
the organisation of the multiple and indefinite po-
wer relations between all points of the social body,
then the sovereign's desire can be conceived as re-
Quiring an analogous organisation and mobilisation
of the desires of those points. And thus will the
works of Derrida, Foucault and De leuze and Guattari
be brought together to show the workings of power and
desire in economy. Derrida has been seen to outline
the workings of economy. Foucault has been, and
Deleuze and Guattari will be, seen to provide the
accounts of power and desire as they are found in
those workings. ~As Clement says of this connection,
'the work of deconstruction ••• responds to a desire
to interrupt syntheses, to a schizo-desire,4. So far,
Derrida has not accounted for this response and this
chapter attempts to chart it.
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Freudo-Marxism
As both Descombes and Patton have noted,
Deleuze and Guattari's project in Anti-Oedipus bears
on the questions that the various brands of Freudo-
Marxism associated with the names of Reich, Marcuse
and the Frankfurt School attempted to deal with5.
Before them, however, Spinoza had also apparently
formulated their problems; how is it that people will
desire and fight for their servitude as though it
were their salvation? Like Foucault's, then, Deleuze
and Guattari's task is to account for how it is that
power and desire operate so that they are accepted,
desired, even, and yet constitutive of servitude6•
Declaring that 'there is only desire and
the social, nothing e1se,7, Deleuze and Guattari must
differentiate themselves from Freudo-Marxism, which,
as might be imagined, is also concerned with desire
and the social. The move of differentiation is effec-
ted, basically, by their saying that desire is part
of what Marxism calls the 'infrastructure' or baseS.
For Marx, Marxists and even Freud-Marxists, desire
is part of the superstructure, represented in ideolo-
gy, and thus no part of the productive forces of the
economic, political and social fields. Analyses
along these lines ~ill thus see their role as accoun-
ting for how the masses were fooled or how their des-
ires were irrational or mistaken in desiring servi-
tude.
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For Freud, Freudians and Freudo-Marx-
ists, on the other hand, desire would be articulated
in terms of what Deleuze and Guattari never cease to
oppose, the representation of desire in terms of law,
lack and signifier9• Whether the la~, power, was
constitutive of desire or simply repressive of it,
desire would be represented as lack. As Donzelot has
noted, that lack takes two farms: it is either tha
lack of some originary past or the lack of the real.
'The first claim is that desire is reactionary in
its essence ••• [iha~ it seeks a reactivation of the
past' and the second claim is the more Lacanian one
that 'desire is a denegation of the real since all
desire is desire of images or, worse still, of images
of images,lO.
Deleuze and Guattari will say that all
desire is not, as Freudo-Marxists ~ould have it, part
of the superstructure and no part of the infrastruc-
ture or production but that it is part of that infra-
structure. Similarly, they ~ill say that all desire
is not produced in the Oedipal scene, the theatre of
'Daddy, Mommy, Me', and that it is not organised in
terms of law, lack and signifier, as Lacan says.
As they say, 'the schizo-analytic argu-
ment is simple. Desire is a machine ••• a machinic
arrangement, desiring machines. The order of desire
is the order of production: all production is at
once desiring production and social production. We
221
therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled
this order of production, for having shunted it into
representation,ll.
Thus they say that it is simply not· the
case that desiring production, the production of fan-
tasy, exists 'on one side' and that social production,
the production of man's material reality, exists on
'the other'. The 'Marx-Freud parallel' between the
two is 'utterly sterile' as long as they remain 'al-
ien' to each other. Rather Deleuze and Guattari
would have it that 'the social field is immediately
invested with desire ••• and that libido has no need
of any mediation ••• in order to invade and invest
the productive forces and relations of production,l2.
Having looked briefly at the relation
of Anti-Oedipus to Freudo-Marxism, however, it should
be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari are in no
way concerned to reject psychoanalysis or Marxism
wholesale. In a move reminiscent of Deleuze's book
on Nietzsche, and of Derrida's statements regarding
critical and metaphysical propositions, they say that
revolutionary and reactionary moments co-exist within
the same corpusl3• As with Derrida, then, they will
show the tension between the various strands of Marx-
ism and psychoanalysis and 'take what they want',
take whatever works or does the job they want from
eachl4.
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Desiring Machines
So, with the intentions of instituting
a 'materialist psychiatry'and of being more Marxist
than Marx in this regard on the one hand, and of
countering the familial and theatrical representat-
ions of desire and the unconscious on the other,
Deleuze and Guattari posit the notion of desire as
a machine or machinic arrangement. Basically, the
idea of desire as a machine is to present desire as
only functioning or existing in relation to other
machines: there is not, as there is in the theatric-
al and familial models, an already organised system
of images or representations of desire that involves
the organising work of a privileged representation
or represented. But, in order to get some idea of
what Deleuze and Guettari intend by desire as a mach-
inic arrangement, this section will consider how it
differs from ~hat it is set up to counter, theatric-
al and familial models of desire and the unconscious,
before looking at how desire relates to ec- centric
and centric economy.
As noted above, one of the more signif-
icant moves Deleuze and Guattar! make is to introduce
desire into production and production into desire in
such a way that talk of desire or talk of production
'on their own', as it were, is rendered completely
inade~uate. Moreover, not only are desire and pro-
duction not to be considered separately, as two
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disparate economies16, they are not to be conceived,
as did Reich, as two economies each of which carries
on the other's ~ork. 'There is not a libidinal eco-
nomy that ~ould subjectively prolong, through other
means, political economy'. Rather, 'what is at stake
is the libido as such, as the very essence of desire
and sexuality; it invests and disinvests the flows
of all kinds that flow through the social bOdy,I?
Scorning the 'right-minded psychoana-
lysts and epistemologists' who would baulk at what
would appear to them as a simple confusion oflevels,
Guattari defends the practice of a materialist psy-
chiatry or 'schizo-analysis' that would chart the
flows of libidinal energy in production, in desiring/
. I d t' 18soc~a pro uc ~on • Thus they say in Anti-Oedipus
that the problems of desire and power in contemporary
society 'must be posed at the deepest level of a
single and same economy, of a single and same process
of production,19. 'Desiring machines are the funda-
mental category of the economy of desire,20 and it
is what happens to these desiring machines under cap-
italism that Deleuze and Guattari are interested in.
Where what may be called the traditional
and metaphysical notion of desire involves desire as
productive only of images or phantasms, ideology,
and thus no part of material production, Deleuze and
Guattari posit the notion of desiring machines, des-
iring production that would, as will be seen later,
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both produce and destroy traditional notions of
base apart from superstructure, desire apart from
production. Far from producing only representations,
signs that are part of the theatre of the unconscious,
and which signify something lacking, either contin-
gently (Freud) or necessarily (Lacan), and far from
being a denegation of the real, desiring production
is productive of the material reality in which man-
kind lives everyday2l.
So, theatrical and familial models of
desire would present desire as a denegation of the
real, desire and production as completely separate,
and desire as productive only of representations.
Deleuze and Guattari posit desiring machines, at
home in the factory, and say that desiring produc-
tion is production of the real, desire 'and' pro-
duction are one economy. This economy, however,
like that of differance, is subject to various org-
anising operations. Desire may be such sometimes
that it desires its o~n repression: this question,
noted above, Reich's and Spinoza's question, ia also
Deleuze and Guattari's question22•
Machinic desire, desire as productive
and material, then, is more a system of forces or
flows of energies and of breaks or changes in dir-
ection in those flows than either the necessary or
contingent desire for something that is represented
in the unconscious as lacking. As they say, 'desire
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does not lack anything; it does not lack its object'.
The idea of desire as lack, they say, collapses into
some form of absurdity: Lacanian statements concern-
ing the lack of being that is life itself seem to
reduce to the claim that 'there exists some other
place that contains the key to desire,23. Consequent-
ly, 'desire is a machine and the object of desire is
another machine connected to it,24.
If this is the case, that there is no
'gap' between desire and its object, that 'each' de-
siring machine is only ~hat it is, only functions,
in its relations to other machines25, then it must
be the case that desire is not to be found in isol-
ated cases but that what is called desire is more
accurately to be conceived along the lines that Fou-
cault lays out for the notion of micro-power. 'One
26machine is always connected to another' ,then, and
although these machines may be 'disparate' in one
sense, they are also always connected together to
form another machine27•
Thus desire is at once that which joins,
breaks or re-directs the flows in production and
constitutive of those flows: 'desire causes the cur-
rent to flow, itself flows in turn and breaks the
flo~s,28. So~ having introduced production into de-
sire and desire into production, by way of the schizo-
phrenic perception of the self and the body, (which
is that they are machines or factories), and by
way of a machinic conception of society~~ different
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social formations may be seen as 'so many different
sections of coordinating or encoding the mass of de-
siring machines that go to make them up,30.
The child, for example, constitutes a
particular organisation of the desiring machines
that go to make him/her up. The child at the moth-
er's breast constitutes the mother and child machine
and, while being themselves constituted by the many
different machines that go to make them up, also
form the components of various other machines - they
may form part of the various State-welfare machines,
for example.
While the child's mouth-machine functions
along with the breast-machine, causing and breaking
the flow of milk, the various desiring machines that
constitute the mother-and-child machine are operative.
The child may disconnect one machine in order to con-
nect another and the mother, similarly, may decide
that the child has had enough, that she does not wish
to feed the child or that she does not want the child
at all, thus breaking, re-directing and so on, the
different desiring machines that go to make up the
arrangement.
The factory where the child's father
works is also a machine in this sense. It is constit-
uted by desiring machines and fits into larger mach-
inic arrangements. The father, then, stands in many
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different relations of power with the people around
him. There are different flows of desire between
him and the supervisor, him and his colleagues and
between him and the bosses so, in addition to being
made up by various machines, the desire to keep his
family, to retain his job and self-respect with reg-
ard to his relations to those around him and so on,
he is also a working part of the factory. Similarly,
the factory, constituted by the various machines that
go to make it up, supervisors, operative, bosses, is
also a part of the Union-machine's affairs, the gov-
ernment-machine's affairs and the boss- machine's af-
fairs. The factory has a part to play in a larger
machinic organisation.
In this way, social and economic prod-
uction may be seen as a particular arrangement of
desiring machines. Social production, the collection
of institutions, (church, education, army, welfare,
unions and so on), is made up of a multiplicity of
desiring machines and these machines are connected,
disconnected and reconnected to one another in the
daily life of society3l. Thus the child, for example,
progresses through the various stages of the school
machine, under the eyes of the church-machine, perhaps,
to be disconnected and reconnected to the factory
machine or the welfare machine. The various relations
in which the child exists, the different social
formations of which s/he is a part, are organisations
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of desiring machines.
Reference has been made to organisation
and to schizophrenia. Before looking at Deleuze and
Guattari's relation to centric and ec- centric econo-
my, it would be useful to account for these terms.
In addition to introducing the relation to and the
role of ec- centric economy, this will relate back
to the discussion of Freud-Marxism and to the refer-
ences to Foucault and Nietzsche in the introduction.
Basically, the claim is that the ec- centric economy
of schizo-desire is organised, (or, as Deleuze and
Guattari have it, axiomatised), into manageable
shapes within centric economy for much the same rea-
sons and in the same ~ay that Derrida's differance
and Foucault's micro-power are reduced and occluded.
However, as noted above, the schizo-
phrenic self-perception is of a body that is made up
of a multiplicity of machines, a factory. Each of
these machines is working a~ay, connecting and dis-
connecting itself from the other machines, breaking
and joining flows. The organisation of these mach~
ines constitutes the repression of desire since that
organisation establishes what become familiar and
represented as fixed and proper assemblages of des-
ire. For example, once the desiring machines have
been organised and they exist in various stable rel-
ationships to one another, they may be identified as
a certain sort of machine, as paranoid or perverse
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desiring machines, for example.
It is a form of this organisation or
axiomatisation which Deleuze and Guattari claim
Freudian and Marxist analyses have perpetrated:
they have thus contributed to the repression of de-
sire that they supposedly abhor in the economies of
libido and capital. Thus ~hile Marxism analyses the
ways in which capitalism frees desiring machines
from their old connections and roles to connect them
to other machines, while it discovers the activity
of productivity in general (labour)32, it neverthe-
less petrifies that productivity within a purely
historical formation. And while psychoanalysis ana-
lyses desiring production and attempts to liberate
that production from the constraints it existed under
before, it nevertheless forms the concept of !h! lib-
ido and repr... ntsthis libido in the form of an eter-
nsl Oedipal situation.
On the other hand, according to Deleuze
and Guattari, capitalism similarly decodes the flux
of desiring machines, these machines are disconnec-
ted from the assemblages they were conne~ted to, the
flows of libidinal energy are redirected, but these
desiring machines are immediately reorganised or ax-
iomatised and become the means of a novel form of
b· t· 33su Juga 10n .• That is, capitalism liberates the
subject's productivity, people move from the land
to the factories, for example~4, but this liberation
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of desiring machines is seen or presented only in
economic terms, not in terms of desiring production.
As a result, the subject's private labour is axiom-
atised ~ private labour, (as opposed to production
'which is both desiring and social), and as found in
those new relations to the factory or to industry35.
The process of decoding, of scrambling
the flows of desires, which is what Deleuze and Guat-
tari consider capitalism to do, constitutes, they
say, the or a, (for there is no ideal form of this
process, as there is no ideal form of control36),
process of schizophrenisation. Every machine may be
disconnected and reconnected elsewhere ~ith no pri-
vileged organisation being 'sacred'.
But this productivity, the material form
of subjectivity, is 'repressed' through being masked
or represented in the Oedipal triangle. Productive
desire, which is at once productive and social, is
presented under capitalism as private productivity,
as an individual's labour power, on the one hand,
and as subjective familial libido on the other. The
former conceals the desire in productivity and the
latter occludes the productivity in desire. Desire
is thus axiomatised or Oedipalised in order to form
the structures of desire prevalent and familiar under
capitalism.
It is thus that schizophrenia is 'in
opposition' to the axiomatisation of organs into fixed
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subjective structures in which each organ has a
limited range of connections which it can make be-
fore it is called perverse or whatever. Schizo-
desire would :burst apart all those structures of
desire which capitalism and psychoanalysis have leg-
itimated and tend towrds what Deleuze and Guatteri
call the 'body without organs'. The body without
organs is a surface upon ~hich desires are inscribed
in such a way that no one organisation or axiomat-
isatian is privileged over any other. Although
'organ machines attach themselves to it, the body
without organs remains without any organs at all
since they lead only to axiomatisation,37.
The body ~ithout organs, then, is the
body, but the body considered or experienced, (as
in schizophrenia), as being 'divested of that arran-
t f th t k f 't ,,38gemen 0 organs a ma es 0 ~ an organ~sm •
As Deleuze says in his Dialogues, 'it seemed to us
that desire was a process and that it unfolds in a
plane of consistence, a "body ~ithout organs" as
Artaud put it,39. That is, without the arrangement
of organs that make the body a particular sort of
body, (the disciplined body, the body of the child,
the worker and so on), the body is a surface of in-
tensities, of flows of desires that are not organised
in terms of any transcendental signified. So Deleuze
and Guattari say that 'desiring machines make us an
organism; but at the very heart of this production,
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the body suffers from being organised in this ~ay,
from not having some other sort of organisation, or
no organisation at all,4D.
It is the becoming organised of this
body, the body without organs, that Nietzsche and
Foucault have analysed in works like The Genealogy
of Morals and Discipline and Punish for example.
In these works, the operations of micro-power in its
work of organising the body, in arranging, or construc-
ting a particular disposition of machinic desire, are
accounted for. As Foucault says in this latter work,
the body is embedded in a political field and sub-
ject to a multiplicity of pOlllerrelations which 'in-
vest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to
t t k t f . t .t· ,41carry ou as s, 0 per orm ceremon1es, 0 em1 s1gns •
Thus Deleuze and Guattari's work is a
continuation, or the other side, of Foucault's and
Nietzsche's work in that it charts the construction
of desiring machines or organs on the body without
organs. The body without organs, then, is a tension
between a libidinal surface of intensities and nomad-
lc desires which traverse and inscribe it and which
constitute schizo-desire on the one hand and the fix-
ed subjective structures (Oedipus) by means of which
that nomadic desire is 'domesticated' or given a pro-
per home, repressed through being organised.
Deleuze and Guattari consider desire to
be that which is 'revolutionary in its essence,42,
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as that which ~ould 'scramble all the codes,43 by
which it has been organised but which has been ax-
iomatised44, rendered harmless in such a way that it
d d de s i .t . 45can an oes eS1re 1 sown repreSS10n • Without
suggesting that desire may be simply liberated,
that natural flows of desire may be freed by remo-
ving the regulations under which desire is constrain-
ed, they suggest that desire is that which both con-
stitutes and threatens the order of society.
If desire threatens the very being of
society, as Deleuze and Guattari say46, then that
society must find some way of 'repressing' desire,
'and even ••• find something more efficient than re-
pression, so that repression, hierarchy, exploitat-
ion and servitude are themselves desired,47. This
something that is more effective than simple repres-
sion, than the simple yoke placed on revolutionary
desire, they call Oedipalisation. Desire is so con-
stituted that it desires its own 'repression' by way
of being constituted by micro-power, by the various
micro-powers that capitalism has at its disposal.
So, rather than being constituted by a sovereign law,
it is constituted by a multiplicity of relations of
force and, as has been seen with regard to Foucault,
it is that it appears as being constituted in such
a way, and thus that sovereign po~er may be removed
and desire simply liberated, that ensures desire is
'able' to desire its own 'repression'.
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In this way, then, although capitalism
liberates the subject's productivity, although it is
'born of the encounter of two sorts of flows, the de-
coded flows of production in the form of money capit-
al and the decoded flows of labour in the form of
the "free worker",48, that productivity is axiomati-
sed or Oedipalised by the multiplicity of the rela-
tions with power that capitalism sets up in such a
way that it is rendered harmless49• Thus they argue
that the 'liberation' of desiring production is accom-
panied by a perpetual 'reterritorialisation' or ax-
iomatisation. There is not a desiring machine that
is not at once both a threat to, (decoded, explosive),
and constitutive of, (axiomatised, organised), soc-
ietySO.
Through this constitutive relation with
micro-power, desire is 'taught' in a sense to desire
what it desires, to flow in certain ways and not in
other ways. Oedipalisation, then, is the multiplic-
ity of ways in which desire is constituted in rela-
tion to micro-power.
Desire and Economy
Having outlined what Deleuze and Guat-
tari consider psychoanalysis and capitalism to do
to desire and having outlined the idea of schizo-
desire as an 'unbroken and polyvocal flux,Sl that is
not found outside of, but which does not necessarily
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fit into, or only fit into, the shapes that capital-
ism has organised it into, this section will show
that and how schizo-desire constitutes ec- centric
economy and is 'repressed' by being constituted as
Oedipal, as centric economy. It may thus be read as
providing an account of what Cl~ment has called the
schizo-desire that invests deconstruction.
In a ldter work, entitled Mille Plat-
~, the notion of the 'rhizome' begins to take -
over from that of the desiring machine and that of
the 'root tree' begins to take on much of the work
that had been done by the idea of desire that has
been Oedipalised. As Patton says, 'On one level,
greatly simplified, the opposition between rhizomes
and root trees is the opposition between the prod-
uctive, creative and revolutionary aspect of desire
and its petrification in structures of po~er,52.
Inspired by whatever reason, and Patton suggests a
few in his essay, the rhizome carries on many of the
tasks begun by desiring machines in Anti Oedipus.
'Rhizomatics = Schizo-analysis ••• =
micro-politics,53 is one of the ways in which Deleuze
and Guattari connect the later talk of rhizomes
with both the earlier analyses and Foucault's work
in the essay which forms the preface to Mille Plat-
~. And it comes as no surprise to see that, like
desiring machines and their connections in production,
rhizomatic arrangements are 'a-centric', non-hierar-
chical 'systems' that are 'without a general, without
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any organising memory or central automaton, unique-
ly defined by a circulation of states,54. The rela-
tion bet~een desiring machines, then, may be des-
cribed as forming ec- centric economy where there
is no transcendental value or state of desire that
would organise, once and for all, the flows of des-
ire.
Instead, like Derrida's differance and
Foucault's micro-power, Deleuze and Guattari's des-
ire is an immanent conception of desire; desiring
machines are only defined by their relations to oth-
er desiring machines. Moreover, those relations may
be broken and re-established without reference to,
or prohibition by, a centre, a desiring machine that
would ultimately account for the value of all the
others. It is only in Oedipalised desire, desire
that has been organised and legitimated in terms of
a fixed, subjective and familial structure, that de-
siring machines are defined in terms of one privil-
eged machine. In such a centred economy of desire,
the privileged machine is what Deleuze and Guattari
call Oedipus. The Oedipal configuration orders and
organises all other machines such that their values,
as preverse, paranoid and so on, may in turn be dec-
ided.
Thus, desire, as Deleuze and Guattari
'analyse' it, is not, or is not originally, a centred
economy, governed by the 'sovereign' oedipus55 which
237
regulates the values and relations of the terms in
order to form stable structures of legitimated des-
ire. Those fixed structures are the work of desire
that has been constituted to desire its own 'repres-
sion' in those structures or centric economies. As
in Foucault's account of power, those economies in
which desire is 'repressed' are legitimate by virtue
of the micro-power that has so constituted desire as
to desire them.
In being presented as a sovereign power
repressing desire from outside, or as sovereign power
repressing desire through constituting it, the power/
desire complex that is prevalent under capitalism
has succeeded in occluding its own non-full, non-sim-
ple 'origins' in the relations that ec- centric pow-
er establishes with ec- centric desire. If it is
seen at all, then, it is seen as legitimate. Thus,
'the fundamental notions of the economy of desire -
work and investment - keep their importance, but as
subordinated to the forms of an expressive uncon-
scious and no longer to the formations of the produc-
tive unconscious,56.
Three important points follow from the
subordination of the ec- centric ecoDomy of schizo-
desire to the centric economy of Oedipal desire.
First, ec- centric, non-Oedipal desire is both con-
stitutive and subversive of the Oedipal formations
and of the social systems that it invests or
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animates. Second, schizo-desire is also undecidable
in terms of representation. Where centric desire is
represented in terms of the family, for example,
schizo-desire, (being originally neither representat-
ion nor expression, but production and destruction),
presents problems for representation in that it both
constitutes and subverts it. And thirdly, if it is
not a question of simply liberating desire, a natural
force or flo~, and if it is not a case of simply re-
moving the sovereign power in terms of which it might
be held that desire ~as constituted, then, as they
say, SChizo-analysis is left only the recourse to
strategy.
With regard to the first point, then:
if desire is conceived as being a natural and spon-
taneous energy ~hich power, the law, simply dams or
keeps in check, then it may be said that desire is
simply subversive of that power and a transgressive
operation would be to just lift the barrier. If,
on the other hand, desire is considered as being
constituted by sovereign power and therefore in sup-
port of the social organisation that is thereby con-
structed, then, as Foucault says, desire is always
already trapped57 and the only transgressivB practice
~ould be to remove the power that laid down the law.
However, in the same way that Foucault's
micro-power is always already manifested against res-
istance, in the way that it is both constitutive and
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subversive of sovereign power, so schizo-desire is
also undecidable with regard to the opposition con-
stitutive/subversive. That is, although the multi-
plicity of desiring machines that go to make up a
social formation go, precisely, to make up that for-
mation, they are also the potential destruction of
it. Another way of saying this would be to say,
with Patton, that 'revolutionary movements are not
immune to repressive forms and practices,58 and with
Deleuze and Guattari that there are 'nodes of arbor-
escence in rhizomes' as there are 'rhizomatic sheots
in roots,59.
So desiring machines or, as the later
formulation has it, rhizomes, are at once the sub-
version of, and the energy behind, economies of de-
sire. It is not the case that desire simply repres-
sed, such that it could be freed by the lifting of a
prohibition. Nor is it as if desire is simply con-
stituted by power, so that it is always trapped by
and solidary with that power. Rather, decoding and
axiomatisation are found in the same desiring mach-
ine60, just as power is always manifested against
resistance and micro-power is at once the 'source'
of, and a threat to, what appears and is experienced
as sovereign power.
Schizo-desire is similarly undecidable
with regard to representation. As noted in the
earlier sections, 'The order of desire is the order
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of production ••• We therefore reproach psychoanal-
ysis for having stifled this order of production,
for having shunted it into representation,6l. It
is in this way that the 'de-materialisation' of des-
ire that takes place with Freudian and Marxist ac-
counts robs desire of most, if not all, its produc-
tive force. To remove desire from the register of
social production, or to make it productive only of
phantasies, is to consider it as primarily a system
of representations, as expression.
Desiring machines, however, are neither
representation nor expression, they do not signify,
but rather produce. And they produce the real as
opposed to chains of signfiers or the imaginary.
Consequently, for psychoanalysis to account for des-
ire in the form of representations is to reduce that
desire. So, while desire desires what capitalist
micro-powers present to it as desirable, that desire
is also something other than what is presented to it.
Desire, on Deleuze and Guattari's account, is thus
productive and destructive of representation and
hence undecidable in terms of it.
Given all this, Deleuze and Guattari
are left only the recourse to strategy, to what
Patton calls 'prudence', in attempting to deal with
Oedipalised desire. In statements reminiscent of
what Derrida says when he argues that critical and
metaphysical motifs coexist even in the same
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proposition and thus that it cannot be a case of
simply reversing a privilege or of avoiding all
privilege whatsoever, Deleuze and Guattari say two
things. The first is that, in any particular ar-
rangement of desiring machines, 'the choice is bet-
ween ••• the paranoiac counter-escape that motivates
all the conformist, reactionary and fascisizing in-
vestments and the schizophrenic escape, convertable
into revolutionary investment,63. The second is
that they 'invoke one dualism only to ~ard off ano-
ther,64.
That is, if, as they claim, reactionary
and revolutionary investments are to be found within
the same desiring machine, then there can be no
question of simply freeing desire from the ~orkings
of power for the simple reason that desire does not
work like that. Nor, on the other hand, is it a case
of avoiding all positions and relations of desire,
since even that ~ould count as a desiring machine -
Deleuze and Guattari would probably call it a celib-
ate machine. And, Similarly, if desire is constitu~
ted in relation to micro-power, it cannot be a mat-
ter of removing a form of domination because desire
is not originally in relation to power as sovereign
domination.
Thus it is a question of mobilising the
various dualisms or dichotomies that desire is org-
anised in terms of against themselves. On this
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account, schizo-analysis would seek to 'liberate'
the desire that does not admit of Oedipalisation
but which has, nevertheless, been so constructed
8S to 'fit' into the Oedipal structure. The dual-
isms or dichotomies that are inherent in desiring
machines, those of revolutionary/reactionary, de-
coded/coded, territorialised/deterritorialised and
so on, must be 'worked with' since that is what
desire is: desiring machines are the connection of
the two as power is always in relation to resistance.
Deleuze and Guattari's strategy, as
with Foucault's is to chart those flows that are
revolutionary, resistant to the work of po~er in
coding and organising desire, and the attempt to
render undecidable the desire that has been made
manageable by capitalism and Oedipalisation.
Conclusion
Thus this chapter has attempted to com-
plete the analysis of economy, power and desire by
accounting for the role of desire in economy. Oel-
euze and Guattari's work has been used to show how
the sort of desire that is found in ec- centric eco-
nomy, schizo- or machinic desire, is mastered to form
the sort of desire that is found in centric economy.
Schizo-desire, which is constructed by the relation
to Foucault's micro-power, and which is found in ec-
centric economy, is both constitutive and subversive
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of the supposedly fixed and stable forms of desire
to be found in centric economy.
In phallocentric economy, that is, des-
ire is presented as either constitutive or destruc-
tive of the economies in which it is found; it is
presented as decidable. But, as Deleuze and Guattari
show, desire is more 'originally' conceived as being
in relation to micro-power and as.being undecidable.
It is the energy which invests and proves a threat
to the organisations in which it is found. And thus
this chapter claims to have completed the task of
accounting for the possibility of feminism, having
shown how the final ingredient in economy escapes the
attempt to reduce it to an identity.
In looking at the work of Derrida, Fou-
cault and Deleuze and Guattari, chapters five, six
and seven claim to have illustrated the possibility
of feminism insofar as they have elucidated the var-
ious ec- centric moves made by these thinkers in the
face of what they perceive as metaphysics, phallo-
centric economy which privileges identity and deci-
dability over a difference that is irreducible to
identity or decidability. In that the privileging
of identity is the vulgar masculine concern, a differ-
ence that does not thus reduce to identity may be
said to be part of a non-vulgar femininity.
The following chapters will show how
these concerns manifest themselves in more 'concrete'
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economies, attempting to illuminate the 'gap' that
is held to exist between these perhaps more 'philo-
sophical' concerns and the actual struggles of wo-
men. Chapter eight will look at the work of Freud
on female sexuality and of Gallop on the relation
between women, feminism and Lacan. Chapter nine
will discuss the various strategies that are avail-
able to feminism in the critique of the phallocen~
tric production of value.
CHAPTER EIGHT
WOMEN AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
This chapter sees the return of what
are more obviously or 'vulgarly' feminine or femi-
nist concerns. In chapter two, the production of
value and identity, economy, was seen to be a matter
of a relationship between identity, difference and
some form of opposition. Two accounts of two 'sorts'
of economy were given here. On the one hand, there
was restricted, phallocentric economy which was
productive of value and identity by means of the re-
lation to the centre or transcendental signified.
This 'sort' of economy was said to be phallocentric
in a 'vulgar' sense in that the privileging of self-
present and self-identical values has traditionally
been the male concern.
On the other hand, there was feminist
or ec- centric economy which would at once produce
and destroy stable identities and: values. This
'sort' of economy was labelled 'feminine' or 'femi-
nist' for ~ant of a better word to indicate a trans-
gressive moment that would not simply and immediate-
ly be appropriated and rendered harmless by phallo-
centric economy. 'Feminist' or 'feminine', here,
then, were intended in a non-vulgar sense since the
value of the feminine had hitherto been produced in
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relation to a centre, phallic or phallomorphic va-
lues. The relation between these 'sorts' of econo-
my was seen to be a 'tension', hence the inverted
commas.
In chapters three and four, the matter
of identity, difference and opposition was traced
through the ~ork of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and
Adorno on dialectics, showing how the question of
the possibility engaged with the problems of the
limits of thought and language. In addition to
showing that and how the problems of feminism were
problems of economy and that they concern the very
limits of thought and language, these chapters
showed how the relations of these thinkers to econo-
my, and the matter of economy itself, provided for
the possibility of feminism, as this latter is to
be found in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze
and Guattari. Lastly, chapters five, six and seven
looked at the work of these latter in order to show
how ec- centric economy operates and is operated
upon, how it is constituted and subverted, how it
is traversed by relations of power and desire and
how it relates to phallocentric economy.
In the light of all this, the present
chapter intends to begin the analysis of how the
identity and value, (and hence status and worth),
of female sexuality is, or has been, produced in
economy. The particular aspect of the value or
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identity of women that will be dealt with here is
that of female sexuality as it has been described in
the work of Freud and as it is dealt with by Gallop.
This aspect has been chosen because, as Marks and
deCourtivron note and Mitchell impliesl, Freud's
work in this area has been the subject of much femin-
ist attention in the past and because it is one of
the areas in which much critical work is presently
being done.
So, this chapter is concerned first
with the production of value in sexual or libidinal
economy, (in a vulgar sense, again), that is descri-
bed in and by the work of Freud. It will be shown
that this economy is phallocentric insofar as it is
a centred economy and insofar as the phallus or phal-
lomorphic values are privileged as transcendental
signified. It will also show how the value and iden-
tity of female sexuality that is produced within
this economy appears and is experienced as being
produced by relation to that centre in the occlusion
of ec- centric economy.
That is, it will show how differance,
ec- centric economy, and the relations of power and
desire that are to be found within it, are organi-
sed by centric economy in the production and legi-
timation of the value and identity of female sex-
uality.
Having looked at these aspects of Freud's
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work, "The Ladies' Man", an essay by Jane Gallop
which relates Freud, Lacan and feminism, will be
discussed. Among other things, the essay concerns
Lacan's relations with his female readers and crit-
ics, his position with regard to phallocentrism
and Freud and the question of the feminist critique
of the production of value. As such, it relates
back to the earlier concerns of this essay with
economy 'in itself' and forward to the discussion
of strategy to be found in the next chapter, in
addition to dealing with some of the issues with
which contemporary feminism is concerned.
Consequently, this chapter may be seen
as providing a fairly concrete illustration of how
precisely economy works in the production and legi-
timation of value and identity and as continuing the
discussion concerning what a feminism, a discourse
that would critique and transgress that production,
would look like. This chapter does not attempt to
give a complete and entirely 'authentic' account of
the work of either Freud or Lacan.
FREUD
Introductory
Basically, then, this chapter is attemp-
ting to show that and how the perhaps more philoso-
phical concerns of earlier chapters manifest them-
selves in more 'concrete' instances and how the
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value and identity of female sexuality is produced
in phallocentric economy. The things that it is
not trying to do should also be emphasized. First,
it is not trying to show that Freud's accounts of
female sexuality are all hopelessly phallocentric
and should be disregarded wholesale. And, second,
it is not interested in proposing an 'authentic',
definitive or even necessarily accurate account of
Freud's views on the matter.
That is, although there are metaphy-
sical elements to be found in Freud's work, although
it is to be shown that his version of psychoanalysis
operates a phallocentric economy in the question of
female sexuality, there are also, nevertheless,
various important critical motifs in that work.
As has been seen, Derrida suggests that, 'in every
proposition ••• metaphysical presuppositions co-ex-
ist with critical motifs,2. As his treatment of
Husserl and Saussure, for example, makes clear, a
text exhibits and makes sense on the basis of the
co-existence of both centric and ec- centric elements.
General and restricted economy are not to be separ-
ated in such a ~ay that one could be ~ritten without
the other. So, although it will not be a matter of
simply rejecting Freud's account on the basis of it
exemplifying phallocentric economy, they are, never-
theless, those aspects of the account that the later
sections of this chapter ~ill be interested in.
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Secondly, with regard to this point,
Mitchell notes in the introduction to her Psycho-
analysis and Feminism that Freud is offering a
description of, rather than a prescription for,
patriarchal or phallocentric society. others have
argued, however, that Freud cannot but have been
offering support, if only tacit and unwitting sup-
port, for phallocentrism and that he cannot but
have been subject to the ways of thinking about fe-
male sexuality that he describes. And Freud's 'own'
account of the matter is that psychoanalysis does
not attempt the almost impossible task of describ-
ing what a woman is 'but sets about enquiring how
she comes into being,3.
Nevertheless, the ideas that D2 des-
cription of a state of affairs can be free from pre-
suppositions and that a text only makes sense on the
basis of the presence of centric elements should be
sufficient to prevent the simple rejection of Freud's
work.
With regard to the idea that this chap-
ter does not attempt an 'authentic' or even chrono-
logically accurate account of Freud's theories of
female sexuality, it may be said in explanation that
this is neither a psychoanalytical nor an 'intellec-
tual-biographical' account of his work. The role of
his account of female sexuality here is to illustrate
first how various elements work together in-economy
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to produce the value and identity of female sexual-
ity and second to show in what ways that economy is
phallocentric. Objections along the lines of 'Freud
changed his mind on this in 19 ••• ' are therefore
irrelevant.
So, if, as this essay claims, there ex-
ists a tension between centric and ec- centric eco-
nomy, that a value or identity is at once produced
and destroyed by its place in ec- centric economy,
and that that value or identity is rendered decida-
ble only in centred economy, then this chapter must
show that the ec- centric economy in which the value
and identity of female sexuality is undecidable is
reduced by centred economy in which female sexuality
is given a stable identity.
As 8 form of economics, the production
of the identity of femininity, Freud's account of
female sexuality is closely related to the perhaps
more general account of sexual difference per se.
The treatment of female sexuality, that is, is lin-
ked to the treatment of the different ~ays in which
the little boy and the little girl relate to the af-
fairs constitutive of the Oedipus and castration com-
plexes. While tha nature of this relation between
Oedipus and the construction of female sexuality will
not be explicitly dealt with in this chapter, some
of the ways in which each operates as a set of
economic practices will be dealt with below.
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Undecidability
One aspect of ec- centric economy that
is to be found in Freud's work, which provides the
'tension' with centric economy and which must be 're-
duced' by centric economy in order that the text on
female sexuality be written, consists in his treat-
ment of the female genitalia. That tension will be
illustrated here before looking at the treatment of
sexual difference and female sexuality.
On Freud's account, the female genital-
ia consists of both 'feminine' and 'maculine' ele-
ments; being 'improperly' both, it is ,properly'
neither. That is, of the two parts of the female
genitalia that Freud refers to, he refers to the clit-
oris as either being or being like a penis4, and to
the hole or absence that the vagina is presented as
th 1 f . . 5as e, or a, more proper y em1n1ne organ •
In possessing ~h8t would, in 'proper'
terms, or centred economy, be referred to as both
'feminine' and 'maculine' characteristics, the fe-
male genitalia possesses no stable identity. Its
value, as either masculine or feminine, is both pro-
duced and destroyed by the interplay of differences
or oppositions that constitute sexuality. In ec-
centric economy, then, the difference between two
forms of sexuality is not reduced to an opposition
or contradiction.
It is, rather, seen to constitute and
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subvert the identity of both the two poles of the
difference at once. It is in centric economy that
that production/destruction must be reduced and made
decidable. The value of either pole must be seen
to derive from some stable identity in centred eco-
nomy and, it will be shown, that is what Freud's
~ork on female sexuality tends to do.
One version of this sort of argument is
to be found in Sara Kofman's l'Enigme de la femme.
In this text~ she claims that Freud operates a
double gesture, analogous to the tension between cen-
tric and ec- centric economy_ On the one hand, he
recognises the enigmatic or, as Kofman puts it,
unheimlich, figure of the woman. And, on the other,
that undeidable and threatening aspect of femininity
is supposedly sublated, it is presented as having
been accounted for and mastered by the theory of pen-
is envy.
As has been seen with regard to Derrida
and as will be seen in the sections on Gallop, it
is the role of difference that 'begins' Freud's, (and
Kofman would say 'vulgar' males' in general), deal-
ings ~ith the figure of the woman. Freud argues6
that men question the oature of women because they
are different; this makes them 'anxious and fearful'?
and gives them a sense of the uncanny, of the unheim-
!!£h. Sexual difference, especially the '"small
differences" in that which otherwise resembles one
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the most,S, arouse anxiety and fear in men - a
state that must be overcome in some way and render-
ed as harmless as possible.
One of the ways in which this discon-
certing state of affairs is dealt with involves the
setting up of a whole series of taboos around fe-
male virginity. These taboos, moreover, revolve
around the role of penis envy. The taboos of vir-
ginity, ways of distancing oneself, (that is, a
male oneself), from virginal women, are set up in
order to defer contact with a woman who is supposed-
ly even 'more redoubtable at the moment of her first
sexual relations,9. So, in order to overcome what
10Freud calls a 'fundamental fear in regard to women' ,
men set up a series of taboos around virginity in
order that they can avoid women's mastery.
However, according to Kofman, there is
more to this story. It is women's penis envy which
apparently begets a 'bitter hostility,ll on her part
and which the male must protect himself from. It is,
then, this envy that man fears, since the hostility
it engenders leeds men to think that the woman will
revenge herself upon them for being so inadequately
equipped. On Freud's account, man's fears of being
castrated by the woman as revenge for her not having
a penis and thus the woman's penis envy are thus at
the root of the various taboos surrounding virginity.
Kofman's response to this is to argue
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that woman has had penis envy foisted upon her as
a result of the woman's enigmatic differences which
result in the feeling of the uncanny, unheimlichkeit.
Thus she says, and it is of great importance for this
chapter, that 'it is woman who is said to have an
incomplete sexuality. to suffer from penis envy •••
while man ••• finds nothing to envy in woman,l2. In
the context of this section, woman's enigmatic sex-
uality which, as suggested above, partakes of both
vulgarly masculine characteristics, (the clitoris),
and vulgarly feminine characteristics, (the vagina),
must be reduced or 'domesticated' in order that it
no longer pose a threat to the male.
Another version of this move is made by
Culler in his On Deconstruction. 13Here ,he is look-
ing at Freud's treatment of sexuality in the essay
"Femininity", where psychoanalysis is said to ask
'how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual
disposition'. Culler gives an account of how, from
this original bisexual disposition, which gestures
towards 8 non-vulgar femininity, female sexuality is
reduced and rendered decidable. Moreover, the iden-
tity that results from this ordering of sexual dif-
ference is one that allows femininity to be presen-
ted and experienced as a derivative and parasitic
form of sexuality.
The role of ec- centric economy and the
tension in which it exists with centric economy
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becomes clear when Freud's account is read as show-
ing how both vulgar masculinity and vulgar femininity
are the result of the vulgarly masculine reduction
of non-vulgarly feminine economy. As Culler puts
it, 'man and woman are both variants of archi-woman,l4.
That is, with vulgarly masculine clitor-
is and vulgarly feminine vagina, the woman gestures
beyond both to the undecidable, the non-vulgarly
feminine or Culler's archi-woman. The reduction of
this ec- centricity, in the thoroughly ironic ascrip-
tion to woman of an incomplete and derivative sex-
uality and the privileging of the male penis, allows
vulgar masculinity to 'forget' or occlude the 'fact'
of ~omen's enigmatic non-identity. It allows vulgar
masculinity to set itself up as privileged, as the
norm, rather than be recognised as lacking and deri-
vative which, in relation to non-vulgar femininity,
it most certainly is.
Through the economic work of the penis,
as transcendental signified, which orders and regu-
lates identity out of the enigmatic play of sexual
differences, woman is simply constituted as the sex
which does not have the penis and therefore the in-
complete sex. Man, proud, if anxious, possessor of
the penis, no longer finds anything to envy and no
longer finds anything to be afraid of, having sec-
ured the identity of female sexuality as a lack.
In both these examples, woman's enigmatic or
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undecidable sexuality has been reduced to a mana-
geable identity by virtue of the relation to the
penis as transcendental signified.
Sexual difference
Thus there are ec- centric elements to
be found in Freud's account of female genitality.
As noted above, before looking at the account of
female sexuality, sexual difference itself will be
examined. That is, although they are in no sense
separate operations, this section will consider how
sexual difference is produced in Freudian economics
before looking at the account of how the value or
identity of female sexuality itself is generated.
It should, perhaps, be stressed that
these are in no sense separate operations: where the
transcendental signified was said to both produce
differences out of differance and to regulate the
relative values that were generated by those differ-
ences, so the penis in Freudian theory regulates
both the production of sexual difference and the val-
ue of female sexuality 'within' that difference.
The passage through the Oedipus and castration com-
plexes, and the differences between the ways in
which the little boy and the little girl accomplish
that passage, produce both gendered human subjects
and the relative value and identity of those sub-
jects.
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Prior to the Oedipal phase, there is no
sexual difference, at least as far as the infant is
concerned. The same libidinal forces are 'at work'
in both 'male' and 'female' children in the various
economies of object, aim and pleasure that consti-
t t 0 d' 1 l't 15 5 th h'ld f thu e pre- e 1pa sexua 1 y • 0 e c 1 0 e
oral and anal stages of sexuality, in which object,
aim and pleasure are united in the ingestion of food
and the mastery over the musculature of the bowel
ti 1 ' t d db' tISrespec ve y, lS no a gen ere su Jec •
In these stages, then, the child's body
is a field traversed by libidinal forces. Pleasure
is generated in a movement of objects and aims, (the
mother's breast, the child's mouth and so on), none
of which are stable and all of which are 'intra-fam-
'I' r'1. aa • In these stages, there is no relation to ob-
jects that are outside of the familial situation.
There is no gendered subject and pleasure is produced
in a shifting economy in which there is no single,
stable value to organise the relations of objects
and aims in the production of pleasure.
I bl d' t 17n no sense separa e or lscre e ,
these economies of sexual value do not produce a gen-
dered human subject. It is with the onset of the
'genital' or, as Freud called it later, the phallic
stage and the development of the Oedipal situation,
that sexual difference and, along with it, the res-
pective sexual identity of the little boy and the
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little girl, are produced. Somewhat obscurely, that
is, the phallus 'comes into account,l8 for both male
and female children and begins to organise pre-Oedip-
al sexuality into post-Oedipal differences.
In the phallic phase, contemporaneous
with the Oedipus complex19, the penis begins to as-
sume its role as the centre of sexual economy and to
organise sexual difference. The little boy is said
to desire union with his mother, perceiving his fath-
er as a threat and rival. While the little girl,
whose earliest desires had been homosexual, turns
her attentions to her father20• It is the castration
complex, the threat or perceived fact of losing the
penis, that is at work throughout this development.
The castration complex destroys the
Oedipus complex in little boys and leads up to it in
little girls2l• That is, the threat of being castrat-
ed leads to the boy forsaking his mother as sexual
object and, submitting to the authority of the father,
realising that he will occupy such a position as he
no~ desires at a later date. As Freud says, the dis-
covery of the threat of castration leads to the for-
mation of the super-ego and initiates the process
that will lead him to find a place in the cultural
community22.
The situation is more complicated with
the little gir123 and there are numerous problems
with Freud's account, some of which have been hinted
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at above. However, those problems will not be dealt
with in any detail here and the basic mechanisms
only ~ill be described. The little girl acknowledges
her castration as a fact24 and turns her attentions
from her equally ill-equipped mother to her father.
There are now three paths open to the female child
at this stage. The first is a revulsion from sex-
uality altogether, the second consists in the defiant
assertion that she really has a penis. And the third
is the 'normal female attitude'; it consists in wan-
ting to substitute her father's child for the penis
she does not have.
Freud says that it is the difference in
the relation to castration and Oedipus between boys
and girls which 'gives its special stamp to the char-
acter of females as social beings,25. Women, lacking
the penis, lack also the relation to the values of
society that are embodied in the paternal authority
on incest. Similarly, they have less motivation for
26the setting up of the super-ego • As was seen with
Hegel, in chapter three, Freud's account of sexual
difference involves the exclusion of women from the
social and ethical aspects of life, confining them
to desiring the father's child or some substitute for
it, confining them to the hearth.
This is the context, then, for the pro-
duction of the value of female sexuality. It is to
the production of the value of female sexuality in
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this difference that this chapter now turns. The
account of this economy will be carried out under
five headings.
Female sexuality
The five headings under which the
account of the production of the value and identity
of female sexuality will be divided are as follows:
1) The suppression of differance; how the centre
operates in subordinating differance to form differ-
ences organised in relation to itself.
2) The regulation of economy; how the centre
balances, orients and organises the centric economy
that is established in the suppression of differance.
3) The nature of the centre as 'out of play',
as immune to or beyond the play of deferral and dif-
ferentiation that all .other terms in the economy are
subject to.
4) The supplementary nature of the repressed
term in that economy; how female sexuality is ex-
cluded and contained outside the realm of the centre.
S) The nature of power and desire; the roles and
relations of power and desire as they are found with-
in centred and ec- centric sexual economy.
It will be noted that these headings
are taken from the account of economy in chapter
two.
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1) Suppression of differance
It was noted in chapter two that the
centre of economy had at least two functions. The
first was to 'master' differance, 'to limit what we
might call the free-play' of differance27• It was
to put an end to or curtail the endless dispersal
and deferral of identity in the systematic play of
ec- centric economy. So, if differance is a 'com-
plex interplay of presence and absence,28 and must
be thought as predating even as it produces the
conceptual oppositions of language29 then, since
the economy that is found in Freud's work operates
in terms of presence and absence, the presence or
absence of the penis, it is therefore centred eco-
nomy.
It was also noted above, with regard
to female genitality, at least, that the value or
status of that genitality was defined in terms of a
lack or absence, the lack or absence of the penis.
The vagina, that is, is not defined as 'something
having a form and different constitution', as some-
thing 'dissimilar and distinct,30 and nor is it said
to be something the value of which is problematic.
If the economy in which its value was
produced was a gynocentric economy, the vagina would'
be said to have a different and distinct constitution
and if it were produced within ec- centric economy
it would be said to have an undecidable value.
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However, it is said to be the effect of castration,
an absence or lack at the place where the penis
would be in the male3l• Like any other, according
to such feminists as de Beauvoir and Feral, who was
quoted above32, female genitality can only be des-
ob dOt' t d f' d by "'hat l.'tl.'Snot33crl. e l.nnega l.ve erms, e l.ne w
in relation to the penis in the male.
Similarly with regard to the clitoris,
it is in terms of the presence or absence of the
penis that its value or identity is generated. In
this case, however, the penis is almost present,
it is not fully present, but exists in the form of
an inferior version of the penis. As Freud says,
'it is a small penis' and, although it behaves like
a 'real and genuine penis', it is still not quite
real34•
It is claimed that this illustrates that
the economy in which the value of female sexuality
is produced is an economy which involves the sup-
pression of difference. The ec- centric economy of
differance as productive of the values of presence
and absence has been suppressed in favour of an eco-
nomy thet conceives difference, and regulates the
production of value, on the basis of the opposition
presence/absence - the presence or absence of the
penis.
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2) Regulation of economy
The second role of the centre in eco-
nomy was seen in chapter two to be that of organi-
sing, balancing and orienting that economy. In, or
in addition to, mastering differance, the centre
provides an organising pole around which the terms
within the resulting centred economy may be arran-
ged and in terms of which they are said to have the
value they have. This duality of function may be
said to correspond to Freud's concern with account-
ing for sexual difference on the one hand and with
female sexuality on the other. That is, the centre
at once organises differance into centred economy,
producing stable differences, and regulates the val-
ues and relations of those differences. In this way,
female sexuality is not only different from male sex-
uality, but also of a different, inferior, status.
One way in which the penis as centre
organises those elements which are part of sexual
economy may be seen if the example of female homosex-
uality is considered. The penis, or phallomorphic
values in general, in this case, provide the source
for the value of female homosexuality. They provide
the pole around which female homosexuality is said
to have the identity or meaning it has in that, crude-
ly and as Irigaray puts it, female homosexuality is
reduced to 'acting like a man,35.
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That is, female homosexuality is ex-
plained or made meaningful, its identity is gener-
ated, in terms of phallomorphic values. Value and
identity are here produced in relation to phallomor-
phic values ~hich are themselves fully and simply
present and not defined by their relations to other
terms. It is made meaningful or valuable in this
way rather than being explained on its own terms,
(~hatever they would be and as gynocentric economy
would do), or in terms of the ec- centric economy
of differance, (in terms of a value that is undeci-
dable).
Noting again, as does Freud, that the
opposition male/female is conventional rather than
. t·f' 36th t d . hi h th Isc~en ~ ~c , e cen re economy ~n w ~c e va ue
of female homosexuality is produced generates that
value in terms of acting like a man. As Freud says,
for example, the girl 'changed into a 37man' • Any
form of specificity that might be held to pertain to
female homosexuality and any question of the 'prop-
riety' of ascribing stable identities or essences to
any form of sexuality are suppressed or subordinated
in this account and phallomorphic values held to pro-
vide the key to the production of the identity and
meaning of female homosexuality.
The girl in Freud's case chooses a fem-
ale object. Freud merely says that this is to act
as men do, in choosing a woman as object of their
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attentions. Moreover, in choosing a specific sort
of woman, Freud tells us that she was what he refer-
red to in "A special type of choice of object made
by men" as a 'cocotte', she is coresponding to the
male choice of object38• Similarly, the way in which
she goes about 'courting,39, (a word laden with phal-
lomorphic associations), this woman of lo~ repute
is said to be a 'masculine attitude towards that ob-
ject,40. In behaving in this way, Freud's female
homosexual is apparently doing nothing that is not
in keeping with female homosexuals generally, who,
he says, 'exhibit masculine characteristics, both
physical and mental, with peculiar frequency,41.
Thus it is claimed that the production
of the value or identity of female homosexuality is
governed by the penis or phallomorphic values, acting
like a man. Female homosexuality is not considered
to be problematic, nor is it held to have any value
or identity of its own. It is explained, rather, in
terms of phallomorphic object choices and ways of
relating to those objects.
The role or rule of the penis and phal-
lomorphic values within Freud's sexual economy may
also be seen in relation to the last of the three
paths which he says are open to the woman in the
essay "Female sexuality,,42. Having acknowledged the
'fact of her castration', the 'superiority' of the
male sex and the ~inferiority' of her own, there are,
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apparently, three paths a woman's sexuality may trav-
el. The first, as seen above, consists in a 'gener-
al revulsion from sexuality,43 and the second in
clinging with 'defiant self-assertiveness to her threat-
d 1° °t ,44ene mascu ~n1 y •
On the third path, however, the position
of the woman with regard to the penis and phallomor-
phic values is that of trying to appropriate it and
them, of trying to possess a penis or a version of a
penis. The identity of female sexuality is defined
in terms of the penis at least twice here in that it
involves the subjugation of femininity to maternity
and in that it defines the value of motherhood as an
attempt to possess the penis or something like the
penis, in the form of the husband or the husband's
child.
That is, where any 9ynocentric account
of the value of female sexuality would presumably
account for motherhood in its own terms, this phallo-
centric explanation defines it in terms of the desire
to possess the penis. And, where that gynocentric
account would presumably, and as Feral suggests,
not involve the subordination of female pleasure to
maternity, phallocentric economy determines that
'pleasure [la jOUiSsanceJ no longer comes first,45.
Woman's pleasure is no longer that which provides the
'defining element,46 for sexual relations. In the
same way as infantile sexuality comes 'under the sway'
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of the reproductive function, then, it is the end
result, the telos or sens, of sexual relations, in
the form of the child rather than sexual pleasure,
that generates the value of female sexuality.
3) Out of play
It was noted above, in chapter two,
that where, in ec- centric economy, value or iden-
tity was at once produced and destroyed by its rela-
tions to all other terms, in centric economy, one
term was privileged and held to be a full, simple
value. The value and identity of all other terms
was held to derive from their relation to this term,
the centre or transcendental signified. The centre,
moreover, was not held to be valuable as a result of
its relations to all other terms. It was, rather,
absolutely valuable, self-identical.
The centre, then, was held to be a val-
ue which escaped, or was outside of, the play of ref-
errals and deferrals that characterised the values
of all the terms it was thus said to govern. The
centre regulated the values of those identities in
that it determined which could be substituted for
which other, (governing the exchange rate, as it were),
but was not itself to be exchanged or substituted for
anything else. It was in this sense out of play.
Similarly, in the sexual economy being
considered here, the centre as full and simple value
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is held to provide a source of sexual value without
itself being valuable in terms of anything else.
The penis, as centre of sexual economy, is held to
be immune in some sense from being defined in terms
of anything else: its identity is not seen as being
conditional upon a relation to any other element in
that economy.
Thus it is, for example, that the pleas-
ure obtained via the mastery over the musculature of
the bowel may give ~ay or be substituted, in the nor-
mal course of events, for the pleasure that is gener-
ated in the phallic stage and that both these econo-
mies come under the s~ay of the reproductive function.
In this way, they obtain their value from the rela-
tion to phallomorphic values but phallomorphic values
are not themselves defined in terms of anything else.
One more example would be that of female
genl tall ty. As both de Beauvoir and Fera 1 note, it
is woman or female genitality that is defined in terms
of the penis but not the other way round. As has
been seen above, the vagina is the lack or absence
of the penis and the clitoris is a small penis but
not, in the end, a real or genuine one. The penis
does not receive its value from anything else but is
rather held to be the presence from which everything
else receives meaning and value.
So, it is that the penis is not defined
and does not have its value produced in terms of the
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vagina. And so it is, in the phallocentric economy
described in the work of Freud, that the penis and
phallomorphic values are held to be outside or bey-
ond the differences and deferring relations that give
all the other elements within the economy the value
they are said to have.
4) Supplementarity
These points are closely related to the
idea of supplementarity. It was seen in chapter two
that those values which ~ere not 'of the order' of
the centre were held to be secondary or supplementary
to that centre and the terms which were of its order.
Thus it was indicated how, in the tradition Derrida
is apparently most concerned to deal with, logocen-
trism, those values associated with writing, that are
not of the order of full and present speech, logos,
were held to be secondary and supplementary by
Plato, Saussure and the others. Writing,
that is, is held to be secondary, the sign of a sign,
and the guise and disguise of living speech: as such,
it was held to be exterior, inferior and supplemen-
tary. As Derrida says, 'that which represents a
force in the form of writing and essential to it has
been contained outside speech,47.
An important aspect of the notion of
supplementarity is that the element or term that is
thus held to be supplementary is, or may be, obliged
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to 'make good' its deficiency. Thus Plato says
that writing is in need of its father, speech, in or-
der that it be protected from the attacks that its
deficiency leave it open to and in order that it be
of some value that is not merely supplementary.
Speech is necessary to writing in order for it to be
'redeemed', for it to escape the weaknesses that it
has as a result of being secondary.
In sexual economy, these ideas may be
seen in the way in which those elements that are not
of the order of the penis, the elements constitutive
of female sexuality, are held to be of supplementary
status to that of the penis and phallomorphic values.
Women and female sexuality have been represented as
being outside the realm of the penis and phallomorphic
values, as being either wholly or partly other than
it and as being a potential threat to it. Where, then,
female sexuality has not been represented as beyond
and inferior to the realm of phallomorphic values,
(where it has not been represented as the other, the
lack or absence of the penis), it has been represen-
ted as outside insofar as it is not a real or gen-
uine phallomorphic sex.
Similarly, it is held that this supple-
mentary sex which is that of the woman may be, or is
obliged to be, made good. Thus the woman may aspire
to possess the penis through the possession of the
husband or the child that is preferably a male child.
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In this case, she attempts to make her supplementary
sexuality into a proper sexuality, one that is like
the male. As noted above, her sexuality may also be
made phallomorphic through the rejection of pleasure,
the subordination of jouissance, that is involved in
maternity.
The woman, then, may attempt to make
her sexuality phallomorphic through the acquisition
of a penis in the husband and/or male child, or
through subordinating the feminine pleasure that might
be involved in sexual relations to the phallically
defined role of motherhood. In both cases, the dif-
ferent and the threatening (that is, for men) aspects
of female_ sexuality are organised in terms of the
penis and phallomorphic values in the attempt to
make women's sexuality phallic.
'The deconstructive project', on the
other hand, is to show how the setting up of the cen-
tre as absolute value and the repressing of the sup-
plementary term involves the subordination of differ-
ance and the setting outside of the supposedly infer-
ior term. Deconstruction tries to show, that is,
that the supplementary term is 'actually' of the same
order as, and interior to, the supposedly superior,
full term. Thus Derrida tries to show that the prop-
erties which Plato, Saussure et al find in writing
and consider to justify its supplementary status are
to be found within speech as well. Speech, no less
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than writing, is the sign of a sign and unless it
were so, it could not function as it does in commu-
nication.
Thus, without going into too much detail,
for that is properly the concern of the oext chapter,
the moves made by Culler and Kofman which were dealt
with in the section on 'undecidability' above would
be examples of how that which was supposedly superior
was worked over by that which had been excluded and
held to be supplementary. The next section will
look at the workings of power and desire in Freudian
economy to complete this account of sexual economy.
5) Power and desire
This section will begin to chart the
roles of power and desire in Freud's account of fem-
ale sexuality. There are at least two relations
which such a charting might take up with regard to
that account. The first concerns what might be cal-
led the 'internal economy' of Freud's work - the
position of the centre as desiring and powerful
figure, for example. And the second concerns what
might be called the 'external economy' of that work,
in which the value and meaning of Freud's text is
itself produced as scientific and truthful. for ex-
ample.
The latter, which would involve refer-
ence to such things as the ways in which a text is
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constituted as meaningful and authoritative in soc-
iety for example, will not be considered here.
Rather, it is the position of the transcendental
signified, phallomorphic values, and hence masculin-
ity as po~erful and desiring, that ~ill be consider-
ed. That is, these terms or values, along with the
other terms to be found in Freud's account, will be
considered as forces that differ from and oppose one
another in the production of the value or identity
of female sexuality.
It ~ill be recalled that in chapter
six, the version of Foucault's account of power that
was adopted was that micro-power was both productive
and destructive of what appeared and was experienced
as sovereign power. However, the destructive aspect
of those shifting relations that constituted micro-
power was occluded by the operations of sovereign
power which thus appeared to be independent of the
terms it governed. To chart the positions of the
terms or elements within Freud's sexual economy in
terms of sovereign power would thus be to continue
the occlusion of the sorts of power relation ~hich
were to be found in ec- centric economy. Since it
~as also argued that ec- centric economy was femin-
ist in a non-vulgar sense, such an occlusion would
be to contribute to what was supposedly being ana-
lysed - the phallocentric tendencies of Freudian
economics.
275
Thus, according to the juridico-discur-
sive notion of power, power is essentially a juridi-
cal mechanism 'which says the law, which interdicts,
which says "no",48 and which is associated with 'a
whole litany of negative effects,49. It is also held
to be something that can be possessed, exercised and
lost, either by individuals or by a group of indivi-
duals. The paradigm case of power from which the
general title is taken is therefore the Prince who
is said to have power and to exercise it by means of
spoken interdicts which take the form of laws. Such,
crudely, is the basis of the juridico-discursive no-
tion of power as presented and criticised by Foucault.
If the sexual economy that is to be found
in the work of Freud is considered, it can be seen
that the role/rule of the penis and phallomorphic
values as centre of that economy can be accounted for
in terms of the juridico-discursive notion of power.
For example, it could be said that the penis as centre
is the sovereign point that is absolute or beyond the
laws that it supposedly lays down. It would, for in-
stance, be above or beyond the operations in terms
of which female homosexuality is opposed to and def-
ined in terms of acting like a man.
The penis/phallomorphic values as centre,
then, would dictate the laws that bind the actions
and transactions of all other elements within sexual
economy, without itself being subject to similar
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binding or relation to anything else. What appears
and is experienced as the absolute power and value
of phallomorphic values in Freud's account may be
compared, then, to the absolute power (or Power)
supposed to be held by the sovereign on the juridico-
discursive account of power. This, however, would
be to assume a position of complicity with precisely
what is being analysed and critiqued in this chapter.
As Foucault is concerned to show, there
are a number of problems involved in the juridico-
discursive model of power and these problems contrib-
ute to the occlusion of the production and destruc-
tion of sovereign power in micro-power. Briefly, as
seen in chapter six, the juridico-discursive account
of power cannot explain the productivity of power -
that it 'runs through and produces things ••• pleas-
ure ••• 50'knowledge' • Secondly, it is difficult to
see how power should ever have been accepted or tol-
erated - how end why dictates made from a position
of power should ever be tolerated as legitimate given
that all it does is say 'no'. And, thirdly, the jur-
idlco-discursive notion seems to require some sort
of basis or condition for its functioning - it is
hard to understand how the 'terminal forms' of power,
sovereign po~er, could be exercised unless some
'basis' were laid for that exercise.
The sort of power that Foucault says
serves as 'basis' or 'origin', which has hitherto
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been occluded as condition for the functioning and
exercise of sovereign po~er, consists in a 'multi-
plicity of relations of force immanent to the sphere
in which they operate,SI. Sovereign power's 'condi-
tion of possibility' 'must not be sought in the pri-
mary existence of a central point ••• but rather in
••• the moving substrate of force relations which
52constantly engender states of power' •
• • •
So, if the operation of the penis and
phallomorphic values, the masculine operation, is
that of occluding differance and of providing some
principle or source for the regulation of value in
phallocentric economy, then the exercise and exist-
ence of that power must be said to be based upon the
occlusion of its sources in a multiplicity of force
relations. Thus, where differance provides the non-
full, non-simple 'origin', (the production and des-
truction), of the centre's value, Foucault's micro-
power provides the condition, (the production and des-
truction), of the power of the sovereign. The oper-
ation of the penis and phallomorphic values as abso-
lutely powerful in centred economy is to occlude the
origins of its power in the multiplicity of force
relations that would, precisely, both produce and des-
troy its power.
For example, although the penis and phal-
lomorphic values appear and are experienced as gover-
ning the other values in sexual economy, and to
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govern in the manner of the sovereign, the source
of that power, (and the potential undoing of it),
is to be sought in the shifting multiplicity of
relations in which the penis is not (yet) centre
but is rather of the same order as those elements
in relation to which it obtains its value and power.
That is, although the meaning and identity of fe-
male homosexuality, for example, is produced in
terms of its relation to the penis as transcendental
signified, (as 'acting like a man'), that centred
economy has occluded the origins of the penis and
phallomorpbic values so that they appear and are ex-
perienced as simply dominant over female homosexual-
ity. In ec- centric economy, the value of any term,
and also the power of any term, would only be gener-
ated by its relations to or differences from all the
other terms - there would be no privileged or domi-
nant term that was set up as absolutely powerful.
So, what is presented and experienced
in phallocentric economy as the sovereign power of
the penis and phallomorphic values over all the other
terms is dependent upon the occlusion of the non-full,
non-simple origin of that power in the ec- centric
economy of shifting and multiple relations of forces.
The penis and phallomorphic values, like the other
terms, are invested by various degrees of force
which differ from and oppose one another, thus both
creating and destroying their power in ec- centric
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economy. Only in the move to masculine, centric,
economy, does one term, the penis, become privileg-
ed, solidary with the values of identity and presence
and begin to take on the role of sovereign, that from
which supplementary powers derive.
The desire that is in relation to both
micro-power and sovereign power must also be accoun-
ted for. It will be recalled from the previous chap-
ter that desire is that which power is already in re-
lation to. The tension between ec- centric and cen-
tric economy, which manifests itself on the level of
power in the relation between sovereign power and
micro-power, will be seen in the register of desire
as the difference between schizo-desire and Oedipal
desire. SchiZO-desire, which is in relation to mic-
ro-power as plebness, the resistance which cannot be
completely mastered, therefore provides the basis
for Oedipal desire, the desire for something that is
lacking and which is presented as being in relation
to sovereign power.
Thus, if feminine desire was to be ac-
counted for in the terms of phallocentric economy,
in relation, that is, to sovereign power, it would
be said that either that desire was simply reppres-
sed or that it was simply constituted by that power.
Female homosexuality, for example, would be theorised
either as being dammed, channelled or otherwise throt-
tled by sovereign power or as being simply constructed
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by that power. In both cases, female homosexuality
would be represented as being in relation to sover-
eign power.
If, on the other hand, the penis or phal-
lomorphic values were theorised as desiring to govern
and regulate the production of the value of all other
terms in sexual economy, that desire would be presen-
ted as the desire for something that was simply lack-
ing. It would be presented as the desire for stable
and self-identical values that were lacking either
contingently (Freud) or necessarily (Lacan). Mascu-
line or phallocentric desire, as presented in the
terms of phallocentric economy, therefore, would be
presented as that which desired to be sovereign.
This desire, to govern and regulate by
means of a stable and self-identical value, is what
has traditionally and vulgarly been the masculine
concern. Such is the desire and the power that is
found within centric, phallocentric economy. Such,
also, is the desire for and the sort of power presen-
ted as appropriate for the establishing of centric
economy.
However, as has been shown, this sort
of power, sovereign power, and the sort of desire
that is in relation to it, only obtain on condition
that the multiple and shifting relations of forces
that constitute micro-power on the one hand and the
sort of desire that is in relation to micro-power on
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the other have been occluded. It is this latter po-
wer and the schizo-desire that is in relation to it
that has been presented so far as feminist in a non-
vulgar sense and which is never mastered or regulat-
ed by sovereign, phallocentric, power.
Consequently, feminine desire, as it is
found in Freud's sexual econQmy, in female homosex-
uality, for example, would be theorised as that which
would both produce and destroy the appearance of Oedi-
pal desire from an anti-Oedipal standpoint. The val-
ue or identity of female homosexuality, that is,
~ould itself be both produced and destroyed by its
relations to all other forms of sexuality rather than
simply being reppressed or simply constituted in re-
lation to male power.
And thus, to present masculine desire
as the desire to provide a stable source of value that
was lacking would be to repeat the very move that was
supposedly being resisted - the attempt to reduce
difference to something manageable. Rather, that de-
sire would have to be seen as being constituted in
relation to the power relations between all the other
elements of sexual economy. To present the masculine
concern as the desire to provide a full and stable
origin for identity is to perpetuate the occlusion
of the origins of desire in schizo-desire - it is to
repeat and partake of that concern.
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So, on this account, masculine desire
to govern and regulate the production of value would
be theorised as just another desiring machine which,
in the manner of Oedipus, had been removed from its
connections with all other desiring machines and made
into an eternal structure of desire.
Conclusion
These sections have thus accounted for
the phallocentric tendencies of Freud's account of
female sexuality. Although it was seen in the earlier
sections that there were ec- centric moments in that
account, the latter sections have been concerned to
elucidate how female sexuality is produced in phallo-
centric economy.
The ladies' man
The following sections will look at an
essay by Jane Gallop which deals with Freud, women
readers and Lacan. It will be seen to relate the
earlier concerns of this work with identity, differ-
ence and opposition to those of the following chapter
~ith strategy.
Gallop's Feminism and Psychoanalysis is,
as she says, a study of the relations between 'con-
temporary feminist theory and the psychoanalysis of
Jacques Lacan,53 and, as the title suggests, the
continuation of a debate concerning and opened by
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Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism. It ls a
collection of interesting and complex essays that
are connected by the desire to be both feminist and
psychoanalytical and to create exchanges between
54'people who do not speak to each other' ,exchan-
ges within and between these generic groupS. Thus,
the essay that these sections will consider, "The
Ladies' Man", elucidates the possibility of a psy-
choanalytic feminism by confronting Lacan first with
Freud and second with Irigaray. The concerns of
"The Ladies' ~an" with feminist strategies in the
face of the various manifestations of phallocentrism
will thus introduce the concerns of the next chapter
as well as relating back to the concerns of the
preceding chapters.
The essay begins by reading an issue of
the French journal l'Arc. ~ore precisely, it looks
at issue number 58 which has been produced by a group
of women and is devoted to Lacan. Gallop makes much
of the notion of devotion elsewhere55 and it is per-
haps the wrong word to use to describe the relation
of the women of l'Arc 58 to Lacan56• However, it
appears that Lacan's practice earns him the title of
'The ladies' man', that he is what Gallop calls a
'prick' and that, because of this and despite them-
selves, the ladies find him 'irresistible'S?
For a long time, Lacan says, he has de-
sired to speak to the women, to stroll among them.
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'A real ladies' man, there is nothing he wants more
that to be with the women'. Moreover, what he wants
to talk to the ladies about is 'the other satisfac-
tion, that which responds to phallic pleasure'.
Lacan, then, 'desires to stroll through the audience
••• to ask the question Freud avoided, "Was will das
Weib?",58.
However, Lacan's seminars for the year
1972-3, (Encore: Seminaire Livre XX), state, 'over
and over again' that 'the phallic order and phallic
enjoyment are ••• a failure to reach the other'. As
Gallop puts it, 'the sexual relation, as relation
between the sexes, fails' and Lacan, who wants to
stroll among the women as 'cock of the walk', is de-
nied his pleasure. 'The cock is that which by defi-
nition cannot be with the women' and Lacan, who can-
not 'strut among the women, joins the women in the
analysis of the failure of his desire,59.
Undeterred, Lacan gallantly begs the
women to tell him something of that other satisfac-
tion: the entire seminar asks 'but one thing, Was will
das Weib?'. The answer he gets is 'tauntingly ambiv-
alent': 'Encore'SO. He wants to know about the other
satisfaction. To the ladies' man, 'Encore' 'calls
for something else', something he refers to as 'bey-
ond the phallus'. But, as 'cock of the walk', 'he
cannot help but want to give another phallic perfor-
mance,Sl •
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Thus Lacan is not always 'seductive and
elusive,62, his 'poetic' and 'allusive' flirting with
the women63 'continually tends to freeze into a rigid
system centred on the phallus as transcendental sig-
nifier,64. The ladies' man risks being turned into
the man's man, the frank and serious philosopher, and
for Gallop it is only the ladies' man's continually
posing the question, without being satisfied with any
'recuperative' answer that might be provided by the
earnest philosopher, which prevents the system solid-
ifying around the phallus and phallomorphic values.
Dishonourable Lacan is on feminism's side, with the
women, against the philosopher who is honourable and
surrounded by all the virile, phallocentric, values.
The Prick
So, Lacan at his most 'stimulating and
forceful' escapes the accusations made, as Gallop
notes, by Derrida among others, that he is phallocen-
tric. There are two problems with the claims of peo-
ple like Derrida, according to Gallop. On the one
hand, Derrida is a philosopher. To call Lacen phel-
locentric is thus to 'approach the proper epithet'
but to 'misfire' through adhering to 'polite, discur-
sive philosophical terms'. Lacan, on the other hand,
is not 'simply a philosopher': his flirtatious and
cocky discourse is more a performance that is 'attun-
ed to the register of aggression and desire'. On
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Gallop's view, he is more than phallocentric.
'He is also phallo-eccentric. Or, in more pointed
language, he is a prick,65.
It is Lacan the prick that the ladies,
despite themselves, find irresistible. The prick is
in some way undecidable - 'both resented by and at-
tractive to women,66 as a 'narcissistic tease who
persuades by means of attraction and resistance, not
by orderly systematic discourse,6? Lacan's trick
is to lay bare his desire, to show his prick and 'let
the girls know he wants them,68, whereas the honour-
able philosopher cannot reveal his sexualised rela-
tion to his audience. The phallocentric order demands
impassivity and that the law, rather than desire,
issue from the paternal, philosopher's position.
Thus, as seen in chapter two, phallocen-
trism and the polemic, the idea of serious, earnest
and terminable debate, 'are masculine, upright, mat-
ters' while the prick and the idea of philosophy as
housework, as something that must be returned to ag-
ain and again, 'in some crazy way is feminine,69.
And Lacan, who taunts and insults his audience, who
does not 'play by the rules', escapes the polite,
paternal and non-sexualised role ascribed the philo-
sopher and obviously enjoys his teasing. It is 'the
evidence of the pleasure' that undermines the rigid
authority of the paternal position.
It is at this point, and via their
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relations to Freud, that Lacan is confronted with
Irigaray. Where Lacan suggests that Freud's success
with his hysterics was due to the 'attentive court'
he paid them, Irigaray suggests that 'it would be
too risky ••• to admit that the father could be a
seducer' but that this risk is avoided by the 'cloak
of the law with which he covers his desire and his
sex organ'?O. That is, where Freud pays attentive
court to his hysterical patients, where he manages
to unveil at least a part of his sexualised relation
to them and thereby achieve some success with the
girls, Lacan 'gets all the girls because ••• he un-
veils his desire,?l.
As Gallop says, 'in Lacan's writing,
the Name-of-the-Father is the Law,72. And, if the
Name-of-the Father is phallocentric law, designed to
curtail speculation as to the identity of the father
and the paternity of the child, 'thenthe father's
prick is the derision of his name,?3, reminding us
of 'the extra-legal beginnings of the child,74. So,
if the risk of suggesting that the father could be a
seducer is avoided by 'the cloak of the law with
which he covers his desire', and if Lacan manages to
show his prick, then 'the enquiry into Freud's phallo-
centric cloak reveals Lacan's prick,75.
In this way, then, for Irigaray to ref-
use to mention Lacan's name in her essa~ "La 'mech-
anique' des fluides" 'is to refuse to read him as
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L . ,76aw-g1ver • It is not to read him as being in a
paternal position, the identity of which is guarran-
teed by law. It is rather to read him as a body, in
a position of desire and 'open to intercourse'??
Into Lacan's textual body, then, she weaves her own
sinuous text and, where Lacan declares that 'woman
does not exist', where the honourable and solid sys-
tem of philosophical discursivity cannot account for
woman 'because it demands the solid, the identical,
to the exclusion of the fluid', she declares that
'the woman creature does speak' but that 'it speaks
"fluid"'.
On Gallop's account, this 'fluid' speech
is not presented by Irigaray as the simple opposite
of the solid: Irigaray would rather study the fluid
as having a mechanics of its own. But at the same
time, the fluid 'resists any attempt at static iden-
tification,78. However, Lacan the man threatens to
envelope Lacan the prick and, according to Irigaray,
it is precisely the failure of desire, noted above,
that poses this threat. Lacan's theory of the objet
! signals the return of a protective rigidity to the
unprincipled teasing of his feminism.
As noted above, the relation to the
Other (Autre) fails. Phallic enjoyment, as an attempt
at sexual relations, fails and 'in the place of the
Woman ••• is the objet a,79. Thus Lacsn's desire,
(both in his theory of desire and in his desire to
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be with the women, the ladies' man), fails to reach
the women and 'short circuits' itself by fixing it-
self onto an object. Fluid desire is reduced or do-
mesticated by fixing itself onto the objet a, a sol-
id, identifiable object. As Gallop puts it, 'the
relation to the Other fails whereas the relation to
the object works: so the object! allows for a mech-
i th t d ib .t k' ,80an cs a escr es 1 s wor lngs • And it is Ir-
igaray's task to stir the fluid that is to be found
around Lacan the prick in order to drown Lacan the
man ~ho, in his account of the objet a, 'clings pre-
cariously to the solid system,8l.
The final section of the essay connects
all these themes with the idea of woman as truth,
using Lacan's television appearance in the year of
l'Arc 58's appearance. Lacan apparently avoided any
'man to man' confrontation over the very questions
that he had himself commanded. Arrogant and imperi-
ous, he begins by saying 'I always speak the truth:
not the whole truth [pas toute] because one does not
succeed in speaking the whole truth,82. Such a per-
formance, Gallop suggests, is 'the ultimate in fem-
ininity,83.
It is the ultimate in femininity because
on Lacan's account, 'truth is already a woman by not
being the whole truth [de n'etre pas toute~ not
wholly to be said [pas toute a se dir~ in any case,84.
The truth is not wholly to be said, it is not
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reducible to a stable and unitary structure that
could be guaranteed by laws because it escapes,
like lacan, from the phallic structure of objects
that can be identified. Thus that which is not true
in the sense that philosophers understand, as can
be guarranteed by laws, the truth of objects, is
not true or a lie from the position of the man.
And thus Irigaray says that 'Woman never speaks par-
!i! [similar, like, equa~. What she emits is
flowing [fluent], fluctuating. Cheating [flouan~.'
She is attempting, still, to stir up the current,
flowing/lying that is truth/feminine in lacan the
ladies' man8S•
Economy
The concerns of Gallop's book generally
are those of this essay: identity, difference/oppo-
sition and economy. As she says, the 'question of
identity poses itself in various fashions throughout
the book,86 and the 'problem of dealing with differ-
ence without constituting an opposition may just be
~hat feminism is all about,8? Similarly, the no-
tion of economy, of centric and ~excentric' moments
of economy, is to be found at numerous points in her
analyses88•
Moreover, where both psychoanalysis and
feminism would want to question 'a rigid identity
that cramps and binds' they alao want to produce a
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new identity. Gallop holds 'the Lacanian view',
however, that any form of identity, any attempt to
give an identity to the subject of either feminism
or psychoanalysis, 'will necessarily be alien and
t .. ,90cons ra1n1ng • This is not to say that identity
can or must be escaped from: 'that would only lead
to another form of paralysis - the oceanic passi-
vity of undifferentiation,9l.
Thus difference, which produces great
anxiety92, must be dealt with in such a way that it
is not domesticated through being reduced to polar
oppositions between two representable identities.
Nor must it be allowed to degenerate into the ocean-
ic undifferentiation noted above. Rather, 'identity
must be continually assumed and called into question,93.
This, for Gallop, entails paying close attention to
specific differences between texts and authors:
their differences, like those between psychoanalysis
and feminism, are productive. So the results of the
confrontations between different texts, authors or
fields in Feminism and Psychoanalysis 'is not a mys-
tical fusion obliterating all difference and conflict,
but a provocative contact which opens each to what is
not encompassed by the limits of its identity,94.
Although, as Gallop says, with regard
to Lacan, 'it is too eloquent, too comfortable, too
complicitous with philosophical mastery' simply to
claim that anyone is Phallocentric", this section
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will attempt to illustrate the tension between ec-
centric and centric economy in the works of Gallop
and Lacan. That is, although there are moments of
what has thus far been termed ec- centric and hence
feminist economy in Gallop's work, those moments do
not always or necessarily coincide with what she
terms feminist.
In the essay that precedes "The ladies'
man", Gallop hints at what this essay is trying to
establish: 'it may be that "centric" of any sort is
al~ays phallic,96. Exploiting the fact that both
'centric' and 'to prick' derive from the Greek ~-
trein, she suggests that 'centric' is simply short-
hand for phallocentric, that centric economy is, in
a vulgar sense and as this essay has argued, the
masculine concern. This section will attempt to
show that and how, although there are moments of ec-
centric economy, non-vulgarly feminist economy. in
Gallop's and Irigaray's readings of Lacan, those mo-
ments exist in a relation to vulgarly masculine mo-
ments. That is, Lacan's prick is not necessarily
feminine in a non-vulgar sense - rather it is some-
thing like the reverse of traditional, masculine val-
ues.
Two instances in particular which might
be used to illustrate ho~ Gallop's and Irigaray's
readings of Lacan approach what this essay has called
feminine economy include Gallop's portrayal of Lacan
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as both 'resented by and attractive to women,9? and
Irigaray's attempt to designate and study the fluid
as having a 'mechanics of its own,98 - as rendering
problematic the distinction between the solid and
the fluid.
Lacan the prick is resented for his high-
handed disregard for others99, for his abuse of phal-
locentric po~er which involves flaunting that power.
And he is attractive because he manages to let the
girls know that he wants themlOO, because he shows
himself in a position of desire to them. Thus Lacan
the prick is in some way undecidable with regard to
the opposition seducer/father. He is at once in a
position of authority and of pleasure seeker, each of
which is supposed, on the phallocentric register, to
be exclusive of the other. So, Lacan as cock of the
walk and even as ladies' man combine in some way to
produce the undecidable Lacan the prick.
Similarly with regard to Irigaray's at-
tempt to drown Lacan the man, who clings to the sys-
tem of solids that phallocentric Western science has
privileged over the feminine fluid. Irigaray does
not simply designate the fluid as the other of the
solid, as if it were a simple opposition. Rather,
and as if to obscure the distinction between the two,
to present the fluid as a moment of the solid, she
would study that fluid as having a mechanics of its
own.
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However, having said that, this section
must show that Lacan's femininity, Lacan as prick, is
not the saving moment that Gallop and Irigaray appear
to think it is. This account of the tension in their
readings will differ from their own in that they are
saying that Lacan is truly feminine or the 'ultimate
in femininity,lOl at some points but not at others.
This account will suggest that he is often not even
truly feminine, (whatever that would be), at the very
moments they say he is. It will suggest, then, that
the femininity that is privileged in his and their
discourse is, apart from the aspects noted above, pro-
duced in phallocentric economy and ultimately a form
of vulgar femininity, a reversal of the feminine iden-
tity that non-vulgar feminists would object to.
Briefly, almost algebraically, then, the
phallocentric law would veil the father's phallus,
preventing the view of him as seducer and Lacan's un-
veiling of his desire would, in Gallop's opinion,
'feminize' himl02. In terms of what has been presen-
ted so far as ec- centric economy, it would have to
be said that a veil passes between the term, (the fa-
ther or the prick/seducer), and itself. That is, the
sort of femininity that is supposed to fall to the
prick is but a reversal (or the opposite pole) of the
masculinity of the man's man. This sort of femininity
in a man is no less a traditional categosry of sexual
relation than that of the man's man, something evinced
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in the familiarity of the phrase, the ladies' man.
That the position of the ladies' man is
but a reversal of, and no less traditional than, that
of the man's man may be seen if the idea of the un-
veiling of the phallus is considered. Lacan says
that the phallus works, it can play its role, only
~hen veiledl03 and his appearing in a sexualised and
desiring relation to the women around him is supposed
104to unveil that phallus, to 'spoil its game' •
There are at least two problems involved in these
claims.
The first is that the practice of unveil-
ing the phallus, of blatantly appearing in a sexual-
ised position, is but a reversal of the phallic, man's
man's stance of non-desirous, paternal authority.
The second problem appears from an anti-Oedipal point
of view. It would be that the supposedly paternal
position, that of non-dangerous, non-seductive author-
ity, is itself already a position of desire; that it
is already a desiring machine - the father-machine.
Thirdly, these problems together raise the possibility
of asking whether it is not the case that, rather
than reversing the position of the two moments, des-
iring for non-desiring, a strategy of showing the
work of an-Oedipal desire in the position of the fath-
er would be more 'successful' as a 'feminist' strat-
egy.
The fourth question to be asked with
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regard to Lacan's supposedly feminist desiring and
sexualised relation to the women around him would be
'What sort of sexuality is it that he is flaunting,
irresistibly, in front of these women?'. That is,
as has been seen in chapter two, the decision as to
what is and what is not sexual, as opposed to the
political, the social and so on, is only made in,
or as a result of the reduction to, centric economy.
As noted above, then, before the reduction to centred
economy, there was no sexuality, it was not possible
to designate anything as properly sexual or non-sex-
ual as opposed to anything else. Its value in ec-
centric economy would be at once produced and dest-
royed.
The first and third problems raised here
permit another parallel with chapter two to be made.
It concerns the position of the woman as truth in
Lacan's system. His identification of the ~oman as
truth is, like the unveiling of the phallus to reveal
the feminised prick, a reversal of the exclusion of
woman from the realm of truth. On what might be con-
ceived as a positivist or empiricist account of truth,
truth is, as Heidegger says, some form of correspon-
dence with objects. Woman is, as Gallop notes, ex-
cluded from this realm as non-truth, and as Oerrida
notes, for lacking the penis and other phallomorphic
values. On a more Heideggerian plane, truth is that
which first gives objects; it cannot be an object
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itself and cannot consist in any correspondence to
objects.
Lacan's positing of woman as truth be-
longs to this latter section or moment - this form
of truth is not the phallomorphic truth of objects.
From the perspective of truth as truth of objects,
this form of truth is rather a form of lie - the ab-
sence of objects. Similarly, woman is, as the absence
of phallomorphic values and lacking the penis, rep-
resented in Lacan's system as 'already' being the
truth. Woman is represented as the more primordial
truth that is later veiled and presented in virile
economy as the truth of objects.
On both accounts of truth or ~oman or
woman/truth, however, both are presented as decidable:
each has a stable identity. On the Nietzschean/Der-
ridean version, however, the value and identity of
both would be that of the undecidable - both would
be at once produced and destroyed in ec- centric eco-
nomy. This illustrates that Lacan operates a reversal
rather than a reversal 'followed by' displacement in
the matter of economy and female sexuality.
That is, where phallocentric economy rep-
resents the feminine as excluded from the privileged
relation to truth, which is the masculine preserve,
to be won by means of the earnestness and the other
virile values that Gallop notes, Lacan privileges
woman with regard to the truth by means of a
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reversal of the conception of truth. Where once the
phallus and the stable identity of solid objects
were the object and the credentials of enquiry, now
the vagina, the lack of phallomorphic values and the
absence of stable objects, is privileged. So, the
vagina and female sexuality are still conceived as
lack, as the hole that is not Whole or One, but now
it is privileged.
As such, the femininity that Lacan at-
tempts to take on in Gallop's version of his antics
is not a revolutionary or transgressive femininity.
It is, rather, a reversal of the femininity that has
been produced in the economy that both, presumably,
are trying to critique or transgress. And this is
the result of Gallop's position on identity, differ-
ence and opposition, on economy. She says that the
basic project of the book is dialectical - it is to
open each position to the difference that is not en-
compassed by that position's identityl05.
Such a dialectic is necessarily 'recu-
perative', to use Gallop's own word. It cannot ac-
count for that which is irreducible to any identity,
but must provide some means of encompassing that ex-
cess. Thus this section claims to have illustrated
the tension between centric economy and ec- centric
economy in Gallop's reading of Lacan. They were
seen to exist in a tension and that tension was seen
to be reduced by Gallop's recuperative dialectic.
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Conclusion
Thus this chapter claims to have shown
how economy works 'in practice' or in a more 'con-
crete' example than had been presented before.
Although there were seen to be moments of ec- centric
economy in Freud's work, it was also seen that cen-
tric, phallocentric economy ultimately mastered that
ec- centricity to effect the production of the value
and identity of female sexuality in terms of a rela-
tion to the penis and phallomorphic values. Sexual
difference in Freud's work was shown to be ordered
by the relation to the penis.
In the case of Gallop's reading of Lacan,
the same tension was found. Despite moments of ec-
centricity and hence non-vulgar femininity, centric
economy was seen to govern the production of Gallop's
version of Lacan's femininity in that it existed as
a reversal of traditional masculinity.
In addition to relating back to the ear-
lier chapters on identity, difference and opposition,
this chapter has also made reference to possible fem-
inist strategies. In the next chapter, these strat-
egies will be comprehensively accounted for. The
various forms of supposedly feminist or transgressive
practice will be seen to reduce to three basic forms
and their respective and relative chances of avoiding
'domestication' will be evaluated.
CHAPTER NINE
STRATEGY
So far, then, the notion of economy, of
the production and legitimation of meaning and iden-
tity, has been explicated as a matter of a relation-
ship between identity, difference and opposition.
Chapter two argued that that relationship was a mat-
ter for feminism and subsequent chapters have aluci-
dated the possibility of feminism via readings of
Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche and Adorno on dialectics,
a thought that is also the thought of a relationship
between identity, difference and some form of opposi-
tion. In chapters five, six and seven, it was seen
that Nietzsche was decisive for Derrida, Foucault,
Deleuze and Guattari in the matter of feminism. His
antics at the limits of thought and language provided
an instance, and for the possibility, of feminism as
it manifested itself at these limits.
That is, if, as was argued, traditional
or vulgar masculinity was associated with the values
of self-identity and self-presence that were found
to be privileged in centred economy, then a discourse
or practice that opposed those values on the one hand
and that economy on the other was a non-vulgar femin-
ism. It was non-vulgar because it did not oppose,
and was not different to, masculinity and phallocen-
trism in the ways that difference and opposition were
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organised in centric economy. Nietzsche's feminism
was thus a non-vulgar feminism in that it ~as non-
reactive, it did not oppose itself as self-identical
to another self-identity. Rather, it attempted to
chart the constitutive and subversive investments
of forces in the ec- centric economy of will to po-
wer. Ec- centric economy, that is, was non-vulgar-
ly feminine in that it both constituted and subver·
ted the organisation and values of centric economy.
that ~hich had traditionally been associated or sol-
idary with vulgar masculine concerns.
Having shown how Heidegger and Adorno
related to ec- centric economy, the work of Derrida,
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari was seen to consti-
tute instances of non-vulgar feminism in that they,
too, sought to account for that which bbth produced
and destroyed the identity of the terms of centric
economy. While Derrida may be said to have accoun-
ted for the work of identity in economy per se,
Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari provided the analyses
of the role of identity in power and desire, thus
complementing and completing the account of economics.
Thus, having shown how feminism engages
with the limits of thought and language and having
referred at various points throughout the essay to
the question of the strategies or tactics that these
thinkers employ to deal with metaphysical or centred
economy, this chapter will provide a systematic and
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exhaustive account of those strategies. The task
will be accomplished through using the multiplicity
of more or less vulgar feminisms as a guide, (for
it is to be expected that feminisms as they are
found at present will, by definition, propose them-
selves as critical or transgressive of all manifes-
tations of the masculine concern). The account will
be systematic insofar as that multiplicity will be
seen to reduce to three a priori forms of transgres-
sion that are presented by the nature of economy,
power and desire. And it will be exhaustive in that
every concrete instance of a feminism may be seen to
reduce to one or more of those basic forms of resis-
tance.
Before defending these latter claims in
more detail, two related questions must be dealt with.
They may both be described as being concerned with
the centre or transcendental signified of the economy
of which this text is itself a part and which operates
within this text. The first question is highlighted
by this chapter in particular: the concern with strat-
egy brings into relief the question of the point of
such economic analyses. Thus, the first question may
be formulated as 'Why bother to critically oppose
metaphysical or centred economy?'.
The second question concerns any possible
answer that might be given to the first. That is,
any answer to the first question would provide a
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reason for such activity, in the form of a telos,
for example. And, on the grounds of the analyses
proposed in the preceding chapters, such a reason or
telos would constitute a centre, a privileged term
in which relation to which the whole work would be
said to make sense, to have the meaning and identity
that it has.
With respect to the first question, it
need hardly be said that the matters of economy are
matters of identity, status, value or rank and, as
such, are applicable to matters of human identity,
status, value or rank. That is, phallocentric eco-
nomy, the vulgarly masculine concern, orders and reg-
ulates the identity and relative rank or value of
all other terms, (be they women and 'female' values,
as in this case, or any other supplementary term),
by means of the relation to the penis or phallomor-
phic values. Phallocentric economy involves the
privileging of one term or value and one group who
are associated with that term or value over other
terms or values and groups assosiated with those
terms. It also involves the occlusion of the ori-
gins of that privileged position in such a way that
even the question as to how that term came to be so
privileged is forgotten.
Thus, one term is privileged and held
to be the source of value, meaning or identity and the
or 9~Owps
grouPLassociated or solidary with it are privileged
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over those who are not so associated with it. This
latter group, as in the case of women, noted in the
previous chapter, is considered to be of supplemen-
tary value and subjected to various operations that
represent that lack of value or status. This state
of affairs is commonly referred to in a number of
ways, as injustice, imperialism or barbarity, for
example.
However, as suggested, the second ques-
tion immediately becomes relevant. It may be sugges-
ted that, if this is the case, then this essay is
proposing a critique of all forms of justice in order
to set up some quasi-Platonic metaphysic of The Just.
That is, this text is concerned to ascertain the
conditions for a practice that will be critical and
transgressive of a set of economic operations which
are commonly and generically referred to as injust-
ice. Is there not at work some ideal of The Just
that functions as centre and thus opens the text to
precisely the objections that it is supposed to be
making?
An example of a text to which such an
objection may be directed would be Ryan's Marxism and
Deconstruction. In this book, Ryan seems to favour
a state that Nietzsche might have referred to as the
lamb's dream of the end of dominationl• Despite his
proclamations to the effect that a 'deconstructive
socialism' would be plural, open-ended, multiple and
so on, his promise that it would refuse, defuse, undo
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or generally put an end to 'all forms of micro- and
macro- domination,2 seems only to work on the basis
of some quasi-Platonic notion of the Good and Just
life. There is more, that is, to Derrida's strat-
egy without a telos3 and to Foucault's rejection of
the Soul of Revolt4 than a bourgeois-liberal plural-
ity of resistances. This chapter proposes to illus-
trate what more there is.
Just as housework, in a vulgar sense,
is not undertaken in order to abolish dirt, so the
critique of centred economy is not undertaken in or-
der to abolish metaphysics. Rather, and as Oerrida
points out, the centreless economy represents the
unthinkable itself5 and there is no sense in doing
without the elements, the logic, syntax and concepts
of metaphysics in order to deal with metaphysics6•
Thus, if the centre is necessary to thought itself,
the critique of centred economy must involve dealing
with that centre, (getting one's hands dirty, as it
were), and recognising that the task is never fin-
ished as long as there is thought. The non-vulgarly
feminist critique of phallocentric economy, like the
supposedly inferior tasks of women in housework,
must be a constant and critical vigil?
The idea of there being a telos to strat-
egy is therefore part of centred economy. Within
ec- centric economy, that is, there can be no telos,
since that would operate as transcendental signified
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which governed the value of all the other elements.
Only in centred economy is the telos given any cred-
ibility. This credibility or legitimacy can always
be shown to be based upon the occlusion of its ori-
gins in ec- centric economy_ The role and position
of a telos as transcendental signified of centred
economy may always be deconstructed to show its ori-
gins in the relations to all other terms. Thus the
task of 'opposing' metaphysics, as non-vulgar house-
work, as economics, decrees that there can be no
telos in any simple sense.
Strictly and simply, then, there can be
no telos in the sense of a Platonic/Hegelian final,
'clean' state to be arrived at. Such a notion is
itself constitutive of centric economy and perpet-
uates the situation which is ostensibly being opposed.
It does this in the same way as the occlusion of val-
ues in ec- centric economy perpetuates, in that very
occlusion, centric economy. That is, as to account
for power in terms of the juridico-discursive model
is to preserve and maintain the role and rule of that
power, so to account for strategy in terms of a telos
is to preserve and maintain the role and rule of cen-
tric economy.
These statements may be taken as a sort
of deconstructive version of Hegel's advice to the
effect that there is little to be gained from
attacking and defeating one's enemies at a place from
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which they are absent. Where value is 'originally'
both produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy,
opposition to centric economy must use that economy
in order to work with those forces in ec- centric
economy. And where, on the level of power, power
operates 'originally' in the micro-practices in which
sovereign power occludes itself, resistance to that
power must take the form of micro-resistance, the
'pleb', at the places where sovereign power is, pre-
cisely, produced and destroyed.
So, what has been presented as a 'vul-
gar' feminism will ascribe some stable, calculable
value to a telos, arguing that a particular task is
properly feminist, appropriate to and sufficient for
the task of opposing phallocentrism. And what has
been presented as a 'non-vulgar feminism' will recog-
nise that the value of any strategy is at once pro-
duced and destroyed in ec- centric economy, arguing
that ideas of 'the appropriate' and simple 'suffic-
iency' are themselves ideas the meaning of which
is produced only within centric economy_
However, it is also the case that the
value of a telos as undecidable, as both produced,
and destroyed in ec- centric economy, simultaneous-
ly allows and disqualifies this vulgar/non-vulgar
distinction. That is, as ec- centric economy can-
not be simply opposed to centric economy, so non-
vulgar feminism cannot be simply opposed to vulgar
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feminism. The difference between them is not the
difference of centred economy but rather that of
ec- centric economy and as such ec- centric economy
exists as the forgotten or occluded differance of
centric economy.
Thus non-vulgar feminism may be said
to exist as the occluded differance of vulgar femin-
ism which would ultimately subvert or postpone the
aims of vulgar feminism. Consequently, while the
aims of, and tasks undertaken by, both vulgar and
non-vulgar feminisms may be 'the same', non-vulgar
feminism recognises the 'fact' that the value of
those aims and tasks is at once produced and dest-
royed in ec- centric economy. While of local and,
precisely, strategic, value, they are eventually
undecidable. In that they are undecidable, non-
vulgar feminism refuses to allow itself to be ap-
propriated by that which it attempts to critique or
transgress by deconstructing the very values it em-
plOys in that critique.
Therefore, the tasks involved in the
critique of phallocentric economy must be performed
again and again, (there is no end to the process),
and entail getting one's hands dirty, (the centre-
less economy cannot be thought). This chapter will
account for the various ways of attempting to critic-
ally oppose and differentiate oneself from the pro-
duction of value in phallocentric economy in such a
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way that one's position is not unproblematically
appropriated by that economy. It will account for
the possibility of feminism by evaluating the chan-
ces that those various attempts have of transgressing
phallocentric economy.
Strategies and feminisms
It was claimed above that, given the
nature of economy, power and desire, there followed
a priori three basic forms of strategy that might be
used in the attempt to critique the production of
value in phallocentric economy. Within each of these
basic forms there are any number of positions that
might be adopted but which will not necessarily be
dealt with here. And between all three there are,
presumably, as many positions to be adopted as there
are feminists to adopt them. Moreover, rarely, if
ever, are these positions encountered in a pure forffi.
It is the case that in actual examples of feminist
strategy, elements from one form are to be found
alongside, even contradicting, in some cases, ele-
ments from another form of feminism.
However, it will be seen that it is pre-
cisely the treatment afforded that difference, wheth-
er it is termed contradiction or differ!nce, for ex-
ample, which at once allows and precludes the attempt
to either unify or distinguish vulgar and non-vulgar
feminisms. 'Non-vulgar' feminism must partake of
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Some 'vulgar' feminist practices since the centre-
less economy cannot be thought. But, since the val-
ue or meaning of those practices is at once produced
and destroyed in ec- centric economy, they cannot be
taken over in any simple fashion. Thus the between
of 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism is not differ-
ence, (opposition or contradiction, governed by a
non-differential value, the centre), but differ~nce,
the differential production and destruction of value
which would likewise produce and destroy any value
held to so govern difference.
The three basic forms that opposition
to phallocentric economy may take are as follows:
a) Reversal
i) The privileging of the hitherto
supplementary term on the basis of its possessing
the value that metaphysics ascribes to it.
ii) The privileging of the hitherto
supplementary term on the basis of the claim that it
is of the same value as the term that is originally
privileged in phallocentric economy.
b) Refusal
i) The refusal of all centred economy
and the relations of power and desire that are to be
found there on the basis that all are equally phallo-
centric.
ii) The refusal of the particular cen-
tric economy and the relations of power and desire
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found there on the grounds that it is phallocentric
and that alternative economy and relations exist.
c) Deconstruction
i) The deconstruction of centred eco-
nomies such that there is no longer any centre from
which other values are said to derive; the elucida-
tion of the undecidable. The identification of the
relations of power and desire upon which rest the
appearance and experience of sovereign power and the
desire that is in relation to it: again, the identi-
fication of the production and destruction of states
of power and desire.
Reversal
i) Where centric economy organises dif-
ference into hierarchy, this strategy involves the
reversing of the privilege accorded one of the terms
of that hierarchy •. That is, the privilege that was
accorded the term which was solidary with the value
of the centre is now accorded the term that was con-
sidered supplementary. The justification for this
move is that the properties assigned to the supple-
mentary term and held to justify its status are at
least as valuable as those held to justify the status
of the superior term. Such a strategy would, then,
privilege the hitherto supplementary term on the
basis of its being all the things that had been held
to justify the superior term's superiority.
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With regard to power and desire, this
strategy would support the institution of such rela-
tions as were held to be proper to the supplementary
term within the centred economy. Such a strategy
would argue that, if a certain form of power/desire
had been considered proper to the supplementary
term, then that form should be universalised to all
terms.
Thus, for example, Leghorn and Parker,
exploring what they call 'the economy of the world
of women', make a list of some of the characteristics
that women have traditionally been supposed to pos-
sessS. This list of the properties that phallocen~
tric society has ascribed to women also includes
ideas as to the sort of power relations that are sup-
posed to be appropriate to women and is to be used
as a guide 'in exploring the notion of a wo~an's
culture,9.
From this list, one learns that, among
other things, women are 'creators of life, nurturing
and caring ••• clever at making something out of
nothing ••• ~andJ getting round barriers erected to
keep them back,lO. These are some of the values
which, on this form of feminist strategy, are to be
privileged to provide the centre of a female value
based economy. They are those which had previously
been supposed to justify women's supplementary
status within the phallocentric economy that is being
contested.
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The sort of power relations to be insti-
tuted within this female value based economy are also
hinted at. They will involve the capacity to 'get
round barriers' and they will be 'indirect,ll. Such
a notion of power 'does not imply co-ercion', but
'has more to do with creativity and co-operation,l2.
Again, such a conception of the operation of power is
that which was considered appropriate to women within
the original economy: this sort of reversal is con-
cerned to valorise and universalise it above the sort
of power relation that was supposed to be appropriate
to men.
Elements of the same strategy may also
be found in the work of Duras and Chawaf. Duras con-
siders women to have been associated with darkness
and obscurity in phallocentric economy: 'women have
been in darkness for centuries', she says, and 'women
have never known what they were,13. In the face of
this, she advises 'making darkness the point of dep-
arture for jUdging what men call light' and making
'obscurity the point of departure for judging what
men call clarity'. That is, those things that women
have been associated with or deemed to be in phallo-
centric economy are now to be made 'the point of dep-
arture' for a new female economy - they are to form
the origin or transcendental signified of that eco-
nomy.
Similarly, Chawaf considers that
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phallocentrism, in the guise of 'Classicism and
rationalism', has repressed the sensual, 'sensorial'
14and corporeal aspects of language • Women, then,
have been associated with these long repressed mater-
ial aspects, 'material language corresponds to our
historical place', and have been similarlY repressed.
The form that opposition is to take, according to
Chawaf, is that of a feminine language which is 'in
touch,lS with those hitherto repressed aspects and
which will 'disintellectualise' writing, bringing it
back to an appreciation of the organic life of the
word.
However, in view of the nature of eco-
nomy, power and desire, it may be said that this form
of strategy is hardly a form of opposition to meta-
physics at all. Metaphysics involves centred eco-
nomy, the production of stable value and identity by
means of the relation to the centre and the positing
of properties by which supplementarity is justified:
this form of strategy affects neither.
Moreover, the values on the basis of
which the supplementary term is now to be privileged
are precisely those which were originally laid down
or ascribed by the economy this strategy should be
critiquinQ. Were it not a thoroughly metaphysical
distinction, it could be said that this sort of fem-
inism challenges neither the form nor the content of
centric economy since it retains the idea of centred
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economy, (with the resulting positions of supple-
mentarity and so on), and since the values it pro-
poses to make the centre of the alternative economy
are only those which had been held to be of supple-
mentary value in the_original economy.
Similarly with regard to power and
desire. To advocate the universalisation of the
sorts of power and desire that had been deemed to
be proper to women in the original phallocentric
economy transforms neither the meaning nor the value
of power and desire. It is not considered, for exam-
ple, whether it is not something that is only valu-
able or desirable in phallocentric econo~y to desire
power at all. Nor does this strategy consider where
the particular versions of power and desire that had
been supposed to be proper to women have come from.
Those positions and relations of power and desire
that phallocentric economy had ascribed as proper
are simply taken over and privileged.
Secondly, the attempt to abandon one
form of power relations in favour of another is un-
likely to be in any way transgressive if it is the
case that both of these forms are based upon a ser-
ies of micro-practices that remain unaffected. That
is, if it is the case that, rather than areas of
concern being areas in which power is exercised, they
are themselves only produced through the operations
of power, then the attempt to challenge the ways
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in which power is exercised upon those areas will
do little to transform the micro-practices upon
which their existence depends.
ii) On the other hand, the second form
of reversalist strategy would involve the privil-
eging of the hitherto supplementary term on the
grounds that it actually possessed the character is-
tics that were held to justify the superior term's
or group's status. That is, this form of strategy
would attempt to show that the supposedly inferior
term ought to be equally privileged because it was
all the things, because it has all the properties,
which it had been held to lack and in lacking them
was supposed to be inferior.
On the issue of power and desire, this
sort of opposition to metaphysics would support the
insertion of the hitherto supplementary term into
.the positions and relations from which it had been
excluded in phallocentric economy. Thus, where
particular forms of power and desire had obtained
in phallocentric economy and where the supplementary
term had been excluded from those positions and
relations, this strategy would advocate the insert-
ion of the secondary term into those positions and
relations.
A version of this second form of rever-
salist strategy may be seen in what Kristeva summar-
ises as 'the political demands of women, the
317
struggles for equal pay for equal work, for taking
power in social institutions on an equal footing
as men and the rejection, where necessary, of the
attributes traditionally considered feminine or mat-
ernal,16. That is, this strategy consists in the
attempt to demonstrate that women are all the things
that men are supposed to be and de~ands their inser-
tion into positions and relations of worth and power
that had traditionally been denied them. It also
involves the acknowledgement that women, no less
than men, are in relation, via those positions and
relations, to the transcendental signified of phallo-
morphic values.
Thus, where in phallocentric society,
the attributes of aggression, competitiveness and
emotional distance, for examplel7, are privileged
and held to be the appropriate qualities for those
who would be in powerful and important positions, and
where men were held to be particularly well-fitted
for these positions, this strategy would attempt to
demonstrate that women were also competitive and so
on. It would attempt to show, then, that women were
'the same as men' and support the insertion of women
into those positions that had been held to be import-
ant on the grounds that women, too, could wield
power.
Similarly with regard to desire, this
strategy would assert that, within a phallocentric
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economy, female desire has been repressed and repres-
ented as something other than what it in fact is. It
would assert, that is, that female desire was, or
could be, the same as male desire. So, if the male
form of desire involved violence, passion and posses-
sion, for example, then this form of feminism would
demand the recognition that female desire also invol-
ved these things.
However, like the first, this second
form of reversalist strategy admits of the objection
that it, too, operates wholly in terms of the origin-
al economy that is supposedly being opposed. To pri-
vilege the hitherto supplementary term on the grounds
that it possessed the properties previously denied it
affects neither the idea of centred economy nor the
properties ascribed by that economy. This strategy
simply shows that the supplementary term is of the
same nature, the same metaphysically produced nature,
as the superior term: it deals with neither the prod-
uction of the value of the centre nor the nature of
centred economy.
With regard to power, this strategy
appears to be misguided on at least two counts. First,
in proposing that women be placed in positions and
relations from which they had previously been ex-
cluded, it seems to assume that power is originally
something that can be possessed and transfered.
Foucault's account of power, as it was presented above,
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would suggest that this is not the case and that this
strategy, in itself, will do little to transform the
practices upon which the positions of men depend as
conditions of possibility. And second, this strategy
does not consider whether it is not something that is
only desirable and valuable in phallocentric economy
to be in positions of power. It does not consider,
that is, whether it is a 'good thing' to be in posi-
tions of power in the first place or whether it is
not something the value of which has been produced
as desirable within phallocentric economy.
Refusal
i) On the matter of economy, this first
form of refusal would consist in the attempt to re-
ject or step outside of all centrisms on the grounds
that all are inherently phallocentric, based as they
are on the privilege of self-present, self-identical
values. That is, where it has been seen that the pri-
vileging of identity is the masculine concern, this
form of feminism would attempt to refuse all instances
of centric economy since they all privilege the value
of identity. Such a strategy would support all at-
tempts at resisting the ascription of properties to
both supplementary and superior terms and would re-
ject the notion of the production of value by means
of a self-identical value.
With regard to power, this strategy
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would reject or refuse all manifestations of the
possession and exercise of power on the grounds that
all such practices were phallocentric. This strat-
egy would aim at the destruction of power, at the
absence of power relations between, and the non-pos-
session of power by, all elements within economy.
Similarly with regard to desire, it would be argued
that to desire something was a thing that was only
done in phallocentric economy and that a properly
feminist thing to do would be to absent oneself from
all positions and relations of desire.
Such a form of refusal may also take the
form of rejecting all forms of philosophical or theor-
etical discourse. Philosophy and theoretical dis-
course being notoriously based on the privileging of
identity and self-presence, those discourses would
be seen as instances of phallocentric economy and re-
jected as such. The example used above in chapter
one, concerning the feminists who interrupted from
the floor at the 1975 Week of Marxist Thought, may be
used to illustrate such a strategy. ;Clement reports
that the supposedly reasoned speeches from the stage
were disrupted by 'shouts, mimicking, gestures and •••
piercing cries of "Hey, Hey",lB.
She explains that the feminists who in-
terrupted thus considered articulated speech and
theoretical discourse to be phallocentric. They would,
presumably, have argued that 'language is always
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masculine', since in order for it to make sense, it
must be governed by a centre or transcendental signi-
fied. Thus those feminists were only 'allowed'
shouted speech and 'could not use thought to help
free themselves,l9 and other women from inclusion and
repression within phallocentric economy.
An example of the feminist attempt to
escape all manifestations of power may be found in
some of deEaubonne's work. On her account, it appears
that all power is in male hands and that all exercise
of power is a male thing to do. This is because, at
an early stage of civilisation, men took possession
of the land, (and thus of productivity), and because
they have taken possession of women's bodies, (and
thus of reproduction)20. Consequently, a 'transfer
of power is urgently needed, then, as soon as possi-
ble, a destruction of power,2l. Indeed, the only way
'of saving the world today', man's abuse of power
having brought mankind to the brink of global ecolo-
gica1 disaster, 'is that of the great reversal •••
Not matriarchy, to be sure, nor "power to the women",
but the destruction of power by women,22.
w~
However, the questionLraised above as to
whether it was actually possible to step outside all
centred economy and, if so, whether it would be a
good thing to do so. If, as Derrida says, the centre-
less economy is unthinkable, and if thought is centred
economy then it would seem plausible to suppose that
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it would be impossible even to conceive what it would
be to refuse all centred economy, let alone communi-
cate one's findings having refused it. Moreover,
supposing that it was possible to refuse all centred
economy, that incommunicability would be likely to
condemn those who had accomplished it to even greater
marginality than they enjoyed before.
These objections might be compared with
Dews' support of Girard's comments on Anti-Oedipus.
The latter says that Anti-Oedipus has about as much
effect on our everyday lives as the discovery of a
'new layer of gas in the atmosphere of Venus'. The
point Dews makes is that Anti-Oedipus pays for its
radicality with 'an almost total vacuousness,23.
That is, the attempt to step outside all centred eco-
nomy, if it is possible at all, risks having no ef-
fect on that which it is supposed to combat.
Thus, even Clement's shouting feminists
manage to make use of some form of centred economy
dis
in order to make clear their/satisfaction with cent-
red economy. That they make clear this unhappiness
suggests that some form of centre is operative since
some form of centre is necessary for any thought.
~That Clement can explain their 'be a feminist and
shout' policy as 'an unchanged variant of "be beauti-
ful and keep your tongue",24 also indicates that the
practice is available to interpretation and thus that
it is produced in terms of a centric value.
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It is just as questionable whether it is
possible to step outside of all power relations,
whether it is possible to destroy power and relations
of power. It might be claimed that all positions and
relations of domination and dominated had been esca-
ped, but the question would arise as to where one
was having done that. The question would also arise
as to whether those relations constitutive of micro-
power had also been escaped. It might be claimed that
one was outside power, but Foucault's claim that one
is never outside power since it works to found sover-
eign power would cast doubt on such claims.
And, with regard to desire, it is also
unclear as to whether it is possible to be in a non-
desirous position. Oeleuze and Guattari have been
seen to claim that desire is not originally manifes-
ted on the level of subjectivity and lack, for example,
but that it exists as schizo-desire and in relation
to Foucault's micro-power. Hence, to say that all
positions of desire had been escaped would be to
leave oneself open to the claim that this desire that
is constitutive and subversive of the desire which is
experienced as subjective and lack, schizo-desire,
has not been escaped from.
ii) This second form of refusal, the
attempt to step outside of a particular economy, aims
at the institution of a specific alternative economy
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by means of which the first could be opposed. It
differs in this last respect from the first form of
reversal noted above in that it attempts to set up
an economy the centre of which is neither the value
which the original economy privileged nor the value
which was deemed to be supplementary. The centre of
the economy to be set up on this view is rather the
value that is specific to the hitherto supplementary
term but neither that which was privileged nor that
which was supplementary in the first economy.
With regard to power, this strategy
would attempt to replace the original and offensive
relations of power and desire with new ones. Again,
they would not be those which had been considered
proper to either the privileged or the supplementary
term but rather specific to women. And on the matter
of desire, the relations and positions that were to
be set up would not have figured in the original and
objectionable economy of desire but would reflect
some hitherto neglected aspects of feminine desire.
There are difficulties involved in des-
cribing this form of feminist strategy. It was noted
above with regard to the first form of reversal that
the work of Ouras and Chawaf could be criticised on
the grounds that it merely privileged those aspects
of femininity that had been considered of supplemen-
tary value. The problem, then, is that any feminism
which asserts itself to be creating a specifically
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fefYIifll-ne
Leconomy is always open to the charge of being cen-
tred, precisely, on those values that were held to
be of supplementary status and thus not a specific-
ally feminine economy at all.
However, the work of Duras and Chawaf,
along with the others who are concerned with the pos-
sibility of an ecriture feminine, may be described as
attempts at creating such an economy. Kristeva also
describes some of these sorts of feminists when she
speaks of those who are 'essentially interested in
the specificity of female psychology ••• ~nd seekiniJ
to give a language to the intra-subjective and cor-
poreal experiences left mute by culture in the past,25.
The same difficulties arise with regard
to the question of the specifically feminine relations
of power and desire. Those relations offered as spe-
cifically feminine are open to the objection that they
are only produced in phallocentric economy in the
first place. These difficulties may be taken as indi-
cative of at least one sense of Derrida's statement
to the effect that it is not a matter of opposing one
centre to another in the critique of centric economy.
Nevertheless, the concerns of 'psych and
po' with 'the lack of phallic dominance' in their in-
terview with Kristeva26 may be seen as a part of the
attempt to define specifically feminine power relations
that do not necessarily receive any value they have
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from their position within centric economy. And
the various lesbian/separatist groups may still
claim to be escaping the particular phallocentric
versions of desire to institute properly feminine
forms of desire.
The strategy admits of two objections.
It consists in the attempt to step outside of phal-
locentric economy and to set up some alternative
economy. This alternative economy will privilege
women, presumably, on the basis of the properties
they are held to possess but which are not those
which were ascribed in phallocentric economy. It
attempts, then, to centre an economy on some speci-
fically feminine values and oppose the original
economy.
As such, it does not challenge the idea
or practice of centred economy. An economy that has
specifically feminine values, whatever they would be,
as centre is no less a phallocentric economy in that
it is the rOle/rule of the centre that has been seen
to be the masculine concern. Kristeva comments on
these forms of feminism: they 'revive a kind of
naive romanticism, a belief in identity' that is the
reverse of phallocratism27• deBeauvoir objects ana-
logously; 'it would be a mistake to make of the fe-
male body a value and think that the feminine body
gives you a new vision of the world. It would be
ridiculous and absurd, like constructing a counter-
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Secondly, and like the first form of
refusal, this strategy runs the risk of condemning
women to positions of even greater marginality or
supplementarity. In a sense, the reception of some
French feminism, if not French thought generally, in
Anglo-phone countries may be said to illustrate this
situation. Jardine comments, in her introduction
to Kristeva's "Woman's Time" that many American fem-
inists will experience 'vertiginous and difficult'
problems with the text because it is written from
an unfamiliar tradition and attempts to articulate
unfamiliar problems29• That is, the alternative cen-
tre and the values it is held to generate may be
such that the 'dominant economy' can afford to ig-
nore them and thus that those values do not affect
it in any way_
Deconstruction
In a sense, the whole of the essay so
far has been an elaboration of this third form of
feminist strategy. It consists in the attempt to
chart the movements of ec- centric economy in what
is presented as centric economy_ It attempts to
show how the identities and values that are produced
in centric economy are based upon the mastering and
occlusion of ec- centric, non-vulgarly feminine eco-
nomy_
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In one sense, manifestations of this
sort of strategy are hard to find in that they seem
to admit of the objection that they simply take over
the economy that was considered proper to women in
the first place and then privilege it over what was
considered properly masculine. However, such a
strategy consists in the de- centring of centric
economy, in the ways in which Derrida, Foucault and
Deleuze and Guattari were seen to do above. It at-
tempts to render identity and property problematic
through the demonstration that what was thought to
be proper to the supplementary term and held to jus-
tify its inferior status was no less, and no more,
proper to the supposedly superior term. The second
stage consists in what Derrida has referred to as
the disruptive emergence of a third term which refu-
ses to settle into an identity. This third term is
thus held to defer the possibility of the normal-
ising and appropriating aufhebung that characterises
the third term found in dialectics.
Evidence of such a strategy, however,
may be found in the work of such feminists as Cixous,
Irigaray and Kristeva. Irigaray, for example, has
been concerned with the value or identity of female
sexuality as it has been produced in phallocentric
economy. She says 'female sexuality has always been
30theorised within masculine parameters' • It has
been organised in terms of the opposition '''virile''
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clitoral activity/"feminine" vaginal passivity'
and in relation to the penis and castration31•
As such, and as the title of the work
from which these comments are taken indicates, fe-
male sexuality is a sex 'which is not one'. That is,
female sexuality is not considered to be a proper or
genuine sexuality within these masculine limits: as
has been seen above, the clitoris, for example, is
not defined on its own terms, whatever they would be,
but rather as a small penis, as homologous to the
. 32pen~s •
Irigaray is keen to stress, though, fe-
male sexuality is (also) not one in another sense, in
the sense that it is 'always at least double ••• plu-
ral'. Female sexuality cannot be defined as a unity,
as a One, since it consists in at least two lips which
constantly touch and retouch each other in such a way
that it is impossible 'to distinguish exactly what
parts are touching each other,33. Irigaray can be
read as attempting to establish and emphasise the af-
finity between female sexuality and Derrida's dissem-
ination. Irigaray's version of female sexuality, like
Derrida's dissemination, 'mutilates the unity of the
signifier, that is, of the phallus,34.
So, there is no unity to female sexual-
ity, it is an irreducible plurality and resists
appropriation into phallocentric economy. This is
held to be the case not only on an anatomical level,
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as noted above, but also on the level of pleasure.
In addition to the vaginal caress, there are 'gent-
ly stroking the posterior wall of the vagina, light-
ly massaging the cervix etc', to 'evoke some of the
more specifically feminine pleasures' and to dis-
rupt the phallocentric economy of pleasure, which
operates in terms of active and passive principles
and is organised in terms of the telos of orgasm35•
Thus 'woman's pleasure ••• poses a problem for any
current economy in that all computations that attempt
to account for women's uncalculable pleasure are irre-
mediably doomed to fail'. This is because, like
schizo-desire, female sexuality 'diverts the linear-
ity of a project, undermines the target object of a
desire, explodes the polarisation onto only one pleas-
ure and disconcerts fidelity to only one discourse,36.
Thus, where phallocentrism 'mercilessly
represses the uncontrollable multiplicity of ambig-
uity, the disseminating play of writing, which irre-
d .bl t . 1 .,37 duc~ y ransgresses any unequ~voca mean1ng ,an
where a phallocentric economy produces identities by
means of the relation to a value which reduces differ-
ance, Irigaray posits a radical plurality, (which is
not, as Foss says, to be confused with the fashion-
able use of a casual epithet38). Property and iden-
tity are foreign to this plurality, as Irigaray says;
'property and propriety are undoubtedly quite foreign
to all that is female,39.
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On Irigaray's account, then, female sex-
uality is ec- centric economy which resists identifi-
cation and appropriation by phallocentric economy and
which disrupts and de- centres that economy. It does
this in such a way, moreover, that it cannot strictly
be said, as was said above, that 'female sexuality is
such and such a thing'. And, although there is no ex-
plicit mention in her text of a third term, it is claim-
ed that Irigaray's feminism may be seen as an example
of deconstructive feminism in that it attempts the
disconcerting of property and identity.
A general problem that has accompanied
both psychoanalysis and feminism in various forms may
be raised at this point. In a letter to Muller-Braun-
schweig, Freud says that he objects to all those who
'do not distinguish more clearly and cleanly between
what is psychic and what is biological' and who 'try
to establish a neat parallelism between the two,40.
The problem is that, like psychoanalysis, feminism
runs the risk of reducing one set of phenomena to an-
other - here Freud is objecting to the biologism of
Horney, Jones and Rado.
It is perhaps fitting that Juliet Mitch-
ell, the author of Psychoanalysis and Feminism, should
quote Freud's letter in her introduction to the work
of Lacan on feminine sexuality since it introduces a
number of issues which are pertinent to feminism's re-
lation to psychoanalysis on the one hand and to charges
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of biologism on the other. Monique Plaza, for exam-
ple, has argued that Irigaray does not distinguish
between what is biological and what is psychical and
that, attempting to establish a neat parallelism bet-
ween the two, she condemns women to the prison of
41their biology or anatomy- • A concern with the seem-
ingly natural differences found in biology, she says,
can only 'compound patriarchal logic and not subvert
it,42.
Such a criticism, and the question of
feminism's biologism is becoming increasingly impor-
tant, relates to those made of the other forms of fem-
inist strategy - that either they tie women ever more
firmly to the values that had been ascribed them, or
that they find some new and equally constraining id-
entity for them. Deconstructive feminism, then, in
addition to the reversalist and refusalist feminisms
noted above, runs the risk of becoming a reduction-
ism. One way of dealing with criticisms like those
of Plaza lies in the moves made by a double strategy.
It will be shown that deconstructive feminism oper-
ates just such a double strategy. The work of Biddy
Martin will be used to show how such criticisms may
be dealt with.
Martin's essay, "Feminism, Criticism and
Foucault"43, may also be used to show how deconstruc-
tive feminism deals with the question of power. This
essay provides a good example of the sort of double
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strategy which, in addition to being able to deal
with charges of naturalism, was claimed above to
both differentiate vulgar from non-vulgar feminism
and to signal the collapse of that distinction.
~artin's discussion explicitly raises the question
of ~ role of a telos in deconstructive feminism and
in her treatment of this issue allows the gap bet-
ween vulgar and non-vulgar feminism to be at once
opened and closed.
Martin begins, in Foucauldian vein, by
arguing that American Marxist feminism suffers from
a functionalist conception of both capitalism and
patriarchy: these latter are conceived as 'monolith-
ic and total systems of oppression,44. In the same
vein, she continues by suggesting that it is this very
conception of capitalism and patriarchy that makes
it impossible to 'get at the operations of power and
the possibilities for resistance in Western societies'.
Foucault's work, however, as a deconstruction of 'tra-
ditional conceptions of power', questions the history,
validity and consequences of this form of theory and
opens up a space in which feminist questions 'which
have been obscured, marginalised and/or subsumed under
the teleological projects of other theories' may be
. d4Sra1se •
Some of these questions have been raised
by Foucault himself: feminist analyses of the history
of medicine, psychiatry and education, for example,
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support and find support in Foucault's investigations
of the subjects46• It is, however, in relation to
what Martin calls 'classical liberationist approaches
to questions of sexuality and power' that she sees
the greatest lessons being learned from Foucault's
deconstructive analytics. It is also here that the
issues of a double strategy and the ultimate undeci-
dability of vulgar and non-vulgar feminisms are to be
found.
While a classical liberationist appro-
ach runs through much feminist theory, claiming on
the one hand that female sexuality is a naturally
subversive energy which has been repressed and on the
other that male sexuality is naturally aggressive and
repressive, Foucault's work would challenge any 'easy
division between a dominant and essentially repressive
discourse and one oppositional, pure voice of liber-
t. ,47alan • Although Foucault's work may consist in
just such a challenge, Martin wants to suggest that
there is a level of strategic political and historical
necessity to the classical liberationist view. This
necessity arises as a response to the 'forms of vio-
lence against women which have been ignored or accep-
48ted by the society as self-evident for too long' •
As a moment of opposition, such an approach is neces-
sary since a 'voice' different to that of male vio-
lence is needed. But, following Foucault, such an
approach also involves various theoretical and
335
strategic shortcomings.
The forces constitutive of the tension
between these two approaches consistently disturb any
simple distinction that might be made between vulgar
and non-vulgar feminism and raise similar questions
concerning the value of a telos to feminist strateg-
ies. This tension, which has so often in this essay
been seen to arise at moments crucial to the quest-
ion of the possibility of feminism, is the topic of
the central section of Martin's essay.
While there is a need for a different
voice, a female voice, something with which to oppo-
se male dominated discourse, there is the danger of
that voice or those voices subsuming 'difference •••
under the conceptual and strategic grasp of a unitary
identity of woman,49. There is the danger, that is,
of falling foul of the objections that were noted
above with regard to the first and second forms of
feminist strategy, that a new tyranny is established
by the new 'experts'. So, some farm of a telos is
at once desired and to be avoided: the difference '
that is to be presented by feminism must not be al-
lowed to be subsumed under a new and equally con-
straining identity.
Although nat going as far as this essay,
which claims that deconstruction is already a form of
non-vulgar feminism, Martin says that feminism can be
deconstructivel2, showing haw phallocentric culture
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'appropriat [esJ difference, nam Ce:] it opposition
and subsum ~sJ it under the "Identity of ~lan'"51.
And, although not going so far in the other direc-
tion to say, with Bartowsky, for example, that post-
structuralist males are effectively precluded from
dealing with the effects of marginalisation since
they have always occupied a privileged position with
regard to speech and 'Man,~2, Martin suggests that
female feminists are consciously involved and there-
fore situated quite differently to men in the ques-
tion of women's 'exclusion from struggles over rep-
resentation,53. It is thus the 'necessity of a
doubled strategy' that concerns Martin in this essay.
That is, female specificity, informed
by the history of male violence that has shaped it,
has just as valid a part in deccnstructive feminism
as the deconstruction of any form of specificity,
that specificity being seen as potentially a mascu-
line and repressive value 'in the end'. So, the
classical liberationist approach, of constructing
some natural feminine essence that is other or dif-
ferent than masculinity is, on this deconstructive
view, valid insofar as it is necessary to oppose some-
thing to the phallocentric version of 'Man'.
However, Foucault's 'deconstructive meth-
odology' warns against the 'commitment to any con-
fessional mode as necessarily liberating'; he pro-
vides an immanent critique of 'a search for ~
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authentic female voice or the sexuality,54. With ref-
erence to the last paragraph, then, Martin says that
'our deconstructions are neither identical nor syn-
chronous with those of the male avant-garde in spite
of some very significant points of convergence in our
interests,55.
Some of Kristeva's work may also be used
to illustrate the workings of this 'double strategy'.
She says, for example, that for the various women's
groups it is a question of moving from patriarchal
society 'towards - who knows?,S6. There is no telos
in any simple sense to be arrived at and no ideal the
realisation of which will itself secure feminism's
success. However, in the same essay, she also says
that 'there are still many goals which women may
achieve' and goes on to name a few of them: 'freedom
of abortion and contraception, day-care centres for
children, equality on the job etc'S?
As in Martin's case, no-one is suggest-
ing that female circumcision, for example, is a matter
for the endless freeplay of deconstructive parody:
there is historical and political necessity behind
women's abhorrence of such practices. However, in
order that women are not subsequently constrained by
an alternative and equally vicious set of practices,
the ending of these practices cannot be the end of
the strategy. Irigaray, too, may be said to be using
anatomy as a strategic ploy to show how, even within
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biology, the question of female sexuality is not as
simple as is assumed.
So, this 'double strategy' renders the
value of the telos to deconstructive feminism unde-
cidable: recognised as being both produced and des-
troyed in ec- centric economy, it is at once a neces-
sary moment and something to be treated with care.
Since this is the case, it is also the case that the
difference between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism
has also become, or is revealed as, undecidable.
Deconstructive feminism partakes of moments of vulgar
feminism in that it adopts a telos, but it ultimate-
ly becomes undecidable in the terms of vulgar femin-
ism in that it adopts the telos only for strategic
purposes. In this way is the gap between the two
forms of feminism opened and closed simultaneously;
like the hymen, this deconstructive form of feminism
is radically undecidable and cannot be contained by
that which it subverts.
Conclusion
It has been argued, then, that this
third form of feminist strategy alone constitutes a
transgressive or critical discourse that will not be
simply and immediately appropriated by that which it
attempts to critique. In that it is neither a form
of reversal, amounting to little more than a 'clam-
orous declaration of the antithesis,58, nor a form
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of refusal, a simple opposition which, as opposition,
is already swallowed up in the discourse which it
claims to have refused59, deconstruction does not dif-
fer from and oppose phallocentric economy in the way
that difference and opposition are organised in phal-
locentric economy. Consequently, and like Nietzsche's
self-differentiating, noted in chapter three, it con-
stitutes non-vulgar feminism, a feminism the value and
identity of which is not derived from its phallocen-
tric difference from and opposition to masculinity.
That is, centric economy was said to be
a matter of a relationship between identity, differ-
ence and opposition. These latter were organised in
a particular way, such that stable identities and val-
ues were generated by virtue of the relation to the
centre which oriented the differences between the
other terms by means of opposition and hierarchy.
In that centric economy was traditionally or vulgar-
ly associated with masculinity, this economic organi-
sation of identity, difference and opposition was cal-
led phallocentric economy.
Phallocentric economy organised differ-
ence and opposition in a particular way. Thus any dis-
course attempting to be different from and opposed to
(transgressive of) phallocentric economy which was
different from it and opposed to it in the ways that
phallocentric economy organised difference and oppo-
sition could not, ultimately, be transgressive of that
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economy. In that such differentiation and opposition
were only those to be found in phallocentric economy,
a discourse that made use of them could only be a
vulgar feminism. As such, it would be just another
version of phallocentrism, of the masculine concern.
And, as ~, it would already have been appropriated
by, rendered harmless because proper to, the masculine
concern.
Thus the sort of difference and opposition
exemplified by both forms of reversal consists, as
their names suggest, in but a reversal of the privi-
lege accorded one of the t~o terms of the hierarchy.
And the sort of difference and opposition exemplified
in both forms of refusal consists in the rejection,
the simple negation, as it were, of the centre of the
economy that is being contested. In both cases, dif-
ference and opposition are organised in relation to
the value of the centre. Both sorts of feminism, then,
both forms of strategy, are vulgar feminisms.
They correspond, thus, to the two forms
of reactive feminism noted in chapter two. It will
be recalled that in Spurs!Eperons, Derrida attempts
to formalise, for ~hat Argyros calls pedagogical pur-
poses, the organisation of women in the work of Niet-
zsche. That is, the multiplicity of females in that
work, which would form ec- centric economy and who
have no stable identity or value that issues from a
relation to the centre until they are mastered by
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male discipline, the whip, may be formalised 'in
th l""t f h d"f" t" ,61order to mark e ~m~ 0 suc a co ~ ~ca ~on •
Three positions or propositions were
found the principle of which could be related in a
number of finite statements, even though the 'heter-
ogeneity' of Nietzsche's women could not be so order-
ed. In the first of the positions accorded woman,
she is given the value or identity of a figure of
falsehood. Lacking the penis, and therefore the rel-
ation to phallogocentric values in general, woman is
and women are debased and despised by man, who offers
his phallus and his privileged relation to phallogo-
centric values as the only worthy possessions.
In the second position, woman is and wo-
men are again debased and despised. This time, how-
ever, it is as a figure of truth. As in Heidegger or
Lacan, for example, truth is not wholly to be found
or wholly to be said. Rather, some part of it, or
all of it, is lacking. Woman, as the absence or lack
of the penis, is thus in a privileged position with
regard to man and phallomorphic values, since they are
'nearer' or more proper to the value of truth. Man,
as possessor of the penis, debases and despises woman,
who is perceived to be nearer or more proper to the
values he ~ould like to have such a relation to.
The sort of feminism that corresponds
to the first position is that of reversal. Where
woman is said to be inferior or of supplementary
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status because she lacks the penis, this sort of fem-
inism says that women, too, have the value they have
because of the relation to the penis or phallomorphic
values and that she is of at least equal value. That
is, whether the reversal is that of the supposed pos-
ition of women with regard to phallomorphic values
or of the supposed position of specifically feminine
values, this form of strategy sets up phallocentric
economy. This supposedly feminist economy may privi-
lege women's relation to the (vulgar) penis or pro-
vide an equally vulgar counter-penis, but it still
constitutes a reactive and vulgar feminism.
The sort of feminism that corresponds to
the second position is that of refusal. Where women
are debased because they represent an economy to which
men cannot have full access, feminism either says that
this economy is proper to women or it says that all
centric economy is phallocentric. In the first case,
a particular centred economy is refused and in the
second, all centred economy is refused.
And the sort of feminism that corresponds
to the third of these positions is that of deconstruc-
tion. In the first two, women were debased and des-
pised, as both truth and untruth, because of their
castration, because of the lack of a relation to the
privileged phallomorphic values. Woman, then, is
twice castration, twice the absence of a privileged
relation to phallomorphic.values. However, beyond
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what Derrida has called this 'double negation,62,
beyond this dialectic, the relation to the centre is
rendered undecidable. This is the position that cor-
responds to ec- centric economy, where value and id-
entity are at once produced and destroyed in differ-
~nce.
That is, in phallocentric economy and
the two 'feminisms' noted above, value and identity
are governed and generated by the relation to the
transcendental signified of the penis and phallomorphic
values in general. Rather than reverse or refuse
either the privilege involved in centric economy or
the idea of centric economy itself, this strategy at-
tempts to show how the value of the centre is itself
only produced (and destroyed) by its relations to all
other terms in economy. The deconstructive move here
is to show how the relation to the privileged values
that constitute the centre in centric economy both
produces and destroys the identity and value of all
terms and that the value and identity of the centre
is itself similarly produced and destroyed.
Beyond the 'double negation' of woman in
the first two positions, then, and beyond the reactive
feminisms to which they give rise, the identity of
woman is rendered undecidable. It is both produced
and destroyed by the relation to castration which is
itself something the value of which is produced and
destroyed in ec- centric economy. That is, woman's
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relation to the centre has been shown to both pro-
duce and destroy any value or identity that might be
ascribed, it is undecidable in ec- centric economy.
And, where identity, difference and op-
position are ordered in centric economy to produce
stable, self-identical values, this third form of fem-
inism, informed by ec- centric economy, differs
from and is opposed to centric economy in a way that
is not that in which difference and opposition are
organised in centric economy. It is therefore a
critical and transgressive discourse that will not be
appropriated by, rendered proper and harmless to,
phallocentric economy.
Finally, the treatment of the various
feminist strategies in this chapter may be compared
~ith Culler's discussion of 'reading as a woman' in
his On Deconstruction63• He. too, divides the mul-
tiplicity of feminisms into three categories or mo-
ments and, although these moments do not always cor-
respond with the a priori divisions in this chapter,
they consist, nevertheless, in elements from those
divisions. It is, however, precisely the account of
how these different elements relate to one another,
the question as to how the differences between them
are to be dealt with, that distinguishes the account
given here from Culler's.
Culler's first moment of feminist
strategy consists in a mixture of the two sorts of
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reversalist strategy noted above. The first kind of
reversal is evinced by those women readers interested
in the 'situations and psychology of female charac-
ters,64. And the second is seen in that form of fem-
inist criticism which 'puts itself in the position
that phallic criticism usually attempts to OCCUpy,65.
Culler's second moment consists in what has been pre-
sented in this chapter as the second form of refusal.
It is the appeal to a potential female experience
which would escape the limitations of the male and
then the developing of questions which could actual-
. th t . 66~se a exper1ence •
So, where Culler's modes of feminism
first privileges actual female experience and sec-
ond privileg~potential female experience, the third
moment he describes attempts to show that the concepts
used in the first two moments are themselves products
of phallocentric economy. The third form of feminism
he describes, that is, attempts to show that all exper-
ience has this duplicitous character - 'always already
occurred and ••• still to be produced,6? Although
it was seen in chapter one that he refers to the 'gap'
between 'work on or against the institution' and
'philosophical deconstruction,68, and although it has
appeared in the difference between the first/second
and the third forms of feminism, Culler gives no
account of its workings.
As Martin has shown and as seen
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throughout this essay, the 'gap' demands that a trans-
gressive discourse/practice be a 'double strategy'.
And this means that some form of either reversal or
refusal, which maRe use of and partake in centric eco-
nomy, is a necessary 'phase' of deconstructive femin-
ism. Consequently, it is not the concern with the
duplicitous character of experience that is 'decon-
structive'; empiricists and neo-positivists from Hume
to Husserl have dealt with that without anyone calling
them deconstructive feminists. It is rather the rev-
ersal and displacement that such a notion may be
made to effect within concrete economies, without be-
ing reduced to centric economy, that provides the
transgressive force it possesses.
This is clearly not to say that Culler
is mistaken in his account - it is simply to say that
the 'gap', the production and destruction of the telos
or other transcendental signified, manifests itself
in the treatment of the differences between the var-
ious forms of feminist strategy. It is that decon-
structive feminism can bridge the gap, without reducing
it, that constitutes it as a transgressive discourse/
practice.
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINISM II
Where it was noted in chapter one that
the word 'feminism' was used in at least two senses
and that the various relations of forces and desires
that surrounded it were to be found at numerous strat-
egic points throughout the essay, so the word 'possi-
bility' also has at least two senses. It is the task
of the present chapter to summarise the events of the
preceding chapters, to account for the various moves
involved in the task of ascertaining what sort of
thing an '-ism' would have to be in order for it to
be a feminism. And it will note again the other
sense of possibility - the sense in which feminism,
as it has been accounted for here, already relates
to other, indeed all, economies in which identities
are produced, distributed and legitimated.
So, chapter one introduced what contempor-
ary feminism conceived as its problems as problems of
economy, power and desire. Through a reading of 5au-
ssure, chapter two introduced the matter of economy
as a matter of a relationship between identity, dif-
ference and some form of opposition. And, through a
reading of Derrida's reading of Saussure, it explained
the tension between centric and ec- centric economy,
along with the versions of power and desire to be
found there, as the difference between phallocentric
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and feminist economy.
It was then a question of accounting for
how what was presented as a non-vulgar feminism was
possible: what were the issues and moves that consti-
tuted a non-vulgar feminism? The ideas of identity,
difference and opposition, of economy, which could,
to put it as simply 8S possible, be either centric or
phallocentric on the one hand or ec- centric and non-
vulgarly feminist on the other, were also seen to be
the stuff of which dialectics was made. By looking
at the works of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger who,
it was suggested, were the cardinal figures in the
development of non-vulgarly feminist thought, it was
possible to see what they did with economy and how they
prepared for the possibility of feminism.
Their positions on the matter of identity,
difference and opposition and thus their relation to
a non-vulgar feminism provided a kind of genealogy,
not without its occlusions and obscurities, for the
work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari.
The inclusion of Adorno alongside Heidegger in chap-
ter four provided the opportunity to compare 'contem-
porary French Nietzscheanism' with a strand of another
form of critique that was influenced by Hegel, 'Ger-
man Marxist critical theory'.
Chapters five, six and seven looked at
the works of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari
as they illuminated the workings of identity,
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difference and opposition in econoffiY,power and desire.
The tensions between centred and ec- centric economy
within their own works and the ways each dealt with
aspects of non-vulgar feminism that the others did not
were also dealt with in these chapters. As ec- cen-
tric economy could not be simply differentiated from
and opposed to centric economy, so these chapters
showed that 'contemporary French Nietzscheanism' could
not present a united front.
Having accounted for the various aspects
of the work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and
Guattari as non-vulgar feminists, chapter eight began
the attempt to 'fill the gap' between vulgar and non-
vulgar feminism. It did this by showing how the con-
cern with such ethereal entities as identity, differ-
ence and opposition manifested themselves in 'concrete'
economy. The work of Freud on female sexuality and
of Gallop on the relations between feminism and Lacan
were chosen to illustrate these issues since the pos-
itions of Freud and Lacan with regard to female sex-
uality are matters of some concern to both vulgar and
not-sa-vulgar feminism.
Chapter nine continued and explicitly
commented on this task of 'filling the gap' between
a non-vulgar and philosophical feminism and the actual
struggles of women by outlining the various forms of
critical strategy that are available to feminism in
the light of the workings of economy and the workings
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of power and desire within it. 'Deconstructive fem-
inism', which was informed by the tension between cen-
tric and ec- centric economy, the simultaneous pro-
duction and destruction of value, was alone in terms
of non-vulgar feminism. The other two forms, refusal
and reversal, were seen to reduce to versions of vul-
gar masculinity in that they each posited a simple
telos as specifically and properly feminist. Decon-
strcutiue feminism could posit the value of a telos
to its strategies but only as both produced and des-
troyed in ec- centric economy.
Having accounted for the possibility of
feminism, of a critical and transgressive discourse/
practice that will not be simply and unproblematically
assimilated into and rendered harmless by what it at-
tempts to critique and transgress, it remains for this
chapter to look at the other sense of the word 'possi-
bility' in 'the possibility of feminism' and account
briefly for its own position with regard to economy.
It was suggested in chapter one that it
might be considered 'arbitrary' and thus 'improper'
to talk of a discourse/practice that would critique
and transgress, but not be appropriated by, centric
economy as a feminism. This was because the produc-
tion and legitimation of value anc identity in centric
economy was not only the or a masculine affair but
was also solidary with white and bourgeois interests,
for example. The operations that were to be found in
351
what was called phallocentric economy were also to be
found everywhere else that value and identity were
produced and legitimated - in the treatment of the
old and the unemployed as well as that of the mentally
and physically handicapped and disabled, in race-rel-
ations, politics and so on.
A number of reasons were produced to ac-
count for the choice of the name 'feminism' for such
a discourse and they need not be repeated here. How-
ever, that the same operations are to be found in all
these other areas means that a similarly critical and
transgressive discourse/practice is relevant to those
other areas. The possibility exists, then, that fem-
inism, in the sense developed in this essay, is the
sort of '-ism' that is of use to all disadvantaged or
marginalised groups.
And, indeed, elements of a 'deconstruc-
tive feminism' may be found in the strategies employ-
ed by groups working with various supplementary or dis-
advantaged groups. Just two of the various groups are
those concerned with the welfare of the physically
disabled and the mentally handicapped and ill.
Before looking, finally, at how this essay itself rel-
ates to a 'deconstructive feminism', the relevance of
these examples will be examined.
There is an advertisement which has ap-
d· th l. d t 't' hpeare ln e press alme a recrUl lng nurses w 0
will care for the mentally ill and handicapped. It
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consists in two pictures and a text. One of the pic-
tures shows a man, untidily dressed, with a contorted
expression and knotted fingers. The other picture
shows a man who is relaxed and neatly dressed, the
sort of man anyone might expect to see around town.
The text asks, 'Which of these men is mentally ill?'.
It then goes on to explain that, contrary
to popular belief, which would 'naturally' pick the
unkempt for man with the wierd expression, it is the
tidy, apparently 'normal' man who is mentally ill.
The other one is, in fact, mentally handicapped.
So, in addition to revealing the work of metaphysics,
which results in constructing those with mental prob-
lems in general as totally 'o~her' than 'us', this
advertisement shows that those with a particular type
of mental problem are, for all intents and purposes,
just like 'us'.
The demonstration that what is thought to
be a position of deviant 5upplementarity is actually
a position that inhabits the norm is a tactic that is
also found in the work of those dealing with the soc-
ial construction of physical disability. One argument
to be found in this area is that if public buildings,
for example, are so constructed~as to ~ake it impos-
sible for someone in a wheelchair to use them, then
it is no ~urprise that they are considered disabled.
Consequently, it is no surprise that people who
cannot so manage these buildings are seen as different
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and exiled to positions of marginality with regard to
the norm.
strategies like these, which point out,
in the manner of Cohn Bendit's 'nous sommes toutes
indesirables' or the Italian labour organisation who's
slogan is 'the margins are at the centre', that what
is constructed in society as undeniably other and
supplementary is also part of what has been construc-
ted as the norm, may be said to illustrate the work-
ings of 'deconstructive feminism' in areas other than
those usually considered proper to feminism.
The all too brief reference to other areas
in which such strategies may be found and the sugges-
tion of the idea that 'we are all at least potentially
mentally ill or physically disabled' is clearly insuf-
ficient. However, having accounted for the critical
or transgressive force of such strategy, the job of
examining how other concretely transgressive practices
are, are not or may in future be informed by 'decon-
structive feminism' has been proposed as a task to be
accomplished.
So, having summarised the various events
in the development of this thesis, having elucidated
the second sense of 'possibility' in 'the possibility
of feminism' and having illustrated how the concerns
and practices of a non-vulgar feminism are to be seen
in areas other than those usually considered proper
to feminism, this conclusion will account for the
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essay as a ~hole's relation to non-vulgar feminism.
This task will be accomplished by discussing the treat-
ment afforded the various dichotomies, differences or
oppositions in terms of which this essay itself makes
sense. It will be seen that, as non-vulgar feminism
was seen to exist as a tension between centric and ec-
centric economy, so this essay, dealing with the pro-
duction and destruction of those dichotomies, like-
wise exists as a tension, a non-vulgar feminism.
In much work in this sort of area, lip-
service is commonly paid to the idea that Foucauldian,
Derridean or anti-Oedipal economics are ongoing reflex-
ive activities and not, therefore, to be treated as
systems 'capable of summary description,2. Equally
common is the way in which such dichotomies, while
recognised as being in some way a problem, are allowed
to perform their various tasks unhindered. It is as
if the problematic status of these distinctions is
permitted on the proviso that it and they will be
dealt with later and elsewhere but that for the mom-
ent the business in hand can proceed.
The distinction 'activity/system' will
not be dealt with here except insofar as it will bec-
orne apparent that, along with all the other oppositions
in terms of which this and every other text makes
sense, it is at once opened and closed by the work of
ec- centric economy. That is, there are many oppositions
in terms of which this text itself makes sense.
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Moreover, the treatment of those oppositions, itself
presented as a matter of economy, is said to disting-
uish, among other things, vulgar from non-vulgar fem-
inism.
However, it will be seen that all of the
various dichotomies which arise in this essay, (femin-
ist/non-feminist, vulgar/non-vulgar, metaphysical/non-
metaphysical, centric/ec- centric, telic/non-telic
and so on), are subject and subjected to being both
made possible and precluded by the treatment of dif-
ference that this essay adopts. In addition to deal-
ing with the work of difference in various texts, then,
the concepts/oppositions which this text uses to deal
with that work are themselves shown to be inhabited
by the sort of tension that at once produces and des-
troys them. In that feminism was shown to also encom-
pass non-feminism, (chapter one), metaphysics to con-
sist in non-metaphysical moments, (chapter two), and
so on, this essay may be said to 'practise what it
preaches' insofar as it is possible in a text of this
kind.
So, housework, for example, on what
might inadvisedly be called a vulgar account, would
be described as a thoroughly centrist affair. The
attempt to achieve and maintain order in one's own
and proper home seems only to have any value on the
presumption that ownness, property and good order
are themselves both possible and desirable. The will
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to housework, that is, seems predicated on the values
of self-identity and self-presence which must be pro-
tected from the insidious effects of that which threat-
ens the home from within.
However, it can be seen, on what might,
equally inadvisedly, be referred to as a non-vulgar
t~t
account,~the notion and practice of housework is in-
vested by various forces, none of which assumes a
governing role. The value and identity of housework
is both produced and destroyed by the differences and
relations between those forces. It can be seen, for
example, that feminism or the sort of philosophical
activity that has been characterised as housework
so far operates not only in what might be expected
to be its own home but also in places which might be
thought to be most improper to it. Feminism was seen
to apply to all other economies, not just that one
usually labelled 'the feminine concern'.
The tension between centric and ec- cen-
tric economy, which demands that neither can be simply
or decidably presented, manifests itself in the ten-
sian between the various senses of housework. Thus
the value or meaning of housework, dealing with the
production and destruction of value and identity, is
itself produced and destroyed in the differences and
relations between forces that constitute the economy
of differance. Housework, then, partaking of both
centric and ec- centric investments, is strictly
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undecidable with regard to the various dichotomies
and dichotomous values used to describe it.
At the risk of labouring these points,
at least one other area where the tension in which
this essay exists manifests itself may be pointed
out. In the essay, "Cogito and the history of mad-
ness"3, Derrida reviews Foucault's Madness and Civil-
isation. He argues that Foucault charts the devel-
opment of the treatment of madness in the terms of
Western reason and that this must necessarily reduce
the 'otherness' of madness. The 'force' of madness,
as the 'other' of Western reason, the Cogito, cannot
but be domesticated by being described in the terms
of that reason.
Similar claims might be made concerning
this essay. It might be said, for example, that it
discusses and accounts for the possibility of femin-
ism in the language of phallocentrism. It might also
be said that the essay's having produced as a doctor-
al thesis, a text that is written to conform to numer-
ous standards and rules of both content and form, and
which is, moreover, to be defended by means of the
author's 'living voice', qualifies it as a product
of the mast classical phallogocentrism.
However, in that centric economy has
been seen only to make sense on the basis of the
occlusion of its non-origin in ec- centric economy
and that the forms of economy cannot be simply presented
358
in themselves, such claims are at once pertinent and
disqualified. They are pertinent in that this essay
must make use of various terms and practices, for
strategic purposes, as if they were unproblematic
with regard to the questions of presence and absence
noted above. And they are disqualified in that those
terms and practices are shown to be of strategic use
only, both produced and destroyed in the ec- centric-
ity that this essay also attempts to partake of.
That is, the oppositions used in this
text to make sense of the treatment of difference
found in other texts are themselves shown to be inhab-
ited by the very tensions which, it has been argued,
both produce and destroy the terms of those oppositions.
Consequently, insofar as it is also argued that ec-
centric economy, the conflict of forces which at once
produces and destroys value, is non-vulgarly feminist
economy, the treatment of difference to be found in
this essay is itself non-vulgarly feminist. Similarly,
insofar as its value as non-vulgarly feminist ~ both
produced and destroyed, the essay also partakes of
vulgarly masculine moments.
There are, doubtless, other questions,
other issues and oppositions 'within' the text which
have not been dealt with here and which may prove to
be unsuspected funds of phallocentrism. The role and
voice of the author, for example, has not been dealt
with in any way. However, that further tasks remain,
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that the possibility of feminism has not been ex-
hausted, is perhaps to be expected and is certainly
not conceived as a failing.
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AF TERWORD
In the 'Preface' a first 'precautionary'
attempt was made to clarify the relationship between
'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminisms. This relation-
ship is also the subject of this 'Afterword'. Here,
though, it is to be discussed in terms of the follow-
ing related topics:
1. Alternative readings of Nietzsche;
2. 'Reversal'/'Refusal' feminism and 'non-vulgar
feminism' ;
3. The telos of feminism and local ends;
4. Practical or strategic demands that determine
the type of feminism adopted.
There are, obviously, other readings of
Nietzsche beside this one. Some of those other in-
terpretations have been noted on page 88. Although
it is not and cannot be part of this essays brief to
claim that the interpretation it chooses to explore
is somehow truer or better than any other, it has
been suggested that account be taken of a possible
'feminist' objection.
Basically, the objection is that some,
if not all, of Nietzsche's pronouncements on the
subject of women are anti-women, that he is often
virulently misogynist and that he can tharefore be
no feminist. In a little more detail, tha objection
bears strong resemblances to that advanced by
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Adorno, noted above on page 142. Adorno begins with
the premise that Nietzsche's 'scrutiny stopped short'
of women; that despite an acknowledged critical ener-
gy, when it comes to the subject of women Nietzsche
simply takes over 'a second hand and unverified
image of feminine nature from the ••• civilisation
he otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted,l. As a res-
ult, Nietzsche's comments on women are actively anti-
women and he can be no feminist.
In the face of Nietzsche's seeming miso-
gyny it will certainly not do to suggest that he is
being ironic. As argued above on page 337, it would
be tasteless at best to offer endless ironic playas
the appropriate behaviour to be adopted when confron-
ted by either what Adorno calls the scars of social
mutilation2 or the physical mutilation that this
essay has already referred to on page 337. It is,
of course, not impossible that Nietzsche himself
went too far with his 'Whip' 'joke'.
It is, alternatively, only slightly less
unsatisfactory to suggest that Nietzsche was provi-
ding an analysis of the linguistic and cultural pro-
duction of the value and identity of woman in society.
The much used quotes to the effect that man 'created
woman out of a rib of his ideal,3 and that truth is
a 'mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and anthro-
pomorphisms,4 would be wheeled out to support such
a claim. Even such a mobile army of Nietzsche Quotes
might have trouble countering what he says of
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independent women, however: 'Woman wants to be
independent: and to that end she is beginning to
enlighten men about "woman as such" - this is one
of the worst developments in the general uglifica-
tion of Europe'S.
This claim, picked almost at random,
that feminism is contributing to the 'general ug-
lification of Europe', could be considered fairly
conclusive evidence of how unsympathetic Nietzsche
is to the cause of feminism. However, in the course
of an interview with Christie MacOonald6 which deals
with the notions of woman's proper place, woman's
proper identity, Oerrida proposes what may well be
a more successful account of Nietzsche's pronounce-
ments.
'Can one not say', Oerrida says, 'in
Nietzsche's language, that there is a "reactive"
feminism, and that a certain historical necessity
often puts this form of feminism in power in today's
organised struggles. It is this kind of "reactive"
feminism that Nietzsche mocks and not woman or
women'? He goes on to say that, in the most 'per-
functory' cases of the mis-, or as he has it 'non-
"readings' of Spurs/Eperons, the 'simplification
reverts to the isolation of Nietzsche's violently
anti feminist statements (directed first against
reactive ••• feminism ••• ), pulling them out ••• of
the movement and system that I try to reconstitute'S.
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That is, although Oerrida has perhaps
simplified the matter himself here, there are "reac-
tive" forms of feminism, (what this essay has for
strategic reasons called 'vulgar' feminism), which,
in themselves, will not necessarily advance women's
causes. Oerrida is suggesting, then, that Nietzsche
is against, and often, it must be said, violently
against, this form of feminism when it is proposed
as any form of rigid telos or one proper way for
feminism to proceed. It is the system and movement,
differance with an 'a', which 'vulgar' feminism and
,
'non-readings' of Spurs/Eperons reduce to an identity,
that Derrida and this essay try to counter.
Alternatively, and this is where Derrida
may have simplified matters, Derrida says that such
'reactive' or 'vulgar' feminism has been put in power
in today's struggles as a result of a 'certain his-
torical necessity'. He says this, moreover, in a
tone that does not appear to be entirely approving.
This essay, however, has endeavoured to show that such
so-called 'vulgar' or 'reactive' feminism may well be
entirely justified by 'historical necessity': the
discussion of the work of Biddy Martin between pages
332 and 338, for example, is intended to demonstrate
just this. Thus, following on from the 'Preface',
the two forms of so-called 'vulgar' feminism, rever-
sal and refusal, may well be and indeed very often are
justified for a particular strategic task that is
demanded by historical or political necessity.
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Insofar as this is the case, it cannot also be the
case that 'vulgar' or 'reactive' feminism is inten-
ded in any simple or simplified derogatory sense.
What was referred to in the 'Preface',
and what has been referred to throug~out the essay,
as the 'undecidability' of 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar'
also has consequences for the idea of the telos of
feminism and the strategic use of each 'sort' of
feminism. It would, perhaps, be useful to take
another look at those consequences. The following
should be read with Chapter Nine especially in
mind.
The ultimate 'undecidability' of 'vulgar'
and 'non-vulgar' feminism means that reversalist and
refusalist strategies (which have been seen in Oer-
rida's work as the first stage of a deconstruction9)
are no less a part of and no less proper to dec on-
structive feminism than what has been called, by
Martin as well as in this essay, deconstruction.
Thus, there cannot be, as Martin and Kristeva have
been seen to point out, a talos to feminism in a
strict sense - at which point feminism could declare
itself finished and completed. But there can, indeed
must, as Martin and Kristeva have also been seen to
make clear, be local or strategic tasks to be achie-
ved. As Kristeva, for example, has said, although
feminism is a move towards 'Who knows?', although
there can be no Hegelian or Platonic last place for
feminism, 'there are still many goals which women
365
can achieve: freedom of abortion and contraception,
day-care centres for children, equality on the job
t ,10e c •
Thus local exigencies may demand that
any number of so-called 'vulgar' practices or
strategies are necessary in order to bring about
any particular effect, be it freedom of abortion or
equal pay, but care should perhaps be exercised in
order to prevent what Martin is attempting to pre-
vent, the setting up of a new tyranny under new
11'experts' • It may be this point, that a new ld-
entity would prove equally constraining and certainly
no less metaphysical, that Nietzsche is referring to
when he objects so strongly to the idea of 'woman as
such'. It is in this sense that this essay argues
that a telos is at once to be desired and avoided,
that value is at once produced and destroyed in
ec- centric economy.
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4. Nietzsche, quoted by Spivak in Derrida, OG p. xxii.
5. Nietzsche, BGE, § 232, pp. 144-5
6. "Choreographies", Diacritics, Vol 12, Summer 19B2
PP. 66-76.
7. lb. o , 68
B. Ib. o , 69
9. See Derrida, Pas, p 41, for example.
10. Kristeva in N~P. 141
11. Martin, see P:-335 above.
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